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ABSTRACT
The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement was signed in Arusha Tanzania in August 
2000. This was a result of countless efforts involving countless players; a process which took 
nearly six years to find a durable solution to the decades - long Burundi crisis. Tanzania 
government is one of these players. 
This study therefore focuses on the role of Tanzania in the Burundi’s Peace Process. The 
primary argument put forth by the study is that Tanzania played multiple roles including mediation 
and facilitation, hosting peace talks and Burundi refugees. The study argues that whereas moral 
obligation could be counted for Tanzania’s involvement, the negative impacts of the Burundi crisis 
to Tanzania were central to its engagement. The negative impacts were perceived by Tanzanian 
government authorities as a threat to its national interests, hence warranted a direct response.
The study acknowledges that Tanzania’s mediation and facilitation roles were marred by two 
controversial issues namely; being perceived as ‘biased’ (in favour of the Hutus and hostile to the 
Tutsis) and also as one which favoured military solutions to the conflict as opposed to other 
approaches advocated by other players. These allegations are discussed to determine their 
authenticity and conclusions are made. 
The study also examines whether or not the coming of Nelson Mandela (and South Africa for 
that matter) did influence Tanzania’s role and the conclusion is that it did influence because 
competition for influence between the two countries was obvious when Mandela replaced 
Mwalimu Nyerere as the major facilitator. The point raised here is that whereas Tanzania wanted 
to preserve and continue with its influence in the sub-region, South Africa on its part wanted to use 
that opportunity to penetrate both politically and diplomatically on the one hand and consolidate 
its economic presence in the sub-region on the other hand.  
The study asserts that although Burundi has managed to sign the Arusha Accord, secure 
ceasefire agreements between the Government and the rebel movements and successfully 
completed the transitional period, the country still faces many challenges which it needs to 
overcome if it is to build a new, peaceful and united society.  In this regard, the study recommends 
continued support and responsibility by regional states and the international community coupled 
with close monitoring of the situation in the country. Besides, the study recognises that Tanzania’s 
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1CHAPTER ONE
 INTRODUCTION
Burundi is a small country situated in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. It is a landlocked state, 
sharing borders with Tanzania on the East and the South, Democratic Republic of Congo on the 
West and Rwanda on the North. It also enjoys about 2000 square kilometers of Lake Tanganyika 
waters on its South Western part. Burundi was under colonial rule from 1888 to 1962.1The 
colonisation of Burundi by the Germans, though started in 1888, was completed in 1900 and lasted 
up to1918. Together with Rwanda and Tanganyika, they were colonised under German East Africa-
a German colonial agency. Thereafter, it became a trustee territory under the Belgian colonial 
administration until it was granted its independence on the 1st of July 1962. 
Though historically, its people were leading a peaceful life, since independence Burundi has 
experienced a turbulent history of ethnic violence. The most notable incidents are those of 1965, 
1972, 1988, 1991 and 1993 which followed the assassination of President Melchoir Ndadaye.2
Burundi further experienced its first military rule on 26th November 1966 when Michael 
Micombero staged a bloodless coup which ousted the monarchy. Since then, it became under 
military dictatorship which held the monopoly of the country’s politics as well as economy. This 
resulted into ethnic violence characterised by coup d’etat, counter coup d’ etat, mass killings, 
assassination of prominent politicians and political exiles.3
However, the country had also experienced political-ethnic violence during the end of 
colonialism, especially in early 1960s with the assassination of Louis Rwegasore, a Tutsi nationalist 
leader and a prime minister-elect, in October 1961.4 The political instability of Burundi can also be 
observed in the number of prime ministers it has had between 1962 and 1966.Within that period, 
Burundi had seven prime ministers of whom four were Tutsis and three Hutus. Of the three Hutus, 
two were assassinated.5 The most recent crisis is the one which led to the assassination of President 
Ndadaye in October 1993. Unlike in the previous conflicts, this attracted a wide international 
attention. This led to a third party intervention to resolve the conflict. The peace process involved 
many internal and external actors. Together they have put their efforts to find a durable solution to 
  
1 Mpangala, G. “Burundi and her Society” in Mpangala, G & Mwansasu, B (eds): Beyond Conflict in Burundi, Mwalimu 
Nyerere Foundation, Dar es salaam. 2004, pp. 31-38 
2 Gamaha,J, Matoroka, S, Nditije,C , Ntahombaye, P & Sindayizeruka.O. “Burundi” in Adebayo, A (ed.): Comprehending 
and Mastering African Conflict: The Search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance, African Centre for Strategic 
Studies and Development-ACDESS,Zed Publishers, London. 1999,  p. 81 
3 Maundi ,M. : Initiating Entry into Mediation in Internal Conflict, An Unpublished PHD Dissertation submitted to the John
Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland.  2000,  p.77
4 Ndarubagiye, L.: Burundi :The Origins of Hutu-Tutsi Conflict, Nairobi. 1995, pp. 27-28
5 Mpangala, G.: Ethnic Conflicts in the Region of the Great Lakes: Origins and Prospects for Change, Institute of Kiswahili 
Research, University of Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam.2000, pp.74 -77  
2the intractable conflict facing the country for over thirty years. Among these actors is Tanzania. 
Therefore the purpose of this study is to establish the role of Tanzania in the Burundi peace process.              
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In order to achieve the said purpose, the study has formulated four research questions as the basis 
of the research. These questions are:
· What have been Tanzania’s relations with Burundi over time?
· Why and how has Tanzania been at the centre of Burundi’s Peace Process?
· What is the role of Tanzania in the Burundi’s peace process and what factors have determined 
Tanzania’s assumption of such role? 
· Did change of mediators, from Julius Nyerere of Tanzania to Nelson Mandela of South Africa 
affect Tanzania’s role in the Burundi peace process? If so, why     and how? 
SCOPE AND LIMITATION OF STUDY
The research is limited to the study of the role of Tanzania in the Burundi Peace Process from 
1993 to mid 2006. In the study, different phases of that process will be identified and Tanzania’s 
roles will be examined. In doing so, the study will critically investigate Tanzania’s participation in 
different levels of the Burundi peace process: national, regional and international which is 
considered as very significant. For example, Tanzania’s active involvement in the Regional Peace 
Initiative for Burundi, its membership at the United Nations Security Council as well as its 
contribution to the formation of the UN Peace-building Commission which is instrumental to the 
post-conflict Burundi. Domestically, the research shall look at Tanzania as a host of Burundi 
refugees as well as the Burundi peace negotiations.       
AIM AND RATIONALE OF THE STUDY
Aim
Tanzania, for more than ten years, has been at the centre of the peace process in the Great Lakes 
Region in general, and Burundi in particular. She has played an influential and significant role 
during this period. On August 28, 2000, 19 parties participating in the Burundi peace negotiations 
signed in Tanzania what is referred to as the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement. The 
agreement was a product of twenty six months of intensive and tough negotiations and 
consultations. As Tanzania was and still is at the centre of that process, the aim of this research is 
two- fold. First, to investigate Its role in the Burundi Peace Process between October 1993 and 
September 2006, and second, to analyse the factors influencing its prominent involvement. This will 
help us, first, to understand how an individual country can contribute to the solution of an 
3intractable conflict facing its neighbour, within the context of complex regional, continental and 
international initiatives. Second, how Tanzania has managed to balance its own internal concerns 
with those of regional, continental as well as those of international actors in an effort to find lasting 
peace in Burundi.  
 Rationale of the study
This study is inspired mainly by the need to generate knowledge in conflict resolution. This is due 
to the fact that while significant literature exist on the Burundi conflict and its resolution, there is 
generally a dearth of literature on Tanzania’s prominent involvement and particularly the role 
played in that process. Likewise, as internal conflicts continue to rage in the African continent, 
Tanzania’s experience in the Burundi peace process is worth researching. 
It unfolds complex issues which would assist in understanding how much conflict in one state can 
affect other state(s), and be a motivation to the latter towards searching for resolution. Indeed, the 
experience of Tanzania, being the most affected country by the conflicts in the region and its 
tireless efforts in resolving conflict, demonstrates not only the will and the practical reality of the 
concept of good neighborliness, but also its commitment to regional peace. 
Tanzania, at the midst of conflict area, has managed to remain stable and peaceful uphold its 
neutral position as far as conflicts resolution and management in the region are concerned. Even 
during the trying moments of complex conflict situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) which involved most of its neighbours, the country took a central position despite efforts to 
win support of either side.
In addition, the Burundi peace negotiations provide yet another example of the pursuit of 
“African solutions to African problems.’ This conforms to the philosophy of Mwalimu Julius 
Nyerere, Tanzania’s founding father, who advocated African unity under the banner of ‘United 
States of Africa.’6 Nyerere took African unity as an article of faith and envisioned his country’s 
peace and security in terms of regional peace and security. He believed that a volatile region was a 
threat to Tanzania’s national peace and security. This is worth investigating and documenting as it 
has a wider meaning of immediate relevance and far reaching implications for the Great Lakes 
Region in particular of providing valuable experience and useful lessons in dealing with other 
conflicts in Africa. 
The Burundi Peace Agreement is a product of an African initiative which shows not only change 
of perception on the individual states and its continental body over internal conflicts but also 
  
6 Nyerere, J.: Freedom and Unity : A Selection of (is a word missing here?) from Writings and Speeches  1952-1965, 
Oxford University Press, Dar es Salaam. 1967, pp. 188-203. See also article on the same in the first issue of  Journal of 
Modern African Studies January 1963   
4Africans acceptance of their problems and readiness to manage them notwithstanding non African 
involvement. This fact, also justifies the rationale of this study.   
A further justification for the study is the fact that the Arusha Agreement is the first peace 
agreement to be implemented in the region. Previous agreements like the one signed in August 1993 
between the former government of Rwanda and former rebels Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 
which Tanzania was the main facilitator failed. In addition, the involvement of multiple 
participants, Tanzania being among them, also justifies this study. Suffice it to conclude that this 
modest contribution is in line with the African Union’s agenda on conflict management and 
resolution in the continent.    
HYPOTHESISES
Actors in the Burundi Peace Process, as in other conflict mediation processes, are influenced by 
different factors and individual interests though some may be common to all. This study is built on 
the following hypotheses: (i) the proximity to the conflict which has likely spillover effects on 
another state can contribute to the type and speed of the latter’s involvement (ii) that the more the 
conflict threatens the interest(s) of the third party, the more likely the latter would respond and help 
find the solutions to the crisis and if possible assume an influential role in the process. From the 
two, it is hypothesised that Tanzania’s search for peace in Burundi is a response to the threat posed 
by that conflict to its ‘national interests’.7
LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature review focuses, first, on the nature and dynamics of African conflicts, secondly, the 
Burundi conflict and thirdly Tanzania’s role in resolving the Burundi conflict. It also focuses on the 
role of external actors in the Burundi peace process. As the literature review outline shows, the sub-
topics are related, so some parts of the literature review were relevant to more than one sub-topic.
The Nature and Dynamics of African Conflicts
The increasing conflicts in Africa in the 1980s and 1990s have attracted many researchers. As a 
result there is an abundance of literature on conflict and conflict resolution in Africa to date. Many 
writers and scholars explain the root causes using different theories and approaches and propose 
varying approaches to their resolutions. 
  
7 According to wikipedia ‘national interest’ is a country’s goals and ambitious whether economic, military or cultural. The 
national interest of a state is multi-faceted. Primarily is the state’s survival and security. The notion is very important in 
international relations where pursuit of national interest is the foundation of the realist school of thought. Sourced from 
http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/national_interet accessed on 2 August 2006ch  
5From North to South, East to West and Central, civil war is self-evident in Africa. One common 
feature of African conflicts is that “most of deadliest conflicts in post colonial Africa have been 
within states.”8
Another common element is that notions of these conflicts have been about competition over 
resources.  
Discussing the root causes of those conflicts, Adebayo Adedeji, relates them with resources and 
power, suggesting that “competition over resources typically lies at the intensity of struggle for 
political power in many African countries.” 9 He argues that the aim of such struggle is to get access 
to and control over means of production which ensure the victors of economic benefits. As a result 
of this, he notes, is the deprivation of the opponents from social public goods by the victors hence 
increase in antagonism between the two. As will be realised in the next section, Adedeji’s 
arguments conform with the situation in our case study (Burundi) where struggle for power is 
intensely linked with the access to scare resources. 
Peter Wallensteen, for his part, outlines the causes of most internal conflicts as the build up of 
internal grievances, many associated with power relations, economic interactions and social 
fabrics.10 In elaborating his point he says that the actors are largely, but not entirely, found along the 
lines of historically ascribed identities. In this case, Wallensteen argues that the conflict becomes 
‘ethnic’ but does not include ambitions of territorially dividing the state. Looking at the Burundi 
case, as will be discussed later, the conflict superficially manifests itself as ‘ethnic’ but in essence it 
is not and both the main protagonists (Hutus and Tutsis) never considered in separation. 
Morton Deutsch says whatever the reality; conflict is usually about one or another of control of 
power, preferences and nuisance and, the nature of relationship between parties.11 Stephen Stedman 
describes the root causes of internal conflicts in Africa as basic to all populations, namely  the tugs 
and pulls of different identities, the differential distribution of resources and access to power and 
competing definitions of what is right and what is wrong. 12 Elsewhere, Stedman lays blames for 
  
8 Mazrui, A. “The Failed States and Political Collapse in Africa” in  Otunu ,O & Doyle, W (eds) : Peacemaking and 
Peacekeeping for the New Century, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,Inc. Lanham, Maryland. 1998, p.233 
9 Adedeji, A. “Comprehending African Conflicts” in  Adebayo, A (ed.) : Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: 
The Search for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance: African Centre of Development and Strategic Studies-ACDESS, 
Zed Publishers, London. 1999, p.10   
10 Wallensteen, P.: Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System, Sage Publications, London. 
2002, p.133
11 Deutsch, M.: The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes, Yale University Press, London. 1973, 
p. 15
12 Stedman,  S. “Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa: A Conceptual Framework” in Deng, F M and Zartman W 
(eds),Conflict Resolution in Africa, R R Donnelly & SONS Co.Virginia.1991, p.368 
6recent African internal conflicts on colonial legacy as the immediate proximate causes.13 On 
colonial legacy, he points out that legacy from colonialism predisposed much of Africa to violent 
conflict over distribution of resources, access to political power and basic political identities. He 
goes on to suggest that such legacies help to create a pattern of state and elite formation in which 
political leaders relied on external support to reward their allies and ignore the needs of their 
citizens. In addition, Stedman contends that proximate causes of African internal conflicts basically 
stem from political and economic conditions that existed in the post- colonial era, on one hand, and 
policies adopted by the elites to gain and consolidate power, on the other hand. Both views above 
by Deutsch and Stedman are relevant to the Burundi case where colonial legacy and policies 
pursued by the African elite during post independence period have their shares in the crisis which 
befell Burundi. This will be discussed in the next section. 
John Dzimba, on his part, argues that the root causes of internal conflicts in Africa centre on four 
related conceptual issues namely; identity, participation, distribution and legitimacy.14 In 
elaborating his point, he mentions crisis of national governance, lack of accountability of rulers, 
deprivation of political and economic participation coupled with abuse of human rights, poverty and 
exploitation.   
There is also another view explaining the root causes of internal conflicts. This is referred as the 
weak state theory. Thomas Ohlsen describes a weak state as that which is characterised by a lack of 
societal cohesion and consensus in running of the state, inability of the state institutions to provide 
citizens with minimum levels of security and well being, fragile economy which cannot absorb 
external shocks and low degree of population legitimacy to status quo.15 Although, Adedeji does not 
mention or use the concept of weak state he does however enlist some of the characteristics of such 
states as sources of internal conflict in Africa. These include complete disregard of the peoples’ 
freedom, lack of empowerment and accountability by the government and general bad governance 
which he describes as the features of a divided society.16
There is another view which is close to the weak state theory which is advanced by William 
Reno. This is referred as the shadow state theory. Reno conceptualises the shadow state with the 
relationship between corruption and politics. He posits that in a shadow state, leaders minimise their 
services to the majority of the population so as to encourage individuals to seek personal favours in 
  
13 Stedman, S. “Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa” in Brown, M. (ed.): The International Dimensions of 
Internal Conflict,, Centre for Science and International  Affairs, John F Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 
University Cambridge,Massachsettes.1996, pp. 236-238  
14 Dzimba, J. “Towards Policy Options for Conflict Prevention and Peace building in Southern Africa” in Journal of Peace, 
Conflict and Military Studies,Vol.2 No.1 November 2002 pp. 3-4
15Ohlsen, T.:  Power Politics and Peace Policies :Intra-state Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa Report No.50.Uppsala 
University,Uppsala.1998, pp.8-11 
16 Adedeji Op Cit p. 7
7order to lure them for their support.17 He adds that these states get support from outside. That is why 
when support ceased as a result of the end of cold war, rulers in these states lost their power. Chris 
Allen supports, in part, Reno’s submission. He relates African conflicts with massive and endemic 
corruption. He argues that with such corruption, governments become incapacitated and unable to 
offer services to the people and thus consequently resulting into violence18.     
Charles Cater while acknowledging the withdrawal of external powers in Africa19, as noted above 
by Reno, also concurs with what is referred to as resource-based conceptual model of armed 
conflicts developed by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffer. The economic model of civil war, denotes 
that it is not political and social grievance per se that leads to civil war, but rather, for given levels 
of grievance, it is the opportunity to organise or finance a rebellion that determines if civil war 
occurs or not.20 Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis further argue that in a state where there is 
abundance of natural resources and large number of youth inappropriately utilised, that state is 
prone to violent conflict. They cite Sierra Leone, as an example of such states. This view is also 
supported by John Hirsch who believes diamonds are the source of Sierra Leonean conflict.21
However, this model can not be applicable to our case study where scarcity of resources is apparent.   
Thandika Mkandawire identifies two sources of conflicts in Africa: the failure of elite to forge 
national unity on one hand and economic problems which have affected the continent for decades 
on the other hand22. He recounts inter-elite struggle for power which he claims often led to their 
(elite) support mobilisation on the ethnic identity basis. He however, blames leaders of nationalist 
movements for their failure to form unity during the decolonisation process. On economic crisis, he 
cites imposed externally-modeled economic policies accompanied by austeric measures. Those 
policies not only exerted pressure on the status quo, but also brought misery to normal populations. 
Besides, they created unimaginable gaps between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’.
Two-decades long economic crisis, and the structural adjustment measures adopted to address it, 
which together have put enormous pressure on the African body politic…. increased income 
inequality and favored dramatic increases  in luxury consumption among nouveaux riche, the 
  
17 Reno, W. “Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars” in Berdal, M & Malone, D.: Greed and Grievance: 
Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, International Development Research Centre, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder & 
London. 2000, pp. 47-57  
18 Allen, C. “Warfare, Endemic Violence and State Collapse in Africa” in Review of African  Political Economy
Vol.26,No.81 ,1999, pp. 367-384
19 Cater, C “The Political Economy of  Conflict and UN Intervention: Rethinking the Critical Cases of Africa” in 
Ballentine,K & Shermand, J. (eds): The Political Economy of Armed Conflict :Beyond Greed and Grievance ,International 
Peace Academy, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. London. 2003, pp.19-20
20 Collier, P & Sambanis, N.: Africa Civil War: Evidence and Analysis , The World Bank, Washington D C. 2005, p. xiii
21 Hirsch, J.: Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy. Lynne Rienner  Publishers, Boulder and Colorado. 
2001,  
22 Makandawire, T. “The Terrible Toll of Post-colonial ‘rebel movements’ in Africa: Towards  an Explanation of the 
Violence against the Peasantry ” in Journal of Modern African Studies Vol.40,No.2 June 2002 p.192
8international businessmen and employees of international organizations and NGOs that have 
multiplied in numbers23  
Mkandawire therefore concludes that such inequalities and austeric measures like currency 
devaluation and cut in subsidies created grievances which were manifested through participation in 
democratic movements, looting and violent riots and ultimately transformed into full blown civil 
wars. Part of Mkandawire’s thesis is useful to our case study, as will be soon shown, namely that of 
inability of African elites to forge unity during struggle for independence (and post independence in 
that matter) and also ethnic identity in mobilising support.   
Based on the literature survey, we can sum up the root causes of conflicts in Africa as a 
combination of poor governance, self-interest, inter-elite struggle for power, political and economic 
deprivation of majority of the population, and imposition of externally-modeled economic policies. 
In addition, was the superpowers’ involvement as a result of the struggle during the cold war 
struggle for strategic interests and influences.  With this overview of the nature and dynamics of 
African conflicts, now follows the background to the Burundi conflict.
Background to Burundi Conflict
In the above section the research made an overview of the nature and dynamics of African 
conflicts and this section will focus on the background of the Burundi conflict. Like most 
contemporary civil wars in Africa which are intractable, Burundi is no exception. The nature of 
Burundi conflict is ethnic-based which lies on the two strong ideological positions of Hutus and 
Tutsis. In spite of those strong positions, the causes could be studied within the context of the 
theoretical framework of dichotomy between underlying factors and ideological factors. The 
underline factors constitute political and socio-economic causes. On ideological factors, Gaudens 
Mpangala clearly synthesises that even if the source of conflict is political and economic struggle, 
conflict in Africa has normally taken the form of ethnicity, racialism, regionalism and religious 
antagonism.24 In this respect, therefore, these have been used as ideological variables dominating 
conflicts in Africa as (ethnicity) in the case of Burundi.
Floribert Ngaruko and Janvier Nkurunzinza have identified three root causes of civil conflict 
which have characterised post independence Burundi history. These are Belgian colonial policy of 
‘divide and rule’ which racialised Hutu and Tutsi, regionalisation of the society by Tutsi elites from 
the south and Rwanda’s social revolution of 1959.25 On colonial policy, they singled out decision to 
  
23 Ibid 
24 Mpangala, G. “The Nature of Conflict in Burundi” in Mpangala, G & Mwansasu. (eds): Beyond Conflict in Burundi. 
Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, Dar es Salaam.2004, p.120
25 Ngaruko, F & Nkurunzinza, J. “ Civil War Duration in Burundi” in Collier, P & Sambanis, N. Op Cit. pp. 35-46
9replace all the Hutu chiefs by Tutsis, a decision which marked the marginalisation of the Hutus and 
the Tutsi domination over Hutus. 
Regarding regionalisation, they highlight the Tutsi elites for favoring the Tutsi, mostly of the 
southern province of the country. Ngaruko and Nkurunzinza refer to such favoritism as “Bururi 
exclusionary” political system which created suffering of untold proportion to those excluded. This, 
according to them, resulted in many political upheavals. Ngaruko and Nkurunzinza also concur with 
other authors who attribute the Burundi conflict with the 1959 social revolution in Rwanda. Like 
others, they argue that the similarities of social and institutional structures of the two countries 
influence each other. To Gilbert Khadiagala, the Burundi crisis is rooted in conflicts over political 
participation and resource scarcity, compounded by regional imbalances and militarisation of the 
society.26
Buluda Itandala contends that when the Belgians took over from the Germans in 1918, they 
inherited indirect rule but made considerable changes aimed at modifying political, social and 
economic formation of Rwanda and Burundi.27 This was to facilitate the intensification of 
exploitation of raw materials from those countries. Among the changes, was to consolidate and 
modernise Tutsi aristocracy by producing a literate and educated Tutsi ruling class. This was done 
through the establishment of government and mission schools. The education system adopted by the 
colonialists instilled a sense of superiority among the Tutsi over the Hutus. “Thus education became 
the means by which the Belgians were able to impose an ethnic definition of eligibility on a new 
political class...ruling class could now identify themselves as ‘Hamites’ and their subjects as 
‘Bantu’.”28 Leonard Ndarabagiye adds that exclusion of the Hutus in education was done also by 
the Church, particularly the Catholic.29  
In their study, Joseph Gahama, S. Matoroka, C. Nditije, P.Ntahombaye and O. Sindayizeruka, 
have described the Burundi conflict as sophisticated in nature both from distant past and recent 
past.30 First, they say the root of the problem goes back to the colonial manipulations which led to 
the crystallisation of ethnicity. On this, they claim that the colonialists used different theories on 
race inequalities and deliberate falsification of Burundi’s socio-cultural reality to portray the same 
as ethnically different. And second, the disastrous management of the post colonial era by the 
Burundi elites. This brought with it violence and authoritarianism. They suggest that with weak 
economy mainly dominated by the state, the state was perceived by many particularly, the elites, as 
a milking cow and the battle ground for survival of the fittest. Hence, the politics of exclusion 
  
26 Khadiagala ,G.“Burundi” in Boulden, J.:Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United
 Nations  & Regional Organizations, Palgrave, Macmillan, New York. 2003,   p.216
27 Itandala, B. : “Ethnicity Versus Nationalism in Rwanda ”A paper presented at  CODESTRIA Conference,Arusha.1995
28 Itandala Ibid
29 Ndarubagiye Op.Cit   p. 25
30 Gahama et al “ Burundi ” in Adedeji, A Op Cit pp.80-89  
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became a mode of governance applied to anyone who did not think like the leaders and who refused 
to be their yes-man.31
Ali Mazrui, however, mirrors Burundi and Rwanda conflict using what he calls the phenomenon 
of dual society.32 He argues that unlike plural society, such states are vulnerable to the risk of 
polarisation due to the absence of mediating groups. He adds that cultural frontiers without 
territorial frontiers in a dual identity within a country are a society at war with itself.33 He however, 
does not ignore other factors stating that “Rwanda and Burundi are a combination of ethnic duality, 
population density, geographical intermingling and legacy of colonial and pre-colonial 
relationships.”34 Explaining possibility of conflict in a dual society, Ibrahim Elbadawi according to 
his findings, concludes that “ethnically polarized societies have higher risk from suffering of civil 
conflict”.35 Likewise, Reynal-Querol asserts that “exclusion of social groups is enough to cause 
civil war in an ethnically divided society”.36 But what is not discussed by these authors is the extent 
to which imbalance in such polarisation leads to conflict; For example, why is it that it was the 
minority Tutsis who were oppressing the majority Hutus in Burundi. 
Rene Lemarchand takes a different look at the Burundi conflict. He dismisses historical 
antagonisms and colonial rule as causes of the conflict.37 In contrast, he subscribes to “mythico-
historical study” by Malkkis on Hutu refugees in Tanzania which claims that perceptions of 
particular events (like that of 1972 massacre) tainted with ethnic primodialism have facilitated the 
use of violence as a mode of discourse for both sides. Lemarchand however underlines the fact that 
ethnicity is used as a political resource deliberately manipulated by ethnic entrepreneurs for specific 
purposes of facilitating their entry into political arena.38 He appreciates the fact that the Tutsi 
domination of the army and their monopolisation of politics and economics of the country 
aggravated struggle for the same between Tutsi elites with those of Hutu.
The peace process was a result of the assassination of President Ndadaye in October 1993, in an 
attempted coup by the military, to topple his democratically elected government. The event was 
followed by subsequent killings which forced many Burundians, particularly Hutus to flee the 
country.
  
31 Gahama et al Ibid p. 94
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33 Mazrui, Op.Cit p.240
34 Ibid
35 Elbadawi (1999) as quoted by Reynal-Querol, M. “Ethnicity ,Political Systems, and Civil Wars” in Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol.46,No.1 February 2002 p.29
36 Reynal-Querol, op cit pp.39-40
37 Lemarchand, L.: Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide, Woodrow and Wilson Centre Press and Cambridge University 
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To many within and outside Burundi, the inauguration of President Ndadaye on July 10, 1993 
following his convincing majority victory was conceived to be the new beginning in Burundi’s 
political history. On the contrary, the results were not well received neither by the outgoing 
president nor his Tutsis allies, particularly the army. In his farewell address to the cabinet which 
comprised army officers and advisers, President Buyoya lamented that his failure in elections was 
not due to bad program, but rather because Burundians have decided to hand over the country to 
divisionists. He then urged the “Messrs Officers” to take their responsibilities39 and his defeated 
party National Union for Progress-UPRONA also dismissed the elections. 
The Tutsi extremists used youth wings and other militant groups to instigate violence and stage 
revolts. This took place before and after the swearing-in of the new president. Therefore, neither the 
news of reported failed coup before the swearing-in of the president-elect nor his assassination 
thereafter was any surprise. It is well argued that notwithstanding internal political and social 
dynamics, political reforms were instituted as a result of the pressure from the West on the one hand 
and the prevailing political changes unfolding in the continent at that material time on the other 
hand. It was evident that Buyoya and his allies were neither sincere to institute reforms nor were 
they ready to address the question of ethnicity. 
The October 1993 coup d’etat was another indication that the Tutsi extremists were not prepared 
to share power with the Hutus, thus perpetuating their exclusionary policy against the latter. 
Likewise, the event may also indicate their determination to physically eliminate them. A quote 
from a Tutsi army major on his impression of the coup explains this:
[Y]ou should see the events of [1993] putsch and assassination of Burundi’s first Hutu 
President] as an act of democracy. It was simply a matter of the politically aware
expressing dissatisfaction with unacceptable development in the country40  
In contrast, unlike the previous coup and ethnic crisis, the October 1993 event attracted the 
attention of the world and immediate reaction was imminent, including condemnations and calls for 
further restraint to avoid mass ethnic killings. The following day, October 22, the European Union 
suspended its cooperation with Burundi and some countries too suspended their cooperation with 
Burundi.41 With such pressure, a series of events then followed to institute order and also to find 
solution to the conflict. A ‘compromise’ president, Cyprien Ntaryamira, from Front for Democracy 
in Burundi-FRODEBU was appointed in February 1994. However he later died in April in a plane 
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crash with his Rwandan counterpart, President Juvenal Habyrimana. Later on the 9 October 1994, 
another political deal referred as the Convention of Government was reached. Following this 
Compromise, President Sylvestre Ntibantunganya was elected. It must be noted however that during 
the period between January 1994 and July 25,1996 when Buyoya staged a coup, it was the military 
which was running the show through National Security Council which the president had to consult 
for any of his decisions.42
Against this backdrop, we can summarise the source of Burundi conflict as basically a 
contestation for state power control and ethnicity being a conveyor belt for political and economic 
competition on the one hand, and military coups on the other hand. Accordingly, it is evident that 
whatever explanation we might have to describe the root causes, the Burundi conflict reflects its 
past history. Since the past makes the present, so does the past and present predict the future. Below 
follows a brief overview of the role played by Tanzania in the Burundi Peace process. 
Tanzania’s Role in the Burundi Peace Process
Although the negotiations process was entrusted to special facilitators, namely the late first 
President of United Republic of Tanzania, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere and later former President of 
South Africa Nelson Mandela, as I mentioned earlier different players including countries, 
individuals and institutions played different roles in different times as well as in different capacities. 
Tanzania is one of those players which were, from the very beginning, involved in playing different 
critical roles. These roles included, among others, persuading conflicting parties to enter into 
negotiations, hosting negotiations (by providing venue and logistics to parties ) and since the 
signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement it fully engaged in bringing into the 
agreement the rebel groups43 which were not party to it.
Likewise taking into consideration Mwalimu’s role as a mediator on the one hand and the fact of 
being former president on the other hand, it is argued that it was difficult to devoid him from the 
Tanzanian government. He was, first, a retired president and secondly at the beginning of his work 
as facilitator, was facilitated by the government.  Indeed, Tanzania participates in the 
implementation of the peace agreement. Besides Tanzania was (and still is) the Vice Chair of the 
Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi and has played host to Burundi refugees for decades. In this 
regard, the problem of Burundi refugees became as prominent as regard to relations between the 
two neighbours and was also prominently featuring in Tanzania’s relations with the international 
community. 
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Based on this understanding, the study underlines Tanzania’s ‘special interests’ in the resolution 
of the conflict. This was clearly confirmed by the following expression from Tanzanian President 
Benjamin Mkapa:
Tanzania has hosted refugees for almost five decades now. We have often paid dearly for that 
humanitarian gesture, in terms of security, in terms of economic and social development and in 
terms of strain relations with neighbours.44
Tanzania’s foreign policy towards its neighbours has always been that of peaceful co-existence 
and fostering good neighbourly relations on which of late emphasis on regional economic relations 
have been featuring prominently. But as is elsewhere, individual country’s internal stability is 
central to the general regional stability which is crucial to the realisation of this goal .That is why 
regional peace and stability has been always top in agenda for Tanzania’s leadership. In the words 
of Mkapa: 
We [people and government of Tanzania] will always stand on the side of peace. We will 
continue to do everything we can to contribute to peace in Burundi...for many years we have done 
whatever we could to contribute to peace in Burundi and other countries in this region. We did so 
for no reason other than the pursuit of peace, security, reconciliation and development in all our 
neighboring countries. I want to affirm our commitment to peaceful co-existence and good 
neighborly relations with all countries.45
Tanzania affirmed its commitment to peace in the region during the period of its tenure as 
president of the United Nations Security Council in January 2006 where it sponsored the adoption 
of Resolution 1653 (2006) on the Great Lakes Region. In its first intervention at the Security 
Council it reiterated that:
[Tanzania’s] primary agenda for so doing (rejoining UNSC) was to make a concrete contribution 
to the search for a lasting solution to the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region. With that in mind and 
as a fervent believer in multilateralism by United Nations and International Community, Tanzania 
resolved to use the occasion of her presidency of Security Council to put the Great Lakes Region’s 
issues of peace, security and development high on agenda of Security Council.46  
As noted earlier, Tanzania’s efforts in the Burundi peace process were part and parcel of the 
collective efforts by various players and actors. The study now moves to another section of the role 
of other players in the Burundi peace process.
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The Role of Other Actors in the Burundi Conflict
Having briefly analysed the role of Tanzania in the Burundi peace process, the study now turns to 
the role of other actors in the Burundi peace process. This is so because Tanzania’s role cannot be 
discussed in isolation with other actors. The aim is therefore to establish how these actors 
participated and particularly how their involvement facilitated the process. It is true that in the post 
Cold War period, civil wars have increased in Africa. The period, however, has also witnessed the 
resolution and management of those conflicts becoming increasingly important. There have been 
various efforts to resolve conflicts in the continent involving actors from both within and outside 
Africa. But the trend shows greater involvement of players within Africa. This could be attributed 
to various factors: First, major powers’ fading interest on the continent. This is a result of the 
demise of cold war. African problems are now considered African, hence it is Africa’s own 
responsibility, and using biblical words “every body should carry his own cross”. This is 
documented in emerging literature. Chris Allen notes that:
[B]roader view of contemporary wars in Africa –that they are internal wars, and that their causes 
and solutions lie ‘within’ rather than the international community sharing responsibilities, both for 
cause and solution.47
Secondly,, a ‘new awakening’ among African leadership in dealing with internal conflicts in the 
continent. The first point and the negative effects caused by these civil conflicts contributed to this. 
They (conflicts) inflicted adverse negative effects within their respective countries and neighboring 
states, as well as the respective regions. Within the same context, there is a growing interest among 
states to address conflict resolution on a regional basis in a bid to achieve regional security as 
argued below;
[T]he shift from cooperation in areas of soft security to matters of high politics, such as conflict 
resolution, security, and defense on which states have traditionally remained hesitant. This shift has 
great potential to facilitate the attainment of regional security.48  
In the aftermath of Ndadaye’s assassination, Burundi was characterised by arbitrary ethnic 
killings and gross human rights violations49 which led thousands of civilians fleeing to neighboring 
countries, mainly, Tanzania.  
Joseph Butiku points out that the result was a consensus by the players to intervene in order to 
save the lives and halt human rights abuses and then mediate the conflict.50 As the conflicting 
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parties were not prepared for negotiation, thus, intervening efforts were made by external players51
to bring the parties to the negotiation table. The players were concerned about the human tragedy in 
Burundi and the far reaching effects of that situation on the regional peace and security.52 It is worth 
noting that the period under study coincides with the Rwandan genocide which had already put the 
region in a severe situation of insecurity. 
In his contribution, Mpangala isolates the potential contagion effects of the Burundi conflict as 
the main motivation for collective intervention by regional and continental leaders. He notes that:
[I]ncreased instability in the region in the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda and explosive 
potential of cross-border alliances by the various political and military actors threatening  
recurrence of ‘Rwanda’ led the countries of the region, the UN and OAU to the realisation that 
they were facing a volcano about to erupt. Hence they felt they were duty bound to do something 
about it and that the problems of Burundi would have to be addressed in a regional framework.53  
The idea was well received by regional leaders. Its immediate adoption could be well explained 
by the fact that there was a growing and perceived fear of regional war not only among leaders 
but also the normal population. It could be argued that the leaders had borrowed a leaf from the 
experience of West African civil wars. These wars had threatened regional stability by 
destabilising neighboring states. Summing up those experiences, Alhaj Bah explains:
[A] major lesson learned during the conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone is that instability in one 
state can not be contained in that state alone and poses grave danger to the security and stability of 
others. Hence no member state can expect to isolate itself from the political crisis in another state.54
Furthermore, Olara Otunu elaborates the same using the example from West African region that, 
“local conflicts have a tendency sooner or later to walk across national borders, spreading violence 
and refugees in their paths and destabilizing entire regional neighborhood.”55 This brought up two 
emerging tendencies with regards to governing and managing relations among states. First, the 
legitimacy of third party intervention on humanitarian grounds56 as a new challenge to the principle 
of non-interference of the internal affairs of the states as embodied in the principle of state 
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sovereignty. Second, is a change of attitude (as well as perception) by African states and its 
continental body-AU towards management and resolution of internal conflicts. It is viewed that of 
late African countries through its continental body are keen to resolve conflicts in Africa unlike 
before where most countries were shying away from dealing with them.  
The signing of Burundi Peace Agreement in Arusha in August 2000 can be regarded as one of the 
products of the new awakening in African leadership mentioned above. It is the result of an 
intensive and complicated mediation process, engaging parties in the conflict. The process lasted 
nearly two and half years. It had involved different players, playing different roles to facilitate its 
realisation. In spite of that fact, the Burundi Peace Process has been conceived by Heads of state 
and Government of the Great Lakes Region57 as a Regional Initiative.58 To put it in a theoretical 
perspective, it is part of a reactive approach59 to conflict resolution by the region. In addition, it 
demonstrates perceptual transformation of the African states and their regional bodies’ attitude 
towards internal conflicts60 as previously explained.  
The thrust of this regional initiative, was putting to an end conflict in Burundi, which had been 
part of history of that country since independence. It should perhaps be noted that efforts to resolve 
the Burundi crisis were more or less slowed down by the lack of strong regional institutions like 
Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) in West Africa. This was also the case with the 
Rwandan conflict. As a matter of fact, the Great Lakes Region was only recently conceived 
following outbreak of wars in Burundi, Rwanda and DRC and their contagious effects on countries 
in the region. This view, as Salim A. Salim admits, is more accepted, and though does not rule the 
historical trends in the regional development. “It has to be admitted, however, that the current 
conception of The Great Lakes Region is a product of both recent troubled history and historical 
development.”61  
However, before the Burundi Peace Initiative was officially conceived by the region, different 
efforts were made to resolve the conflict. These included two OAU summits between November 
1995 and March 1996 in Cairo and Tunis respectively. They involved leaders from the region and 
some prominent leaders like the former president of Tanzania Mwalimu Nyerere who  later became 
the facilitator, Jimmy Cater of the United States, Toumani Toure of Mali and Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu from South Africa. It is against this background that this study aims to explore Tanzania’s role 
at different levels namely national, regional and international. For example, Tanzania’s active 
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involvement in the regional initiative within the Great Lakes Region as well as its membership on 
the United Nations Security Council and its contribution to the establishment of  the peace-building 
commission which is  instrumental to post-conflict Burundi. These are among the gaps which this 
study wanted to fill.  To achieve the study’s goals, theoretical and conceptual applications were 
applied. Below is the discussion on the same.        
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The study applies broader concepts in conflict and conflict resolution as a basis of the research 
investigation and analysis. Different key concepts on conflict and conflict resolution methods are 
defined, examined and adopted to assert their relevance and also how applicable they are to the 
study. The discussion on these concepts now follows.   
Conceptualizing internal conflict
Klaus Nurnberger, John Tooke and William Domeris write that the essence of conflict is the 
instinct of all living organisms to survive both as species and as individuals, and to develop their 
potentials.62 In this case, for human beings, they identify different needs, among others, survival 
needs, community needs, prosperity needs, aesthetic needs, intellectual needs and religious needs. 
These needs are for their survival. Hence, if they are threatened or their fulfillment is obstructed by 
any cause, usually, the human beings’ response is self-assertion.63 This means human beings have 
been in constant competition to satisfy their daily needs. If that is the case then, how do we define 
conflict? 
Conflict can be defined as a situation of competition in which the parties are aware of the 
incompatibility of potential future positions in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is 
incompatible.64 Conflict therefore denotes the existence of individuals or groups pursuing different 
goals and the processes are not necessarily violent.65 Internal or intrastate conflict is distinguished 
from inter-state conflict as the former is purely domestic whereas the latter is between states. 
Internal conflict can be defined as a dynamic socio - political and economic dispute whose source 
can be traced within domestic factors. Bearing in mind the fact that conflicts are unavoidable in 
modern state system, one of the critical responsibilities of the state is to safeguard and balance out 
legitimate interests of the citizenry in general and legal system in particular. On the contrary, failure 
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to achieve such balance leads to violent conflict. For the purpose of this study, we need to briefly 
revisit violent internal conflict or civil wars/ armed civil wars.  
Mirjam Sorli describes civil war as that which “occurs between government of the state and 
internal opposition without intervention of other state[s].”66 However Sorli quotes from elsewhere 
that armed civil conflict as “a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory 
where use of armed force between two parties of which at least one is a government of a state, 
results at least 25 battle related death.”67 Melvin Small and David Singer characterize civil war as 
that which involves internal military action between the government and the opposition with 
effective resistance by both parties.68 What distinguishes internal conflict from interstate war is the 
fact that parties to the conflict and action take place within the sovereign state without involving 
external forces. Once there is external involvement and recruitment, according to Sambanis, the war 
is no longer referred as internal but inter-state war.69  
There are two approaches to understanding the nature of internal conflict, namely, that of elitists 
or institutional/structural approach and ethnic approach. Institutional or structural theory of conflict 
posits that the primary motivation of conflict is competing interests among groups. The theory 
identifies sources of conflicts in the social, economic, and political organisation of society. Based 
on that, structural conflict can be defined as “an outcome of incompatible interests based on 
competition for scarce resources; it is objective because it is defined as largely independent of 
perceptions of participants and emanates from power structures and institutions.”70 This means a 
group of people in power undermines the competitiveness of other population groups by among 
others, oppressing, discriminating, depriving and humiliating the other population groups. In the 
process, the group, because it is in power, uses state institutions like legislature, judiciary, 
administration, and even the army and police to deprive others from accessing resources. Hence, the 
group in power enjoys the monopoly of political, economic power and social privileges at the 
expense of the other groups. 
On the contrary, the ethnic approach emphasises on the role of culturally shared, profound ‘we-
they’ oppositions, the conceptualisation of enemies and allies, and deep-seated dispositions about 
human action, stemming from earliest development.71 The thrust of this contention is that conflict 
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occurs when a group in a society is discriminated against and deprived, on the basis of its identity, 
of means and opportunities to satisfy its needs. Ethnicity, according to Horowitz, is an inclusive 
concept which covers differences identified by skin color, language, religion or other attribute of 
common origin.72  
Internal conflicts can be classified into two; centralist, in which insurgents fight for a share in the 
central authority or even overthrow the existing authority. For instance, when a group is fighting for 
recognition of its rights from the central government but it has no intention of breaking up from the 
said state. Or, an insurgent group fights to overthrow an oppressive government in power. Both are 
coded as centralist civil wars. Here Burundi and Rwanda could be cited as examples. On the 
contrary, if a group fights against the government in power to form an autonomous new government 
from the existing one that is secessionist or regionalist war. “Secessionist civil wars...seek to redraw 
the boundaries of the political community.73 Jaroslav Tir defines secession as: 
[A]n internally motivated division of a country’s homeland (that is non colonial) state with at 
least one new independent (that is secessionist state) with full sovereign rights and legal recognition 
by international community and leaves behind the new territorially smaller rump state.74
Among successful secessionist wars are Eritrea against Ethiopia and East Timor against Indonesia 
whereas among the unsuccessful ones are those of Biafra in Nigeria and Katanga in the then Zaire 
now Democratic Republic of Congo. Now, the discussion moves to the third party intervention.       
Conceptualizing Third Party Intervention
Third party intervention in interstate conflicts is a common practice in conflict management and 
resolution in international relations. Unlike in intra-state conflict, in internal conflicts third party 
intervention is somehow complicated particularly when it is a violent third party intervention. The 
complexity originates from the principle of non-interference of the internal affairs of a state which 
is the core of the state’s sovereignty. It is agued that the principle has been a stumbling block 
towards effective resolution of many internal conflicts. As Dzimba notes, due to this principle many 
states confronted by internal conflicts resist external mediation efforts by insisting that those 
conflicts are exclusively internal ones.75
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The experience shows that the principle is also used to refuse international action to assist the 
needy and to protect those in danger. Pease and Forsythe elaborates in the statement:
[E]ven when a number of fundamental rights specified in the two 1966 UN Convents on human 
rights were being denied (e.g., rights to life, adequate nutrition, adequate shelter, freedom from 
arbitrary detention, torture, and mistreatment),some governments used claims to state sovereignty to 
block international actions that could have ameliorated these denial rights.76  
However there is, today, a growing consensus amongst players in International Relations 
including academics, diplomats, politicians and human right activists that there is a need to redefine 
or reexamine sovereignty in relation to responsibility rather than legal application as it is now. 
Francis Deng puts the argument that “state sovereignty should be understood as responsibility rather 
than as a legal privilege.”77 This means advocacy for more states responsibilities to their peoples’ 
welfare. William Zartman elaborates, “ideas of sovereignty as responsibility, concerns for human 
life, and enlightened interests of restoration of domestic and international order.”78 The concerns 
become imminent, he argues, when the domestic actors (the government and opposing side(s)) have 
failed to resolve their conflict and need help to restore order so that domestic welfare and 
international order can be protected.    
Mkapa on his part advances this argument by denouncing the use of the principle to keep a wall 
on bad governance as follows:
[W]e must now stop misusing the principle of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs 
of states to mask incidences of poor governance and unacceptable human rights abuses....it is 
inevitable to conclude that [the] principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of state can no 
longer find unqualified, absolute legitimacy.79  
He accentuates his argument by citing the aftermath of 1994 Rwanda genocide and its contagious 
effect on the region. He notes that some civil wars are a product of failure of the structures and 
processes of internal governance, but they have spillover effects and can produce unnecessary 
tensions between neighboring states. To him, probability for intervention must be placed on the 
table as part of regional strategy for durable peace and security
The debate has also taken its stage at the level of UN leadership as its former Secretary-General 
Javier Perez de Cuellar notes:
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[I]t is increasingly felt that the principle of non-interference within the essential domestic 
jurisdiction of states cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which human rights could be 
massively and systematically violated with impunity. The fact that in diverse situations United 
Nations has not been able to prevent atrocities cannot be accepted as an argument, legal or moral, 
against the necessary corrective action, especially when peace is threatened.80
De Cuellar’s view carries many of UN members’ concerns on misuse of that principle at the 
detriment of innocent civilians who suffer from their own governments’ brutality and suppression. 
He acknowledges the failure of the world body to act promptly to address such atrocities but also 
emphasises that such failure cannot be taken as a precedence to justify future acts of human rights 
violations. The incumbent UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan also concedes this view when he 
declares that the principle does not make a state absolute, for the UN Charter was issued in: 
[T]he name of the ‘peoples’ not the governments of the United Nations…The charter protects 
sovereignty of the people. It was never meant as a license for governments to trample on human 
rights and human dignity. Sovereignty implied responsibility not just power.81
Third party intervention on humanitarian grounds, contends Jan Nederveen Pieterse, raises the 
question of political responsibility in the era of globalisation, and inaugurates a new kind of 
citizenship, namely, the citizenship of humanity. He claims that the changing mode of interactions 
between states marks the end of the cold war where state absolutism was the order of the day, and 
opens a new mode of interaction between states where sovereignty is taking new dimensions:
[T]he increasingly widely accepted humanitarian intervention… marks the cusp of a time of 
transition. Behind us lies the era of the statist paradigm, the billiard ball model of interstate 
relations. A long period of deepening interdependence, accelerating since the late-nineteenth 
century, has narrowed the scope and changed the nature of sovereignty, which is now increasingly 
circumscribed by international conventions and implicated in transnational economic relations.82
He compares conflict situations during cold war era and post cold war era. He notes that conflicts 
which were contained because of cold war geopolitics and ideological alignments have come to the 
fore. Human rights abuses that used to be condoned because they were committed by allies in the 
name of cold war authoritarianism are now viewed in different light as the background becomes 
foreground.83  
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Urquhart takes this issue as one of ‘sovereignty against suffering’84 and says that many 
developments of our time challenge the validity of the principle of total sovereignty, reminding us 
of growing interdependence. He is therefore astonished that the concern of human suffering and 
human rights often tends to stop at the borders. However the debate surrounding third party 
intervention resolves around two contentious issues: on the one hand, the balance between state 
sovereignty and human rights, and on the hand the question of legitimacy and justification of 
intervention. 
Notwithstanding this debate, the need for external intervention both violent and non violent 
emerged because of increasing conflicts which affect human lives and endanger general human 
security in those states in conflict. Indeed, interventions are also prompted by the danger posed by 
those conflicts to the peace and security of the region. This, it is argued, third parties sometimes act 
because of the pressure from the public. Regan is one of those who advance these claims: 
In modern [the] world, humanitarian crises to some extent have impact felt by global community, 
and it is reasonable to expect states to attempt to minimize the social dislocations associated with 
these crises. Domestic constituencies may press strongly for such active policies, particularly when 
the conflict and the resulting carnage may play out through local media.85
As argued in the above quotation, cases of indiscriminate killings, serious abuses of human rights 
by both contending parties (including governments in power) like in wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
Sudan and Burundi compelled the world to consider humanitarian interventions. The main purposes 
of such interventions are to save lives and assist the parties to engage in negotiations. 
Therefore, it is in the interest of human dignity to call for the need to broaden the definition of 
(national) security to include more aspects of life and values as well as emerging conditions. That 
is, to move from the state-centric approach which is the cornerstone of the realist school of thought 
on security, to a people-centered approach as some scholars have recently been advocating. 
Agostinho Zacarias, in his submission on re-conceptualising security, argues that the theoretical 
shift (from traditional understanding) would imply viewing security in terms of the philosophical 
underpinnings pertaining to the ideas of “the good life” which implies an all-embracing  conceptual 
architecture of  which peace, justice, order and economics are the main pillars86
Having reviewed the literature on third party intervention, this study now adopts a more specific 
third party intervention technique namely, mediation. This is because our case study does not 
involve other conflict resolution mechanisms associated with violent intervention. Distinguished 
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from others, mediation involves less threat to state sovereignty; it is non coercive and more often 
acceptable to conflicting parties. The study below conceptualises the mediation of internal conflict.       
Conceptualizing Mediation of internal conflict
This section discusses what constitutes mediation and the difference between mediation and other 
forms of conflict management mechanisms. The discussion also engages on key issues such as 
impartiality and neutrality which have attracted opposing views among experts and non experts of 
conflict resolution. The discussion starts with mediation.
Mediation, probably one of the oldest forms of conflict management, has been variously defined. 
However, such diversity of definitions, as we will see below, revolves around one or more of the 
following: differentiating mediators from other related third party intervention, their roles and 
integrity as well as anticipated results. Mediators encompass among others individual states, group 
of states, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), individuals or groups of individuals and 
commissions
Cathie Witty defines mediation as “the facilitation of an agreement between two or more 
disputing parties by an agreed-upon third party. This third party is known a mediator.”87 Lars 
Stenelo’s definition is “the process initiated by a third party in his attempts to facilitate solution of 
other parties’ disagreements in order to ensure negotiated agreement.”88 John Dryzek and Susan 
Hunter define mediation as “a process in which the parties to a dispute attempt to reach a mutually 
agreed solution under the aegis of a third party by reasoning through their differences.”89 Beardsley, 
Kyle, Quinn, Biswas and Wilkenfeld on their part, see mediation as an “attempt to allow the crisis 
actors to identify and commit to alternatives from Zone of Alternatives (ZOA).”90 Christopher 
Moore defines mediation as an extension and elaboration of the negotiation process which involves 
the intervention of an acceptable, impartial and neutral third party who assists contending parties in 
voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable settlement of the issues in dispute.91 Another 
definition is from Black and Mouton who describe it as “the intervention of the third party who first 
investigates and defines the problem and then usually approaches each group separately with 
recommendations designed to provide mutually accepted solution.”92 Davis and Duncan contribute 
to mediation definition with the following: 
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[A] third party dispute settlement technique integrally related to negotiation process whereby a 
skilled, disinterested neutral party assists parties in changing their minds over conflict needs mainly 
through the non compulsory applications of various forms of persuasion in order to reach a viable 
agreement on terms at issue.93
Jay Folberg and Alison Taylor describe mediation as a “process by which the participants, 
together with the assistance of a neutral person or persons, systematically isolate disputed issues in 
order to develop options, consider alternatives, and reach a consensual settlement that will 
accommodate their needs.”94
From this survey of definitions, we have realised that mediation is different from other 
negotiation variables like conciliation, adjudication, arbitration and good offices. Whereas 
negotiation generally refers to the peaceful means of resolving conflict through dialogue, mediation 
on its part plays the role of facilitating dialogue between those parties particularly when they are by 
themselves unable to conduct the negotiation. It is also evident that mediation is a process that leads 
a conflict to be resolved. It also appears that mediators should be neutral and /or impartial as 
indicated in Folberg and Taylor, Zartman, Davis and Duncan definitions. 
However, the issue of neutrality or impartiality on the part of mediators has always been 
contentious. Some scholars, instead of neutrality, use impartiality or both. Some have tried to 
differentiate one from another. However, for the purpose of this study, such distinction is not of 
paramount importance. Hence, we use them interchangeably. Oran Young defines impartiality as 
follows:
[A] situation in which the intermediary has no biases or preferences in favor of one of the original 
player or another. That is, impartiality is a condition in which the intermediary has no personal 
interest in the relative distribution of payoffs among the original players.95
Many researchers and writers in conflict resolution in general and mediation in particular, suggest
that neutrality or impartiality is one of the indispensable characteristics of a third party intervener. 
They argue that it is a necessary condition not only for his or her acceptability to mediate but also 
for his or her effective performance. However there also are opposing views on this.
According to Young, impartiality is a key condition to successful intervention. He argues that “a 
high score in such areas as impartiality ... would seem to be the heart of successful intervention in 
many situations.”96 In the same vein, Jackson emphasises that, “it would be difficult, if not possible 
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for single mediator who was distrusted by one of the parties to carry out any successful function [in 
mediation].”97 Likewise Young attaches impartiality of the third party with its role by underlying 
that “the existence of meaningful role for a third party will depend on the party’s being perceived as 
an impartial participant in the eyes of the principal protagonists.98
In contrast, David Brookmire and Frank Sistruck firmly contend that these characteristics 
(impartiality and ability) relate only to how a third party is perceived by parties in conflict, not its 
actual performance.99 In addition, they stress on the effect of perceived impartiality, which is 
intuitively attractive but seems to have little effects on actual negotiation. Saadia Touval however, 
argues that impartiality in many ways is a subjective perception of the parties in conflict. Hence, it 
is neither a condition for acceptability nor success to third party intervention. To substantiate his 
view, he cites several cases of perceived biased mediators who were accepted to mediate conflicts. 
Touval argues that their acceptability was not conditioned upon impartiality but was rather a 
decision influenced by the expectation of outcomes. “Whether intermediary is perceived as biased is 
one of the several factors shaping expectations, but by no means is it the preponderant 
consideration.”100 A case in mind is Nyerere’s mediation of Somalia and Kenya conflict of 1965. 
Somalia appealed to President Nyerere to mediate the dispute with Kenya over the status of the 
Somali-inhabited area in northern Kenya. Touval contends that although Somalia President Aden 
Abdullah Osman knew of Nyerere’s close relations with Jomo Kenyatta, and Nyerere’s diplomatic 
efforts to isolate Somalia at Cairo’s OAU 
meeting in July 1964, nonetheless, Osman chose him to mediate. Surprisingly, however, it was 
Kenyatta who objected to Nyerere’s mediation though at the end accepted him and met Osman.   
Jacob Bercovitch and Rubin question the neutrality of third parties and hold the view that they are 
never neutral. “... Mediators are not, and cannot be neutral... (they) can be impartial, but they 
certainly not be neutral.”101 They argue that mediators have motives in initiating their entrance into 
mediation. They enlist four motives namely: first if mediators have clear mandate (referring to 
organisations like AU), and second if a conflict is likely to adversely affect their political interests. 
Third if they wish to preserve existing structures (if beneficial to them e.g. military or economic 
blocks), and fourth if it is the mediators wish of extending and enhancing their influence by being 
indispensable to the parties. It can however be argued here that, this mostly answers the next 
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pertinent question of why and how mediators enter into mediation: using James Wall Jr. and Ann 
Lynn’s words, “under what circumstances does a third party answer a call and agree to mediate?”102
Wall and Lynne argue though that not wholly mediators enter the dispute to maximise benefits of 
their constituencies or their allies. 
However, as a fact, unlike third party violent intervention which is mostly undertaken without the 
consent of parties, third party non violent intervention has to be agreed upon by both parties as have 
been depicted in the definitions. Therefore, mediators are either invited or they themselves propose 
to offer their assistance. This is, may be, because of the aforementioned reasons or as humanitarian 
gesture. However, it is also assumed that some “intervene because they feel their assistance will be 
useful to the parties but others it is their profession.”103
But what about the parties themselves, how can their acceptance of mediation be explained? 
Bercovitch and Rubin argue that parties in conflict seek or accept mediation because firstly, they 
believe the process will assist them to improve their understanding of the conflict and consequently 
get close to resolve it. Secondly, each party expects the mediator might nudge or influence the other 
and also expect guarantee of the implementation of agreed solution. Thirdly, parties want to hold 
others responsible for the failure of the mediation and finally, they accept mediation as a public 
relations exercise.104  
Mediating internal conflict is always regarded as difficult because it is often assumed as being 
intractable with parties finding it difficult to reach a compromise. This is due to the fact that each 
assumes a zero-sum game and strives for high stakes of their demands. In this case, the parties’ 
perception is that one’s gain is another’s loss. Hence preference will be given to a unilateral 
solution which is violence. On the contrary, if parties’ perception of the conflict is win-win then the 
policy option will be dialogue. Therefore, the work of the mediator is to transform the environment 
from zero-sum situation to positive - sum situation and attitude in which each party comes out with 
some benefits; no one comes off unilaterally or exclusively best but all parties come off better than 
before.105
To internal conflict, like in this case study, it means convincing the government in power to 
recognise that violent antigovernment reactions are signs of grievance and a return to a legitimate 
governance means opening the political system to the participation of those opposing it. We have 
demonstrated earlier that Tutsi dominated government applied policies of exclusion and domination 
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of the majority Hutus. This made Hutus resort to violence trying to quash Tutsi domination. At the 
same time the Tutsi government has always been using force to suppress any attempt challenging its 
tyranny. Mohammed Maundi elaborates this point: 
[S]et in zero-sum terms, the government’s perceived solution to the conflict has been a total 
Tutsi dominance in all spheres of country’s life. The government’s policy preference to any 
challenge of Tutsi political dominance has constantly been violent. The Hutus violent
anti-Tutsi reaction to this oppression has always been logical response to Tutsi dominated 
government’s violent offensive.106
As a result the study shows that it has taken the Burundi government over two years to accept 
mediation. In the case of Mozambique, parties took about five months dragging their feet on the 
choice of mediators107
It is worth noting here that a review of the literature on mediation suggests that there are some 
concepts which are used interchangeably to denote mediation or are intrinsically intertwined with 
mediation. That is, there is no consensus on classification of those concepts. As Ronald Fisher and 
Oraleigh Keashly note that there is “no agreed typology for classifying third party interventions... in 
some context terms are used interchangeably (e.g. conciliation and mediation) and in some cases, 
single term, usually 
mediation, is used to refer to a wide range of different third party interventions.”108 For this study, 
the mention of third party consultation, facilitation and intermediaries needs no overemphasis. 
There have been efforts by some authors to differentiate them from mediation but it appears their 
efforts end up by describing or isolating roles played by third party at certain stages in the 
mediation process. In the case of third party consultation and intermediaries, the concepts mostly 
describe the preliminary stage or pre-negotiation stage. 
Fisher and Keashly describe third party consultation as an intervention often in the form of 
problem solving workshops in which consultants work with parties to improve communication, 
diagnose underlying relationship issues and facilitate search towards creative resolution of 
conflict.109 They add that the main roles of that intervention are just facilitative and diagnostic. 
Touval uses intermediaries, to denote third parties that intervene diplomatically in a conflict with 
stated purpose of contributing toward its abatement or termination, and they are accepted by the 
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parties.110 He argues by giving two characteristics of intermediaries which are the highlights of his 
definition of intermediaries. These are, being restricted to diplomatic initiatives and their acceptance 
by all parties in conflict.    
Some writers on mediation assert that mediation is different from facilitation. William Dixon, 
among others, identifies three categories of conflict management practices according to groups of 
roles performed by an agent.111 These are those of procedural matters like facilitating 
communication and enunciation issues, and those that require agents to assume somewhat direct and 
active roles like fact finding and supervising agreements. And finally, those at the heart of the 
dispute that is mediation and formal adjudication. Another author upholding this view is Ronald 
Fisher who labels facilitation as third party consultation. He argues that third party consultation can 
be distinguished from more traditional types of interventions on a number of dimensions including 
the degree of coercion applied to the parties, flexibility of the interaction and the nature of 
objective. He adds that “the approach is decidedly non-coercive, non-evaluative, relatively 
nondirective, and seeks exploration and creative problem solving with respect to basic relationships 
rather than settlement of specific issues through negotiation.”112
As mentioned elsewhere in this study, the differences advanced by authors between mediation 
and those concepts, on the one hand are related to the roles played by third parties at different levels 
in mediation process, and on the other hand, show the measurement level of interactions of the third 
party with the parties in conflict during mediation process.  Notwithstanding this debate, this study 
however, considers sharp distinction of these concepts unnecessary. With this survey of mediation, 
the following is the analytical framework of the study. 
Analytical Framework
The analytical framework is important in order to show the causal relationships between various 
factors and how they relate or affect the study. The study has identified four independent variables 
namely social economic variable, security concerns variable, influx of refugee factor variable and 
diplomatic imperative variable. The causal diagram below demonstrates the relationships between 
those four variables with the research’s dependent variable which is Tanzania’s decision to engage 
into the process of resolving Burundi conflict and referred in this study as Burundi Peace Process. 
The study argues that the Burundi conflict inflicted negative impacts on Tanzania which threatened 
its national political, economic, social, and security stability. As a result of these impacts, Tanzania 
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was compelled to take the decision of involving herself in searching peace in Burundi: hence, the 
independent variable of the study. Besides, the study underscores that moral and humanitarian 
reasons and good neighborliness also contributed to Tanzania’s involvement in the Burundi Peace 
Process. The two, affirm Tanzania’s commitment to peace and respect of human life and its moral 
obligations to the society. The study shall also demonstrate that the thrust of Tanzania’s 
involvement in Burundi Peace Process is in line with the country’s foreign policy goals and 
objectives as well as domestic development policies and plans. It will indeed show that these goals 
and objectives concur with Tanzania’s regional economic, security and development cooperation 
ambitions.
The diagram shows also that Tanzania was not alone in the peace process. Other actors were 
involved amongst them were those directly affected by the conflict and others’ involvement was 
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EVIDENCE COLLECTION AND METHODOLOGY
The approach of this study is that of documentary research supplemented by interviews with 
some stakeholders in the Burundi Peace Process. The choice of the research method lies on the 
advantages it had in conducting research of this kind over the one which solely involves statistical 
data. Documentary research which encompasses review of documents and interviews helps to 
explain not only the processes and behaviors of the players but also their attitudes and motivations. 
The study uses both primary and secondary data. The focused interviews are conducted to gather 
primary data from some stakeholders in the Burundi peace process. This is to supplement 
documentary evidence, and to counterbalance and verify secondary data. The interviewees shall be 
asked open-ended questions. Published books and documents on conflict in Africa generally and 
Burundi in particular are reviewed. Key reports on Burundi crisis are also reviewed. These include 
among others, reports of the United Nations Security Council Missions on Burundi and the Great 
Lakes Region, and UN Secretary General’s Progress reports on Burundi. Others are African Union 
(former OAU) reports on Burundi and communiqués of heads of State and Governments of the 
Great Lakes Region on the country in particular and the region in general. Burundi’s and Tanzania’s 
policy documents including foreign policy documents will also be reviewed to give insight on the 
relations between the countries. Different libraries are consulted to gather secondary data. These 
included those of the Universities of Wits (main library, Cullen Africa, and Jan Smut House 
library), Centre for Foreign Relations of Dar es salaam, Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation’s library, 
Tanzania’s State House library and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation 
documentary room. Different websites which have information on the subject will be visited. These 
include websites of research institutions and online journals of conflict resolution and management. 
Below follows the structure of the study.
STUDY OUTLINE
This study is divided into five chapters. The first chapter introduces the research work, identifies 
research questions, aims and the rationale of the study. It also reviews the literature by providing a 
general survey of internal conflicts in Africa, their root causes and conflict resolution efforts in 
Africa. In addition the chapter presents an overview of Burundi conflict. The second chapter deals 
with the Burundi Peace Process: factors that led to the initiation of the Burundi peace process, main 
phases in Burundi peace process, main issues in the peace process and the signing of Arusha Peace 
Agreement. Chapter three concentrates on Tanzania’s role in Burundi Peace Process: Tanzania’s 
perception of Burundi conflict, the role(s), motives, and factors influencing playing such roles. It 
will also identify Tanzania’s contribution to the process and its experience or lessons learnt from its 
participation. The fourth chapter centers on the roles of other players in Burundi Peace Process. 
These include inter alia United Nations, African Union (former OAU), European Union, United 




THE BURUNDI PEACE PROCESS
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the Burundi Peace Process from 1993 to 2006. However, for logical 
reasons, a brief review of the period between 1987 (after the fall of Bagaza regime) and before the 
1993 elections is made. The year 1993 has been selected as the starting point because it marked the 
beginning of a period characterised by a deepening political crisis in the country. The attempted 
overthrow of the elected government and the subsequent assassination of its President Melchior 
Ndadaye worsened the country’s political crisis. This contributed to giving the crisis an 
international character. The year 2006 was chosen as the end period for this study because the 
signing of a ceasefire agreement between the government of Burundi and the last rebel group-FNL 
in September that year marked a new chapter in the country’s political history.- the ‘end of 
hostilities’ which paved the way for an-all-inclusive peace building effort in that country.
The completion of the period of the transitional government, the successful holding of the general 
elections and the overall implementation of the Arusha accord all signify the achievement of the 
peace accord’s main objectives. But both the start and the end of the study were neither the 
beginning nor the end of the search on peace in Burundi as peace is seen, according to Malan and 
Porto, “not merely as a stage in time nor a condition. It is a dynamic social construct”.113 In view of 
this and given the nature of the country’s turbulent history, it requires a process of building, 
involving investment and of course, continuous maintenance.114  
The chapter begins with an overview of the highlights of the factors that contributed to the 
political crisis that stirred up international interest and attention and led to the various external 
initiatives to resolve the crisis. The Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi was the most proactive 
activity of the phase of the Burundi Peace Process under review because it was the one which 
conducted peace negotiations and succeeded to lead the parties to a peace agreement. The chapter 
outlines the genesis, origin and nature of the Burundi Peace Process; the main focus being on the 
facilitation (and/or mediation) and summitry115 process. It further highlights its major phases and 
stages, the issues, problems, experiences, lessons and outcomes of the peace process. The chapter 
then focuses on the agreement as the basic foundation and framework for peace building and its 
implementation.     
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2.1 Highlight of the Factors which led to the Burundi Peace Process
Although Burundi had been experiencing sporadic ethnic turmoil since her independence, it was 
only after the 1993 overthrow of President Melchior Ndadaye and his assassination that the world 
became strongly committed to assist the Burundians solve their decades-long internal conflict. This 
does not suggest that in previous crisis such as that of 1972 the world stood aside but what is 
emphasised here is the fact that the 1993 event not only received a unique attention, but the urge 
and determination by external actors to find a lasting solution of the problem. According to 
Lemarchand “no other strife-torn country in the continent [Africa] has received more sustained 
remedial attention from many international actors as Burundi since 1994”.116 The crisis attracted 
both state and non state actors encompassing cohorts of special envoys, no less than seventeen 
international NGOs as well as countless formal diplomatic initiatives.117
Lemarchand further notes that Burundi; “has the highest rate of heads of state and government to 
be sent to their graves by an assassin’s bullet.”118 But why such attention now when coup d’etats 
and assassinations have been part of political history and life of Burundi? Various reasons can be 
advanced to explain this. First, the fact that President Ndadaye and his government were elected 
into office by universal suffrage. They were given the mandate by the people and that signaled the 
end of military dictatorship which had dominated the country. So the military seizure of power and 
subsequent killing of the president was seen both internally and externally as a halt to a young 
democracy and yet another obstacle to the conflict resolution in Burundi. This brought up fear from 
both Burundians and non Burundians of possible recurrence of previous mass killings.
Secondly, the global acceptance of both economic and political pluralism had rendered coup d’ 
etats an unacceptable means of regime change. In this regard, the international community not only 
condemned both the coup and the assassination of President Ndadaye but pressed for normalisation
of the political and security situation.  
Thirdly, is the plane crash which killed both Presidents of Rwanda Juvenal Habyarimana and that 
of Burundi Cyprien Ntaryamira-the successor to Ndadaye on 4th April 1994. The two were coming 
from peace talks on the Rwanda conflict held in Tanzania. This tragic incident had quadruple 
effects to Burundi. First, the death of President Habyarimana triggered genocidal killings of the 
Tutsi by the Hutus in Rwanda. This created a mass flow of Tutsi and some moderate Hutus from 
Rwanda to the neighboring states. Second, with ethnic similarities, the killings made the Burundi 
situation more volatile and complicated. Third, the volatile situation led to the emergence and 
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strengthening of extremism among both major ethnic groups-Tutsi and Hutu.  And fourth the death 
of President Ntaryamira created yet another leadership vacuum in Burundi, thus complicating both 
the political and security situation, as the ethnic struggle for power intensified.
It was against this backdrop that there developed a new perception of the crisis in Burundi. It was 
strongly viewed   that given the conflict situation in the region namely Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire, 
there was a possibility of developing a regional war.119 This perception was supported by the fact 
that the Intarahamwe- Hutu militias who fled to Zaire were waging war against a new Kigali 
government led by RPF.
This fear of the regional war was strengthened by the rumor of conspiracy to resurrect a Hima-
Tutsi Empire incorporating Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. This prompted former Tanzanian 
President, Mwalimu Nyerere, to send an envoy to the Ugandan President, Yoweri Kaguta 
Museveni, to enquire about this. The existence of the rumor and the fears it generated were 
confirmed by Museveni in one of his speeches. He stated then:
Some years ago when Mwalimu was alive, he sent a message to me through an envoy. The 
message expressed a worry that a campaign was being waged in the Great Lakes Region to the 
effect that there was a conspiracy to erect or resurrect a Hima-Tutsi empire in this region. The 
campaign was that the authors of this scheme were some of the communities in Uganda, Rwanda 
and Burundi. This is in fact a lie about the Hima Tutsi Empire builders.120  
In short, the aforementioned Burundi’s internal situation as well as the overall regional security 
environment attracted the attention of many actors. As a result, a series of efforts from within and 
outside the region gathered momentum to solve the crisis. Below is an examination of the Burundi 
Peace Process.
2.2 The Burundi Peace Process 
In studying the Burundi Peace Process, the research has identified five phases. The first phase 
covers the period from 1987 through October 1993. The reason of starting with this phase is the 
need to have logical presentation of this section. In 1987 Major Buyoya toppled President Jean-
Baptist Bagaza. After nearly a year and a half, Major Buyoya instituted political reforms which 
gave the way to multiparty elections and subsequent election of President Melchior Ndadaye. It is 
logical therefore to start there and end the phase by the assassination of President Ndadaye. 
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The second phase begins immediately after the attempted overthrow of constitutionally elected 
government of President Ndadaye and his assassination. This phase which started from October 
21st, 1993 to early 1996 was characterised by ad-hoc attempts to resolve the crisis. The third phase 
is that from mid 1996 to June 1998. This period was very critical as was characterised by 
consolidated and extensive diplomatic and ground work consultations which culminated in to the 
setting up of peace negotiations. 
The fourth phase runs from June 1998 to August 2000. This is the phase of peace negotiations 
which resulted into the signing of The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi. 
The fifth phase is the post Arusha Reconciliation and Peace Agreement which covers the period 
from August 2000 up to the signing of the ceasefire and end of hostilities between the government 
and the last rebel group Aghaton Rwasa led Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People 
(PALIPEHUTU- FNL) in September 2006. 
In this chapter only the first, fourth and fifth phases are discussed. Phases two and three are 
discussed in chapter four under the Regional Initiative on Burundi. This is to avoid repetition and 
allow for a more critical analysis of the Regional Initiative and the role of other players within the 
regional setting.    
2.2.1 Phase One   
In September 1987, at the height of internal political tension, Burundi saw yet another coup 
d’etat. Major Pierre Buyoya toppled President Jean-Baptist Bagaza. Gross human rights abuses, 
systematic exclusion and brutal repression of the Hutus, negative campaign against the church 
characterised the last two years of Bagaza’s regime.121 This had led to threats by Burundi’s major 
donors France and Belgium to suspend development support.122 Furthermore, the army was 
dissatisfied by Bagaza’s decision to force them into early retirement as a means of cutting costs.   
Buyoya first consolidated his power by dissolving the opposition parties, suspending the 1981 
constitution, and chairing the 31 member Military Committee for National Salvation (CSMN).123
But in August 1988, Burundi witnessed yet another ethnic violence which inflicted huge human loss 
to both the Hutus and the Tutsi. It was estimated that thousands of people were killed and hundred 
thousands others left the country to seek refuge in the neighboring countries.124 This event marked 
the beginning of political change in Burundi. The West increased their pressure for political reforms 
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and ultimately Buyoya succumbed to it and initiated reforms which the West believed would end 
ethnic turmoil. 
On September 30 1988, Buyoya appointed a 24-member Consultative Commission on National 
Unity; and in October, the same year, he appointed a unity government with twelve Hutu and 
twelve Tutsi headed by a Hutu Prime Minister, Adrien Sibomana.125 The Commission presented 
two reports namely Report on the National Consensus on the Study of the Question of National 
Unity of 1989 and the Report on Democratization of Institutions and Political Life of 1991.
The outcome of the two reports was the birth of The Charter of National Unity which 
recommended a new constitution. The new constitution called for the introduction of a multi party 
political system with equal participation of the two main ethnic groups. A referendum endorsed the 
constitution and the multi party political system.126 With the new constitution in place, Burundians 
elected the new president on June 1, 1993 and a new parliament twenty nine days later. 
In both elections, the Hutu party FRODEBU won, with its presidential candidate emerging 
winner over Tutsi-supported incumbent president Buyoya by 65 percent.127 In the parliamentary 
elections it scooped 65 seats out 85. Following these results, President Ndadaye was sworn-in on 
July 10, 1993 ushering in a new era in Burundi politics. He however lasted for hundred and two 
days before he met his death at the hands of the military on 21 October, 1993.
These political reforms which characterised the Burundi society up to the June 1993 elections 
form part of a series of events which constituted the Burundi peace process. Maundi in his 
submission aptly describes their significance as; first, symbolised regime change that is, it 
introduced a new set of political norms and values hence changed the basis of governance.128 This 
allowed the country to move from military authoritarian sort of governance to democratic 
governance. Secondly, the law establishing political parties required them to have a national 
character across the ethnic divide. This consequently changed the mode of political organisation and 
mobilisation.129 Despite the shortcomings, the developments which took place during this period 
under review underscored several initiatives and attempts to address the country’s political and 
ethnic problems and achieving durable peace.  
As it was stated in the outline of this section, phases two and three will not be dealt here as they 
fall under Regional Initiative on Burundi in chapter four. However some highlights are important to 
enable the reader to follow the discussion. Below are the highlights. 
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2.2.2 Highlights of the period from the October 1993 event to The Signing of the Arusha 
Accord [a synopsis of phases two and three]
The assassination of President Ndadaye on the 21st October put the entire country into a dire 
political and security situation. As was in other previous coups, killings started immediately when 
the news of his assassination broke up. The Hutu reacted by killing the Tutsi and the country’s 
Tutsi-dominated army accompanied by Tutsi extremists responded by cracking down Hutu militants 
as well as Hutu civilians.130 The crackdown involved FRODEBU leaders including ministers and 
members of the parliament. Tension increased following this crackdown, and as a result many 
Hutus including some members of the disposed government fled to neighboring countries. 
It the light of this, the world responded by first condemning the attempted coup and the 
assassination of the President and secondly urging the coup plotters to restore law and order, and 
prevent the country from turning into full scale ethnic war. Thereafter, followed a series of peace 
initiatives. Both Secretaries General of the United Nations and the then Organization of African 
Unity –OAU appointed special envoys namely Ahmedou Ould Abdallah and Leondre Basole 
respectively. The United States and The European Union too appointed their special envoys.131
The interveners’ efforts particularly those of the UN special envoy yielded fruit by facilitating, in 
January 1994, the appointment of a compromise president, Cyprien Ntaryamira, a Hutu and the 
installation of the coalition government the following month.132 When President Ntaryamira died in 
a plane crash with Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana later in April, Abdullah also played a 
key role in deciding who to succeed the late Ntaryamira.
However, while these efforts were underway, inside Burundi, the political and security situation 
continued to deteriorate. The UN brokered coalition government failed133 to address key issues, 
among others, the power of the president and the army. At the same time there was an increase in 
rebels’ activity inside Burundi. This worried the army too and prompted a takeover of the 
government on 26th July 1996 in a coup which brought back Major Buyoya into power. 
The reaction was enormous the world over. At the regional level a summit was convened five 
days later on 31st July to discuss the event. It was attended by Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania 
and Zaire. After a lengthy discussion the summit deliberated to impose sanctions against the 
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military regime.134 This was accompanied by a set of benchmarks to make sure the regime complied 
with the summit’s deliberations. The event took the peace process into a new turn where a series of 
summits were held to evaluate and monitor the development in the country and assist to resolve the 
conflict. It is this that is referred to as the Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi. 
2.2.3 Phase Four  
2.2.3.1 The Arusha Peace Negotiations
The Regional Initiative was specific in many ways. First, it was constituted by Burundi neighbors 
that now come to bear the name of the Great Lakes Region. Secondly, it represented the real spirit 
of African togetherness and sense of belonging in a true spirit of Pan Africanism. Thirdly, it was a 
demonstration of the political will among African leaders first to accept and second to be 
accountable and committed to solve African problems in a more African way. This initiative was, 
thus, part of an African renaissance, so to speak.   
The primary objective of the Regional Initiative was first “to avert an impending human disaster 
and save Burundi from total disintegration”135 and secondly “sparing the people from the agony and 
suffering that had befallen their neighbors in Rwanda”.136
Regional efforts were supported by other players such as the Carter Centre which took the 
conflict in Burundi in a wider perspective and organised two key summits in Tunis and Cairo to 
discuss and strategise on how to solve the conflict. The two summits shaped the conceptualisation
of the Burundi conflict into a regional perspective and formed the background for the Regional 
Initiative on Burundi. The decisions made by these two summits were supported and approved by 
the OAU summit of March 1996 including Mwalimu Nyerere’s appointment as mediator to the 
conflict.
It took Mwalimu two years to convene the meeting of all, or almost all parties in the Burundi 
conflict in Arusha. It was at this meeting that started in June 1998 that the Arusha Peace 
Negotiations began.   
The Burundi Peace Negotiations unfolded through the engagement of two facilitators overtime 
namely Mwalimu Nyerere (1998-1999) and former South African President Nelson Mandela who 
undertook their facilitation work in purely different environments. The two used different, albeit 
complementary, approaches in their mediation efforts. Below the study examines those two 
approaches.
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2.2.3.2 Peace Negotiations under Mwalimu Julius Nyerere 
Three basic issues confronted Nyerere on his appointment as facilitator. The first was acquiring a 
firm grasp, clear knowledge and understanding the essence, magnitude and nature of the conflict in 
Burundi perceptually as well as from the perspective, position and standpoint of the relevant 
members of the Burundian political community. Specifically, this involved, on the one hand, the 
attribution and perception of the basic causes, fundamental contributory factors and the most critical 
variables to the schism which had pitted the actors and players into adversarial and antagonistic 
positions, and on the other hand, plotting  the way forward.
The second was that of a correct identity of the protagonists, not as a generality but as the people, 
individually and collectively, and understanding their concerns and fears,137 their personal 
aspirations and interests, their perception of the origin and nature of the conflict and how it could be 
solved.
The third was specifics on the possible way forward to resolving the conflict peacefully through 
the process of dialogue, consultations and negotiations in which stakeholders across the broad 
spectrum of the ethnic, ideological and political perspectives could become fully engaged as the 
active participants.               
In order to get first hand information of the three basic issues, Nyerere consulted different actors 
both within and outside Burundi. He had to travel to Burundi, between December 1995 and early 
1996, several times.138 In Burundi Mwalimu met and exchanged views with many actors, players 
and stakeholders, Burundians and non Burundians as was practically possible. He even traveled to 
the West to hear their views139 and as part of public relations exercise in a bid to create a better 
working environment.
From his fieldwork, Mwalimu reached three conclusions140 which later proved to be more useful 
in guiding his work. The first was that the source of the conflict was the exclusionary politics in 
which  majority Hutus were being excluded from the mainstream of the country’s political, social, 
economic and cultural life by the minority Tutsi. Secondly and a corollary to the first was the 
recognition of the Tutsis concerns and a fear of permanent domination by the Hutus, and possibly 
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extermination due to the latter’s numerical strength. Hence, this needed to be considered and 
addressed accordingly.
Thirdly, and based on the two, Mwalimu observed that the conflict was purely political and hence 
needed a political solution.141 In this regard, he considered the 1992 Constitution of Burundi as the 
logical starting point for such a solution.142 But in order to achieve the said political solution, there 
was a need to create a conducive and supportive environment during peace negotiations.       
It is important to note here, the manner in which Mwalimu Nyerere understood and interpreted 
his role. He expressed his preference to work as the Freelance Facilitator. The role of Freelance 
Facilitator was perceived and understood as a totality of the individual person that was synonymous 
to the name of the person so formally designated. In the specific case of the process under review, 
the Freelance Facilitator was Mwalimu Nyerere.
This further included the functions and responsibilities undertaken or carried out on behalf of the 
facilitator as well as the underlying ethos, normative values and standards expected of that role. It 
was this wider perception that enabled the Facilitator first to delegate the day to day activities and 
the other business of a routine nature, the technical issues and minute details to assistants leaving 
him to concentrate on the strategic issues and the big picture. Secondly, it helped to widen up the 
process of facilitation that led to the involvement of many participants as advisors, assistants and 
resource persons at the service of the Facilitator: thus making the process more participatory, open 
and transparent.
The structures, machinery and systems of facilitation that were instituted contributed greatly to 
expedite the process and to improve the quality of the outcomes. Nyerere delegated the 
administrative, financial, legal and other issues of technical nature to specialised institutions and 
relevant experts. The first institution to play this role was The Tanzania Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and International Cooperation. This was replaced by the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation-MNF.  
Mwalimu further meant working outside the ambit of the formal machinery of the states. This 
helped to insulate the process from the influences and other pressures brought to bear to promote or 
defend the interests of the individual states or organisations. It also helped to reduce red tape and 
bureaucracy and to maximise flexibility, autonomy and freedom of action. In spite of this he 
remained under the Regional Heads of state and was expected to report regularly to the Summit 
and, was ultimately accountable to the people of Burundi.
His acceptance of the facilitation role was made with the full awareness of its inherent weakness. 
The facilitator did not have at his disposal neither the carrot, in terms of the glittery incentives to 
dangle before the parties as the reward for compliance, nor the stick, in terms of the sword of 
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Damocles to brandish as a threat. His major resource, as Butiku, noted was his personality, 
morality, integrity, personal standing and credibility for impartiality, wisdom, honesty, truthfulness, 
fair play and a sense of justice.143 Lack of independent source of funds and the subsequent 
overdependence on benefactors, particularly the international donor community, as will be seen in 
chapter four, made his position particularly precarious.  
There were, from the outset, a number of major decisions to be made. These included key issues 
such as the participants, the agenda, the venue, modus operandi of the negotiations etc. Below we 
briefly look at these aspects. The first practical problem which faced the facilitator was to make the 
decision on who was to participate in the peace negotiations.144  
In the first two preliminary talks held in Mwanza, only two participants were involved. These 
were the then ruling party, UPRONA, and the main opposition party, FRODEBU. The decision to 
involve the two was based on their constitutionality as they were the main competitors during the 
1993 elections. This confirmed the inherent traditional thinking of recognising political parties as 
the potential bona fide eligible actors and players. This however, as we will see later, changed after 
extensive consultations within the Regional Initiative, the facilitator, the international community 
and the special envoys to include many other groups that come to constitute the ‘all party talks’ that 
started in June 1998.
2.2.3.2.1 The Agenda
As it will be revealed in the next discussion, what deadlocked the Mwanza I and II talks was 
disagreement on the agenda.  The participants failed to reach a consensus on the signing of the Joint 
Statement which was envisaged to be the agenda after the consultations. As it will be discussed later 
this was due to the different perceptions the participants had on the conflict itself and the actors 
involved. However this jigsaw was resolved during the all party talks when participants agreed on 
what would be the agenda in the famous 21st June 1998 Declaration.
2.2.3.2.2. The Venue
The decision where the talks had to take place had its own significance and therefore it was 
difficult to make. The neutrality of the place, availability of adequate facilities and the security of 
individuals were critical issues to be decided upon. The first place to be considered was Burundi, 
but some stakeholders would not feel safe in Burundi and the Burundi government wanted the 
negotiations not to take place in the neighboring countries. 145 This, however, would increase the 
cost. Finally, Arusha in the northern Tanzania was selected as the venue for the negotiations 
notwithstanding reservations by the Burundi government. 
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Mwalimu Nyerere’s facilitation period can be divided into three; namely the Burundi party talks 
that included Mwanza I and Mwanza II (1995-1996), The Interlude and the All Party Talks. 
2.2.3.3 The Burundi Party Talks
It has already been noted above that the first Burundi Peace negotiations took place between 
FRODEBU and UPRONA that were identified as the bona fide political parties that had participated 
in the 1993 general elections and the only ones that won seats in the National Assembly. They were 
invited to the first ever Burundi Party Talks in Mwanza on the shores of Lake Victoria. The 
Government of Burundi was invited as an observer. An overview of the discussion of this meeting 
which was dubbed Mwanza I follows below. 
2.2.3.3.1 Mwanza I
This was a one week session that took place from April 22 to 26, 1996. The meeting was 
expected to lay the ground work and chart out the way forward. One of the major issues addressed 
was that of the agenda and, to that effect, the Facilitator requested the respective delegations, 
individually or together, to submit the items that were to be included as the substance of the 
proposed agenda. 
Three ideas were expected to form the core of the agenda, namely, an unequivocal avowal that 
there could be no solution to the conflict in Burundi through the use of arms and other forms of 
violence, because the nature of the conflict is political.146 Second, was the condemnation of 
violence, political killings and assassinations as a means of achieving or returning to political power 
or settling differences with political opponents. Third was the reiteration of the parties’ commitment 
and adherence to the use of political and constitutional means to achieve political objectives.147  
The Facilitator then suggested that these ideas be formulated in a form of a Joint Statement that 
would be signed by the parties as the basis of the agenda of the proposed consultations and 
negotiations. Indeed, he proposed the formulation of a draft Joint Statement which was presented to 
the parties for study, scrutiny, comments and amendments as the basis for the final round of talks 
for a formal adoption. However, that was not to be the case because, whereas FRODEBU appeared 
prepared, willing and ready to adopt the proposed formulation as a working document that was the 
basis for final consultations, negotiations and final decision, UPRONA appeared to have different 
ideas.148
  




For UPRONA, preference to ‘political and constitutions means to achieve political objectives’ 
was interpreted and understood to involve, among other things, the working out of a new 
constitution through a process of a national debate similar to the one in 1989 noted to have led to 
the Charter and the 1992 Constitution which the Facilitator had suggested must be the basis. 
Furthermore, condemnation ‘of violence, political killings and assassinations’ meant blacklisting of 
specified ‘rebel’ groups, organisations and entities, Burundians and non Burundians, alleged to abet, 
encourage, sponsor or support acts of violence and killings for condemnation by name.149
Underlying UPRONA’s ideas was a perception that the role of external assistance was to assist the 
Burundi Government dismantling the ‘rebel’ groups fighting against it.
Neither FRODEBU nor the facilitator was prepared to accept UPRONA’s ideas and perceptions. 
They refused to go along with the proposal on the content and tenor of the joint statement. This 
resulted in a stalemate and no joint statement was issued at the end of Mwanza I.
2.2.3.3.2 Mwanza II
The second round of talks also took place in Mwanza from June 3 to 9, 1996 and hence the title 
Mwanza II. Unfortunately, the deadlock on the content and tenor that had precipitated the earlier 
stalemate was not resolved and no Joint Statement was signed. This brought to an end Nyerere’s 
initial initiatives as it resulted into a two year lull period with no visible activities. It is important to 
look at what happened during this interlude.  
2.2.3.4 The Interlude
Following the Mwanza II stalemate, the facilitator briefed the Presidents of Kenya and Uganda 
and after further consultations, a Regional meeting called Summit I, was convened on June 25, 1996 
in Arusha, Tanzania.  The summit suggested the convening of another round of the Burundi talks. 
This however was overshadowed by subsequent events. By the time of the summit, there was 
already growing insecurity in Burundi that had prompted the Burundi government to request for an 
external military presence as a stabilising force.
However, the proposal for external forces was opposed by the extremists and hardliners along 
with the Tutsi dominated army on the ground that such a course of action would be an act of 
invasion by foreign troops.150 This prompted the second coup d’etat by Major Pierre Buyoya on 
July 25, 1996. 
A regional Summit (summit II) was quickly convened on July 31, 1996 in Arusha to address the 
new situation. This resulted in the imposition of sanctions on the military regime. The issue of 
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sanctions was to top the agenda of both Summit III and Summit IV held in Arusha on October 12, 
1996 and April 1997 respectively. 
The April Summit encouraged the facilitator to convene a new round of the Burundi Party Talks 
which would involve additional actors and players to the original two, namely FRODEBU and 
UPRONA. The meeting was scheduled for August 25, 1997 in Arusha. Unfortunately, the meeting 
could not take place because of the non attendance of some key actors and players, in particular, the 
Burundi Government and UPRONA.
The Burundi government dissuaded mostly Tutsi groups from attending.  However the reason 
given to the public for the non attendance were the concerns and fears about the safety and security 
of the participants if Tanzania was the venue and the lack of confidence, faith and trust in the 
facilitator’s capacity for fairness, impartiality and objectivity because of the alleged bias. This will 
be discussed in detail in chapter three. 
The non attendance was a major setback and a personal embarrassment to the facilitator. The 
meeting, however, had attracted new actors and players namely CNDD, Party for Reconciliation of 
the People (PRP), Party for National Recovery (PARENA), Liberal Party (PL), Front for National 
Liberation (FLORINA), PALIPEHUTU and Rally for People of Burundi (RPB).151 It is worth 
noting, in parenthesis, that CNDD, FLORINA and PALIPEHUTU had earlier been included in the 
list of ‘rebels’ while  UPRONA had recommended for direct condemnation by name during 
Mwanza I.
The failure of the Burundi all party talks to take place resulted in Summit V on September 3 and 
4, 1997 in Dar es Salaam. During the Summit, the Government of Tanzania proposed a change of 
venue if Arusha was proving to be an obstacle and the facilitator offered to step down, for a more 
suitable person.152 The Summit prevailed over the Government and the facilitator by the insistence 
that Arusha remain the venue and Mwalimu Nyerere continued as facilitator of the Burundi Party 
Talks.
In addition, the Summit reiterated its preparedness to adopt further measures to deal with any 
‘obstructions’ to the peace process and its stand to maintain existing sanctions. The Summit, 
furthermore, urged the process to work out the transitional mechanisms towards the aspired new 
dispensation and called upon the government of Burundi to foster a congenial environment for 
dialogue and negotiations.
A period of almost nine months followed without demonstrable or visible activities. But 
underlying the apparent lull was an undercurrent of behind the scenes diplomatic efforts and 
  
151 Butiku  Op. Cit 65-70 
152 Burundi: Regional Summit,9/19/97,University of Pennsylvania –African Study Centre. A web source: 
http://www.africa.upenn.edu./Urgent-Action/apic_91997.html accessed on 23 November 2006  
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political pressure on the Burundian actors and players to give the political solution another chance. 
The major breakthrough came with the announcement of a new round of the Burundi All Party 
Talks involving almost all the Parties to the Conflict on June 15 to 21, 1998 in Arusha. This was the 
beginning of the Burundi Peace Negotiations.
2.2.3.5 The Arusha Burundi All Party Talks June 15 to 21, 1998
During the one week sessions, the delegations were requested by the facilitator to deliberate, 
dialogue, consult and negotiate with the objective of arriving at a consensus on the guiding 
principles. These were, as stated earlier, first, the recognition and acceptance of the fact that the 
problem underlying the Burundi conflict and subsequent political crisis was basically and primarily 
a political one that needed a political and not a military or technocratic solution. Secondly, was the 
eschewing of violence, political killings and assassinations as methods of achieving political 
objectives and the accompanying commitment to use constitutional and political means. 
On the basis of that consensus, the parties were to agree on the nature and scope of the issues that 
were to constitute the substantive items of the agenda for the negotiations as well as on the 
modalities for the negotiations. For the facilitator, the consensus on those issues was fundamental as 
the logical starting point of fruitful negotiations to commence and, ultimately, deliver.         
At this meeting, the role of the facilitator was typically that of good offices provider to the parties 
and included the facilitation of space for them to meet, whether in plenary, consultations among and 
between themselves or with the facilitator in groups or on one to one basis and other necessary 
facilities. Individually or in groups, the parties carried out consultations and negotiations on the 
position to adopt, the most acceptable manner of the formulation of that position utilising the 
services offered by the facilitator. 
At the end of the one week session, the parties issued a statement; the Declaration by the 
Participants to the Burundi Peace Negotiations Involving All the Parties to the Burundi Conflict, 
hereafter referred to as  The Declaration of June 21, 1998.153 The Declaration included various 
commitments, among which were;
· The pledge to engage in serious negotiations until a just  and lasting solution on the crisis is 
reached
· The pledge to resolve the Burundi conflict through peaceful means and put an end to all forms of 
violence;
· The suspension of hostilities that was to take effect not later than the 20th of July 1998                        
  
153Butiku Op.Cit  p 90   
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· The commitment “to return to Arusha on 20th July 1998 to commence the Second Session of the 
negotiations.
The meeting further agreed on the issues that were to be the essence and substance of the 
negotiations. These were:
1. Nature of the Conflict in Burundi and Problems of Genocide and Exclusion and their solutions;
2. Democracy and Good Governance; Constitutional Arrangements; Questions of Justice and the 
Fight
against Impunity; Judiciary, Systems of Administration and transitional institutions;
3. Peace and Security for all; issues of Public security and Defense; Cessation of Hostilities; 
Permanent Ceasefire Arrangements;  
4. Rehabilitation and Settlement of Refugees and Displaced Persons; Economic and Social
Reconstruction and Development.
5. Guarantees on Implementation of the Agreement emanating from the Burundi Peace 
Negotiations.
Lastly the meeting agreed on the modalities of the negotiations in which committees would be the 
main forum. To that effect, they agreed to establish five committees to assume the primary 
responsibilities for handling the issues under each separate agenda item. Each committee was 
required to negotiate, prepare recommendations, including draft protocols that were to be submitted 
to the plenary for adoption as the final decision.   
The significance of the June Declaration lies in the fact that it expressed a consensus across the 
broad spectrum of the ethnic, ideological and political divide of the Burundian community. It 
should be noted however that SOJEDEM refused to append its signature to the declaration. The 
government of Burundi, UPRONA, Alliance of the Valliant (AV INTWARI), The Shield 
(INKINZO), Independent Workers Party (PIT), PRP and Party for Social Democracy (PSD) entered 
reservations on the commitments to suspend hostilities and to return to Arusha to commence the 
second session. National Alliance for Law and Economic Development (ANNADE), which had not 
participated in the process of the negotiations, requested to come on board and be admitted.154  
Notwithstanding the reservations by some of the parties on the commitment to return to Arusha 
for the second Session on July 20, 1998 all the signatories attended. The major business was that of 
dialogue, consultations and negotiations and arriving at a consensus on issues of a practical and 




conduct between the parties, the  eligibility for admission to the negotiations and the criteria used; 
the manner of arriving at decisions, the levels of the negotiations, and the leadership of the process. 
The outcome of this session was the Rules of Procedure for the Burundi Peace Negotiations 
involving All the Parties to the Burundi Conflict, hereafter referred as ‘The Rules.’155
The Rules defined the participants, set levels and leadership of negotiations, codes of conduct as 
well as put in place modus operandi for the consultations and negotiations.156 This completed the 
process of addressing these cardinal issues which, as noted earlier, could only be effectively 
resolved by the parties themselves. 
The machinery for the negotiations
As mentioned above, the Declaration and Rules made it possible for the facilitator to put in place 
the machinery for the negotiations by establishing committees and the leadership of each 
committee. In his designation of the leadership of the committee, the facilitator appears to have 
made a deliberate decision not to recommend resource persons from the region. He requested the 
assistance of governments and institutions, national and international, to propose the names of 
people with proven experience, knowledge and competence. Their names were submitted to the 
Plenary Session for consideration and approval. 
Four chairpersons and four vice chairpersons, male and female, of different nationalities and 
races, from Africa, west and south, as well as outside were designated and approved to constitute 
the core of the Facilitator’s Team that was truly international in character157 Apart from the
chairpersons and vice chairpersons, there were additional resource persons designated by the 
facilitator that included people from the region including Tanzania which constituted the 
facilitator’s Team headed by the facilitator’s representative.
The process of the negotiations
As noted above the negotiations were carried out at three levels, the plenary, the committees and 
the consultations, at the most general and formal.158 There were also informal consultations outside 
and concurrent with the formal processes of the plenary, committees and consultations. The actual 
process was that commencing of the detailed negotiations on each agenda: there was a general 
debate in the plenary with all the parties in attendance.
  
155 Butiku Op. Cit p. 93
156 For details of those rules see Butiku, Op.Cit. pp. 93-94
157 For the composition of  different nationalities in the committees leadership see Butiku Op Cit. p. 97 
158 Interview with Dr Bismarck Mwansasu, Dar es salaam, 20 July 2006 
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During the debate, each delegation was given the opportunity to address the plenary to explain 
and put its perception, position and standpoint on the issues. For example, on the nature of a 
particular problem, the causes, attribution of primary responsibilities and the way forward. This was 
done frankly, freely, and transparently without inhibitions and fear of retribution.
It is within the committees that the actual negotiations on the detailed specifics were carried out 
with compromises hammered out either during the formal committee sessions or consultations, 
formal and informal, during or outside the formal sessions. There were five committees as noted 
above.
Each committee adopted its own methodology, pragmatic rules and style considered most 
appropriate to deliver. The complexity, involved and intricate nature of the issues had an additional 
decisive influence on the speed and progress of the work of each committee. However, although 
desirable, it is neither possible nor practical either to attempt an outline on the work of each 
committee or comment on the progress, particularly the difference in the speed of the progress.
It can only be pointed out here that the committees commenced in October 1998 with Committee 
I after general debate on the first agenda item during the second session in July 1998 and 
completing the composition of its leadership and membership. Committee II and Committee III 
followed and Committee IV started in January 1999. There were four successive committee 
sessions in January, March, May and July 1999 during which all the committees were reported to 
have made good progress.
A number of issues emerged and bogged down the work of the committees. The first and most 
contentious was the transitional arrangements and, in particular the leadership during the transition, 
that would start from the day of the signing of the Agreement to the installation of a new 
government after the elections. The second was the cessation of hostilities and arrangements for a 
permanent ceasefire agreement.
Underlying the second issue was the basic question of who should participate in the negotiations. 
There was a perception among the circles of the delegation of the Government that the most 
relevant parties were not the representatives of the sitting delegations of CNDD, PALIPEHUTU 
and even FLORINA for that matter, but of the ‘rebels’ whose forces they engaged in combat in the 
field. The demands to have the delegations of CNDD and PALIPEHUTU currently attending the 
negotiations unseated by the CNDD, FDD and PALIPEHUTU FNL delegations, on the claim that 
they were the bona fide spokesperson of the issues on the further complicated the problem.   
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The impasse on these issues appeared to have convinced the facilitator that the two issues could 
not be handled effectively by the parties. In his closing address to the July 1999 session, he 
indicated his intention to take the issues at a higher level of the Summit.159
The Informal Consultations            
The third level of negotiations was through consultations, some of which were informal. 
Negotiations at the informal level started during the May 1999 Committee meetings when the 
delegations of FRODEBU, CNDD, FLORINA, PL, PP, and PALIPEHUTU held separate 
consultations and agreed on the need to hold further talks to work out common strategies to adopt 
during the negotiations. They sought the assistance of the facilitator to arrange for those 
consultations after the May Committee Sessions. The request was granted and they were facilitated 
to hold their consultations. During the following Committee Session of July 1999, the parties started 
referring themselves as the Group of 7 or the G7.
That had an immediate impact on the environment of the negotiations and the most significant 
was that of the request by the delegations of ANNADE, ABASA, AV INTWARI, INKINZO, 
PARENA, PIT, PSD and PRP for a similar arrangement. The request was granted making it 
possible for the consultations to take place whose major outcome was the formation of the Group of 
8 or the G8. The remaining three parties, the Government, the National Assembly and UPRONA, 
followed suit by adopting the Group of 3 or the G3.  
The significance of this development lay in sensitising facilitation and the facilitator about the 
possibility that existed for reducing the positions to three that was easier to manage the handling of 
eighteen different positions. The most immediate was that of identifying the key actors and players 
from each group to negotiate with the other key actors and players and arrive at positions that would 
be ‘sold’ to the remaining members of the group. FRODEBU and CNDD were identified as the key 
actors and players from the G7, PARENA from the G8, and the Government, the National 
Assembly and UPRONA from the G3.
Unfortunately, the new arrangement was not put to a practical test in the September 1999 
consultations held in Dar es Salaam due to the deteriorating health of the facilitator. The subsequent 
lack of the physical presence of the facilitator robbed the process the drive and push that had always 
proved decisive in giving the negotiations the intended life and vigor. When the ‘key actors and 
players’ arrived in Arusha for reassembled September 1999 Committee Sessions, they did not have 
anything to deliver and the absence of the facilitator was very detrimental as there was nothing 
substantive that came out of the sessions. The death of Mwalimu Nyerere in October 1999 formally 




2.2.3.6 The Peace Negotiations under Nelson Mandela
The Regional Summit of November 1999 decided on Nelson Mandela as the new facilitator to 
replace the late Mwalimu Nyerere. In the formal acceptance of the designation, he stated that he 
would continue using the machinery of the negotiations that was already in place, use the 
facilitator’s Team but would add some to reinforce the team and continue to use Arusha as the 
venue.160 He further expressed his personal disappointment at the slow pace of the negotiations 
indicating a commitment to expedite the negotiations in order to bring them to an earlier conclusion. 
The first activity of Nelson Mandela as the facilitator was that of a formal address to the Heads of 
Delegations to the Burundi Peace Negotiations at a meeting held in Arusha on January 2000. He 
assured them that he had come with an open mind without any preconceived idea, opinion or 
position but only to listen to what they had to say. He reminded them of their responsibility to rise 
to the occasion and demonstrate that they are the true leaders the people of Burundi really 
needed.161
He further drew their attention to some of the basic issues underlying the Burundi conflict. He 
pointed to the gross socio-economic and political imbalances that are in favor of the Tutsi ethnic 
minority as the most fundamental cause. He was particular in disabusing the Tutsi from the fallacy 
of relying on might, the sheer power of the armed forces as the basis of their political power, 
strength and the bulwark of their safety, security and survival, arguing that the “the defense and 
security forces must represent all sections of the population-Hutu, Tutsi and Twa”162.
After his first consultation meeting early in January, later the same month Mandela addressed the 
UN Security Council. Apart from reporting the progress of the peace process, he outlined some 
challenges ahead of his task as facilitator. These included among others bringing those outside 
Arusha negotiations, creating link between the Arusha peace negotiations with reality of political 
life in Burundi, pulling support from international community in order to sustain the negotiations 
and the general ongoing efforts to achieve peace in Burundi.163  
Turning to the negotiations, he noted his concern over the non participation of CNDD-FDD and 
PALIPEHUTU-FNL. He announced his intention to bring them as full participants and, as a result, 
make the process more all inclusive.  He further announced his intention to bring the International 
Community much closer to the peace process by inviting the Heads of State and Governments from 
different parts and other persons in order to share experiences and lessons with the negotiators.
  
160 Address by H.E N Mandela to the Summit on Burundi Peace Negotiations on 21st February, 2000 Arusha, Tanzania. See 
also speeches made in the sessions of 16th January, 2000  and 27 March 2000 all in Arusha. 
161 Ibid.
162 Ibid.
163 United States, News from Washington File, US Department of State Washington File 19 January 2000. A web source 
http://www.usia.gov/cgi_bin/washfuiles/dis....aaf&l=products/washfile/newsitem.shtm accessed on 28 March 2007
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The Major Initiatives and Activities by Mandela can be divided into two main categories: namely 
widening the nature and composition of the participants and expediting the conclusion of the 
negotiations.
Widening the Nature and Composition of the Participants
There were two aspects to the widening of the nature and composition of the participants namely; 
internally, Mandela wanted the inclusion of the CNND-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL. There was a 
misconceived popular belief that the former facilitator, Mwalimu Nyerere, had deliberately refused 
to admit these groups without justification and for reasons best known to him. There was, however, 
a more fundamental problem of representation. The two demanded for the unseating of the 
delegations of the splinter groups of CNDD and PALIPEHUTU as a precondition for joining the 
negotiations.164 . 
The informal consultations and discreet talks were held in with the aim of inviting the CNDD-
FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL. In May 2000, the Facilitator arranged a meeting of Committee III 
be held in South Africa to which the leaders of both groups were personally invited to attend. None 
of the invited leaders attended and those who were sent to represent them refused to take part in the 
negotiations with the other members of Committee III, demanding the unseating of their respective 
splinter groups.
Mandela, in a similar gesture to his predecessor, did not accept the conditionality. He, 
nevertheless, found a way round the problem by putting in place machinery under the auspices of 
the Vice President of the Republic of South Africa and President Omar Bongo of Gabon that was 
parallel and outside the framework of the negotiating machinery165 of the Burundi Peace 
Negotiations to address the issue.
At the international level, the facilitator wanted to bring on board as many actors and players 
from the International Community as the major stakeholders.166 Apart from maximising cooperation 
and effectiveness, the involvement of such players was likely to give the Burundian participants the 
benefits of a wider exposure and learning from the examples and the experiences elsewhere from 
people with problems that were similar.
  
164 At first it was seen as if Mwalimu was opposing the rebels for simple reasons. His main argument was that the rebels 
must reconcile using their own mechanism within their organizations. Without which he considered unethical to unseat 
splinter groups from the negotiations. Attempts by new mediator also failed to attract them until he decided to use 
alternative methods of engaging them separately.   
165 This strategy was however criticized by some quarters as it was not beneficial to the process. For further discussion on 
this see International Crisis Report, Burundi after six months of Transition: Continuing the War or Winning Peace? Report  
No 46, 24 May 2002 p.20  
166 For example in its first session he invited many heads of state and government including US President Bill Clinton who 
managed to participate through video conferencing.
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Thus, the facilitator had used his name, standing and stature to invite many dignitaries to address 
the negotiators on different occasions throughout his leadership. This was a big boost to the Burundi 
Peace Process that pushed it further into an international limelight with a reassurance that their 
efforts had the backing and support of the International Community. This contributed to the faster 
conclusion of the negotiations.
Mandela’s major task on taking over as facilitator, as mentioned earlier, was to expedite the 
conclusions of the negotiations which up to then were going at a snail’s pace, partly up to then, the 
negotiators were still talking in generalities, in the abstract, and at the level of theory with greater 
concern on the terminology, style of formulation, rhetoric, verbiage, semantics and still showed a 
stubborn refusal to make compromises.
During the Plenary Session March 28, 2000, Mandela made proposals on the way forward for 
faster and expedited negotiations. He proposed that the parties analyse the remaining outstanding 
issues on which there had been no consensus, prepare their position on each issue and submit their 
proposals to the facilitator’s Team. Second, that facilitator’s Team would study and analyse all the 
proposals on merit and prepare compromise proposals that would be returned to the parties for 
further study, analysis, and comments, including some amendments.167 Third, that the parties would 
return their revised proposals to the facilitator’s Team for further study, analysis, and synthesis into 
final formulations which would constitute the basis of draft protocols of the Agreement.
On the basis of the above, the Facilitator’s Team prepared an action plan, a timetable and 
deadlines. July 17, 2000 was set as the date for the Facilitator’s Team and the parties to deliver the 
final compromise proposals in the form of a draft peace agreement and July 20, 2000 as the date for 
the formal signing of the agreement.
As noted above, there were two outstanding issues, the transitional institutions and the ceasefire 
and secession of hostilities. On the issue of the transitional institutions, a 36-month period of 
transition was proposed divided into two 18-month period each.168 It was furthermore proposed that 
during the first 18 month period, the President would come from the Tutsi family of parties, the 
former G 8 plus RADDES, which joined the process much later, and UPRONA and the Vice 
President from the G7. During the second 18 month period, the President would come from the G7 
and the Vice President from the other side. It was emphasised that the President and Vice Presidents 
of the transition would not be eligible to contest the first general elections. Each group was 
requested to designate its nominee.
  
167 See Mandela Speech 27th March 2000 Op. Cit. 
168 International Crisis Report. “Burundi neither War nor Peace ” ICG Report No.25,1 December 2000
52
The other proposed transitional institutions were the Implementation and Monitoring Committee 
and the transitional National Assembly whose composition and roles were elaborated in the specific 
provisions of the respective protocols of the draft agreement. 
On the second issue of the cessation of hostilities, the parties were urged to negotiate, make 
compromises and arrive at consensus. The major proposal made by the facilitator on this issue was 
that of the adoption of the formula on the composition of the country’s defense and security forces 
on the basis of a percentage of 50% Hutu and 50% Tutsi. This was carried out at two levels, the 
level of the Burundi Peace Negotiations in Arusha under Committee III and that of parallel talks 
outside the formal negotiating machinery.
When the parties reassembled for what had been scheduled as the final round on the eve of July 
17, 2000 it became evident that there were still various issues outstanding. For one thing, the parties 
refused to honour the promises made in May to accept the compromise proposals by the 
Facilitator’s Team by openly questioning and refusing to go along with some of the proposals.169
There were, indeed, the suggestions to renegotiate some of the issues on which there had been a 
consensus.
When the facilitator arrived on July 19, 2000 for the scheduled finalisation of the process on July 
20, 2000, he found out that the parties had not delivered on the promises made to complete the 
process by that date. Although disappointed, he had no option except to accept the reality of what 
had actually happened and proceeded to hold consultations on how to end the deadlock. He gave the 
parties more time to negotiate, iron out their differences, and make compromises for the larger 
interest of peace in Burundi. August 28, 2000 was announced as the date for the formal signing of 
the agreement. This gave the negotiators time to finalise the negotiations and the draft agreement.
2.2.3.7 The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi.  
 
The final Agreement was basically a summary of the outcome of the consultations and 
negotiations over the twenty six month period of the Burundi Peace Negotiations in Arusha and 
consisted of five protocols each based on the agenda items as noted above. One of the major 
underlying themes of the agreement was power sharing between the two ethnic groups which was 
reflected in the proposed electoral systems, the composition of the Legislature, both the National 
Assembly and Senate, the Executive, including the defense and security forces. Below is the outline 
of the main protocols of the agreement.
Protocol I: Nature of the Burundi Conflict, Problems of Genocide, Exclusion and Sanctions.170
  
169 Mwansasu, B “The Signing of the Peace Agreement” in Mpangala,G and  Mwasasu, D (eds), Op Cit pp 340-242. 
170 For full text visit http://www.usip.org/pa/burundi/pa_burundi_08282000_pr1.html
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The protocol seeks to address the past atrocities such as genocide, war crimes and other crimes 
against humanity which had befallen Burundi and create a mechanism to prevent their future 
recurrences. In order to achieve this, the protocol calls for the creation of mechanisms to prevent 
and eradicate such crimes. These include the establishment of a National Commission on Truth and 
Reconciliation, an International Judicial Enquiry Commission and International Criminal Tribunal 
to judge those guilty of those crimes. The protocol further commits the Burundians to fight all 
forms of discrimination.  
Protocol II: Democracy and Good Governance171
Perhaps this was the most difficult protocol to be concluded as it deals with administrative and 
constitutional matters which are the preconditions for the new democratic and non discriminative 
Burundian society. It tackles constitutional and transitional arrangements which would guide the 
country towards peace, stability and reconciliation. The protocol is divided into two chapters.  
Chapter one is about Constitutional Principles of the Post-Transitional Constitution whereas chapter 
two deals with Transitional Arrangements. There, however, remained gaps in the transitional 
arrangement that were later to bog down the implementation process.
Protocol III: Peace and Security for All172
The Protocol is divided into three chapters. The first chapter is concerned with peace and security 
for all. It underscores among others, the right of all Burundian citizens to live in peace and security 
without any discrimination and reiterates the duty of the state to guarantee citizens’ rights by 
protecting them. The second chapter is on Defense and Security. It sets the principles on mission, 
organisation, structure, composition, size, and criteria to determine the imbalances in the field of 
defense and security forces. The third chapter deals with Permanent Ceasefire and Cessation of 
Hostilities. There were also gaps in this last chapter as no agreement had been reached at the time of 
signing of the agreement.
Protocol IV: Reconstruction and Development 173  
This protocol is divided into three chapters. The first deals with the issues which surround the 
return of the refugees and sinitres.174  It provides the principles governing their return, resettlement 
and reintegration. The second chapter deals with Physical and Political Reconstruction. The chapter 
calls upon the government to initiate programs on rehabilitation, peace building, promotion of 
human rights and freedoms of the human persons, economic growth and long term development. 
  
171For full text visit  http://www.usip.org/library/pa/burundi/pa_burundi_0828200_pr2ch2.html
172 For full text visit  http://www.usip.org/library/pa/burundi/pa_burundi_0828200_pr3ch1.html
173 For full protocol visit http://www.usip.org/library/pa/burundi/pa_burundi_0828200_pr4ch3.html
174 According to Article I chapter II of  Protocol IV sinistres refer to all displaced, regrouped and dispersed persons and 
returnees
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The last chapter is on Economic and Social Development. It underscores the need for engaging into 
long term economic and social development to deal with issues such as poverty and address all 
obstacles hindering economic development. 
Protocol V Guarantee on Implementation of the Agreement175
The protocol serves as commitment to Parties to the Burundi Peace and Reconciliation and the 
guarantors to the implementation of the Agreement. This is done through the Implementation 
Monitoring Committee which comprised both domestic as well as external actors which include 
representatives of the UN, the OAU/AU and Regional Initiative on Burundi. Further commitment is 
to the international community to foresee the process through continuing financial and logistic 
support. 
2.2.3.8.0 Phase Five 
2.2.3.8.1 The Implementation of The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement 
2.2.3.8.1.0 Introduction 
The basic issues were left unsolved by the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, namely the 
transitional government and the negotiations of a ceasefire between the transitional government and 
the rebel groups. In between these two issues, a series of controversial agenda cropped up which 
jeopardised the whole peace process in Burundi. Because of this, it was aptly commented that the 
agreement was “a beginning and not an end”176 and “a mere foundation for a subsequent further 
process of highly complex negotiations”.177 For, it was obvious that the two issues would preoccupy 
Heads of the Regional Initiative, mediation team, the Transitional Government and the rebel 
movements.
The issues surrounding the transitional government which entailed the power-sharing agenda took 
the mediator Nelson Mandela more than a year to resolve. As a result, the incumbent President 
Buyoya had to remain in office for fifteen more months before he was inaugurated as an interim 
president for another eighteen months of the first period of transition. After a lengthy engagement 
of parties it was then declared that the first interim leader would be Pierre Buyoya whose tenure 
  
175 For full text visit http://www.usip.org/library/pa/burundi/pa_burundi_0828200_pr5.html
176 Bentley & Southall Op.Cit  p. 91 
177 Ibid.
55
would start on 1st November 2001 and would end on 30th April 2003 when Ndeyizeye would take 
over the presidency the following day. 
2.2.3.8.1.2 Ceasefire Negotiations
The question of bringing into the peace process those who were not party to the Arusha accord 
had to continue. Fortunately, the six Tutsi parties which boycotted the signing of the accord acceded 
to it later in September 2000 in Nairobi.178
The most difficult work was, however, the ceasefire negotiations. The negotiations with the two 
main groups namely Nkurunzinza’s CNDD-FDD and Agathon Rwasa led PALIPEHUTU-FNL 
were complicated because of the high stake the two had on the peace process particularly on 
military power balance. That is to say the two groups had a more destabilising factor of the peace 
process. Based on this factor, their terms of negotiations also became complicated because if 
accepted would make the Arusha agreement null and void.
The CNDD-FDD Nkurunzinza had among other conditions; wanted the mediator to reject its 
immediate rival (John Bosco Ndayikengurukiye led CNDD-FDD faction), demanded the post of 
Vice President, Commander in chief of the armed forces and the speaker of the National 
Assembly.179 Nkurunziza’s CNDD-FDD, at one occasion, went further to denounce the South 
African Vice President Jacob Zuma’s mediation and called for the return of the negotiations to 
Tanzania.
The PALIPEHUTU-FNL’s Rwasa, on the other hand, refused to recognise the Arusha accord and 
hence the interim president. The Agreement, on his part, did not deal adequately with the ethnic 
issues underlying the conflict.180 In fact, Rwasa wanted the previous military leaders-Jean Baptist 
Bagaza and Pierre Buyoya to be made accountable for the oppression of the Hutus.   
Despite these conditionalities which really put the Arusha Agreement in a precarious situation, 
the two rebel groups intensified their attacks in Burundi in a bid to force the government to give in 
to their demands or offer more concessions.
The intensification of attacks rendered the Transitional Government helpless and frustrated. In an 
attempt to break the deadlock, the Regional summit held in Nairobi, in November 2000, threatened 
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Following this strong position from the summit, a series of negotiations took place in January and 
April 2001 in Gabon under the mediation of the Gabonese President Omar Bongo. These were 
followed by negotiations in October the same year and February 2002 in Pretoria and the Vaal 
Dam, in South Africa respectively.182 A further meeting took place in March 2002, in Tanzania, 
where all Hutu groups including those signatory to the Arusha accord met. However, the 
Nkurunzinza and Rwasa groups did not attend. Further talks were later held in Dar es Salaam from 
12th to 26th August and on 18th through to 26th September 183  
In August 2002, the rebel groups and the Transitional Government convened in South Africa. 
After three weeks of extensive talks, the transitional government managed to sign a ceasefire 
agreement with both factions of Alan Mugabarabona’s FNL and Ndayikengurikiye’s CNDD-
FDD184, in an event which took place on the sideline of 18th Regional Summit held from 6th to 7th
October in Dar es Salaam. During this Summit, more pressure was exerted to CNDD-FDD and 
PALIPEHUT-FNL to engage into direct talks with the Transitional Government. It was further 
decided that the Summit should evaluate the situation after thirty days implying that those ceasefire 
negotiations had to be concluded by that time.185  
On 3rd December 2002 Nkurunzinza’s CNDD-FDD signed a mediation agreement with the 
Transitional Government. Early the following year, on 27th January 2003 the three rebels groups 
signed an additional Memorandum of Understanding(MoU) with the Transitional Government 
establishing a Joint Ceasefire Commission and also setting date for the return to Burundi of 
Ndayikengurukiye and Mugabarabona.186
Nkurunzinza’s CNDD-FDD started dragging its feet and announced the suspension of ceasefire 
talks with the government. He was put under pressure by the Regional Summit to reinstate the 
ceasefire. There were even talks of using force to coerce rebels to engage in ceasefire talks.187
The regional pressure resulted in the first ever direct talks between Burundi transitional President 
Domitien Ndeyizeye and Pierre Nkurunzinza, held in Sun City, South Africa, from 21st to 24th
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Progress, however, was made on reforms in the military which was a big step towards peace. The 
Regional Summit which took place from 15th to 16th September 2003 could not resolve the deadlock 
prompting the interim president Ndeyizeye to walk out of the summit.189  
After the summit, there were extensive diplomatic efforts and pressure which resulted in the 
signing of the Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defense and Security, and Power Sharing on the 8th
October 2003 which paved the way for the implementation of the December 2002 ceasefire 
agreement. The Protocol provided for the admission of the CNDD-FDD into the Transitional 
Government.190 On 2nd November another agreement was signed. This was Protocol on Outstanding 
Political, Defense and Security Power Sharing Issues in Burundi. In addition to this agreement, the 
parties reached a compromise on framework for the ‘inclusive’ reforms of Burundi security 
institutions referred to the Forces Technical Agreement (FTA).191 Following this agreement, in 
March 2004 members of the CNDD-FDD took offices in the government and parliament.192
On the other hand, not so long after this agreement, PALIPEHUTU-FNL- Rwasa held talks with 
President Ndeyizeye in Holland from 19th through 20th January 2004. Three months later during its 
National Congress held from 18th to 21st April in Kigoma Tanzania, FNL lessened its position 
regarding peace negotiations by announcing “to immediately cease hostilities with the government 
and its determination to negotiate a ceasefire with Transitional Government”.193 It took a very long 
time, however, for the FNL-Rwasa to reach an agreement. It was only on September 7, 2006 that 
The Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the government of Burundi and rebel group FNL 
–Aghaton Rwasa was signed in Dar es Salaam.194 At this juncture, it is important, however, to make 
a few comments on the transitional period, in particular on the constitutional referendum and the 
elections that completed the transition.
2.2.3..8.1.3 The Transitional Institutions
Transitional Arrangements which provided for Transitional Institutions fall under chapter two of 
Protocol II, Democracy and Good Governance. Among the Transitional Institutions was the 
Transitional Legislature which was made up of the National Assembly and a Senate, a transitional 
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Executive, A Judiciary and other transitional institutions as set forth in the protocol.195 The 
Transitional Executive which is the Transitional Government and interim presidency has been 
discussed above.
The transitional arrangements were under the supervision of the Implementation and Monitoring 
Committee (IMC). The committee which was established under Article 3 of Protocol V, Guarantees 
on Implementation of the Agreement, was charged with functions of following up, monitoring, 
supervising and coordinating the implementation of the agreement as provided in the respective 
protocols.196 Under the Chairmanship of the representative of the UN and a membership drawn 
mostly from Burundian actors and players, the IMC played an indispensable role in the successful 
implementation of the Agreement under very difficult conditions and, without which, the record 
would not have one of successful delivery that is being reported.
The transitional Legislature is another example of the transitional institutions that have proved to 
have played another important proactive role in making of the Agreement operative, effective and 
fully functioning. One such role, although neither fully appreciated nor properly recognised, has 
been that of giving legality to the various provisions in the protocols on the actions to be taken, the 
activities to be undertaken of an operational and practical nature, that were necessary to facilitate 
the implementation of the Agreement. The various enabling legislations enacted during the 
transition are the most illustrious examples than can be given. The discussion on some of those 
legislations follows.
The Referendum on the Constitution and The Elections  
The transitional period provided for the installation of a new constitution which was to give way 
for the new legislative institutions and a new leadership through national general elections. The new 
constitution provides for two types of elections namely direct and indirect.  The so called direct 
elections were conducted in referendum, communes’, parliamentary and the so called ‘hill’ 
elections.  The indirect elections are for electing the senate and the president where elections were 
conducted through electoral colleges for the senators whereas the president is elected by both senate 
and national assembly. Below is a synopsis of these elections.
The Constitutional Referendum
The first on the process was constitutional Referendum which was held on 28th February 2005. 
Among the issues provided in the draft constitution were guarantees on representations of different 
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ethnic groups in various public key institutions like the parliament, the army and the government. 
The draft constitution was overwhelmingly supported and approved.197 The results showed that 88 
percent of the 3.1 million eligible voters took part, of which about 90 percent had voted yes for the 
new constitution.198  
Communal Elections
Administratively Burundi is divided into 129 Communes. Those communes elected a total of 
3,225 councilors in 3rd June 2005. Although the elections were declared free and fair, in few 
constituencies, they were to be rerun because of violence. The results were in favor of CNDD-FDD 
party which earned 55 percent of the counselors.
Parliamentary Elections. 
These were held, a month after commune elections, on 5th July 2005. The elections which created 
a lot of anxiety were successful in the sense that they did not bring any serious controversy which 
could endanger the peace and stability. It received a clean sheet from the observers.199 About thirty 
political parties participated in the elections vying for 100 seats. According to African Elections 
Database, the final results, however, showed that CNDD-FDD had firmly consolidated its
preliminary victories by winning 64 seats.200 Its nearest challenger was FRODEBU with 30 seats 
followed by UPRONA 15 seats, CNDD 4 seats, 2 seats went to Movement for the Rehabilitation of 
Citizens-Rurenzangemero and 3 to Twa members. To adhere to the constitutional requirements201
for distribution of seats, eighteen more members were co-opted. 
District Elections
To ensure smooth running of the district and people participation, the constitution has instituted 
district councils which consists of five elected members resulting from a direct vote from 
independent candidates. The council’s duration is five years.
Elections of the Senate.
These were held on 29th July 2005 where the senators were elected using the indirect system of 
Electoral College. In  each of the seventeen provinces two senators-Hutu and Tutsi were elected, 
three from the Twa and the four former presidents become members of the senate by virtue of being 
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former heads of State. Women occupy at least thirty percent as was the case of the parliament. In 
these elections too CNDD-FDD continued to show its strength by scooping 32 seats against 5 of 
FRODEBU, 3 of CNDD, 2 of UPRONA 2 and 3 of the Twa.202
Presidential Elections 
The completion of the lower level elections was very fundamental for the running of presidential 
elections. For the members of the Senate and the National Assembly were the ones entrusted to 
elect the president. Pierre Nkurunzinza was the only candidate submitted to the joint session of 
Parliament and the Senate on 19 August and subsequently approved by 151 votes against 9 with one 
abstention.203 He took oath on the 26th of August to become the first president of the new Burundi.   
Repatriation of Refugee and the Resettlement of Displaced persons
The Repatriation of the Refugees and their Resettlement as well as that of the other Displaced 
Persons is the other important aspect of the implementation of the Agreement. This was made 
possible after the signing of a Tripartite Agreement between the government of Tanzania, The 
government of Burundi and The United Nations High Commission for Refugees.204 So far the big 
part of Burundi refugees who were in Tanzania has returned home. The process has contributed 
significantly to the consolidation of peace building efforts in Burundi.
Apart from the above illustrated examples of implementation of the Arusha agreement, there were 
many activities which complement the implementation of the same. These included making of 
various laws which pave the way for realisation of the agreement. For example, reforms of the army 
and police forces, President Ndayizeye signed the law affecting those reforms in early 2005.205  
2.2.3.9 Factors that influenced Implementation of the Agreement.
The election of President Nkurunzinza by the joint session of the National Assembly and Senate 
in August 2006 signified the implementation of various aspects of the Agreement. The signing and 
implementation of Ceasefire agreements and end of hostilities also add to that big achievement in 
implementing the agreement. 
However as was the peace negotiations, the implementation phase was confronted with different 
obstacles which hindered its pace and affected the implementation time table. Below is a brief of 
those obstacles.
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Delay of the start of the Transitional government. 
This was caused by the Tutsi parties-The G 10 which took a year to decide who should be the 
interim president. This affected transitional period and consequently affected the implementation 
timetable. For example elections timetable had to be postponed.    
Rebels’ activities 
Rebel groups which boycotted the Arusha Negotiations mainly Nkurunzinza-led CNDD-FDD and 
Rwasa- led PALIPEHUTU FNL contributed to the snail pace of the implementation of the 
agreement. A lot of resources were used to convince them to sign the ceasefire agreement. Their 
military activities had direct negative impact to the Agreement. First, it created frustrations within 
the Transitional Government and secondly it led to the insecurity and hindered activities geared to 
support people. Their activities even affected support from would-be financiers. Whilst some had 
their pledges withheld until the signing of ceasefire and others failed even to pledge until the 
situation had normalised.
Internal squabbles within political parties and rebel groups.
Misunderstandings within political parties created an atmosphere of insecurity in Burundi during 
the transitional period. It was the same to rebel movements.
Delay of international support
Although the international support was and still is a very crucial element of the peace process, 
delay of support in the form of pledges hindered efforts to implement the agreement. Some, as said 
earlier, had tied up their pledges with the signing of ceasefire agreement. Hence, sometime access to 
resources became difficult.  
2.2.3.10Lessons to be learnt from Burundi Peace Process
Many lessons can be learnt from the Burundi Peace Process with both theoretical and practical 
relevance. Among them are the following;
Identification of conflict protagonists and stakeholders 
The peace process has shown that when conflict erupts and when one decides to mediate, clear 
apprehension of the main actors is imperative. The process should be all inclusive to avoid negative 
forces as well as to prevent clear-cut and extreme divides. The research asserts that the failure of the 
two first rounds of talks was mainly attributed to this fact. Entrusting the negotiations to the two 
protagonists who represented the country’s ethnic divide was a non-starter. The research appreciates 
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the fact that the first All Parties Talks managed to set and agree on agenda in a short time because 
of the diversity of players involved as opposed to the previous two where parties defined the 
conflict in high stakes.
African solutions to African Problems 
The peace process has practically demonstrated the saying that ‘where there is a will there is a 
way’. African leaders in general and those of the Regional Initiative have not only demonstrated 
that Africans are able to handle their problems but also their willingness and commitment to solve 
them. Two lessons can be drawn here; one is, Africans can only solve their problems if they clearly 
identify and admit them, and then united under their spirit of Pan Africanism. Secondly, if they 
have political will. The Burundi peace process has proved both. Whilst their differences, but guided 
by the political will, the Regional leaders, assisted Burundians to achieve peace.
Clear conceptualisation of the Conflict
Giving the right conceptualisation of the conflict in the first place is very important in a region 
with homogeneous societies. This normally assists the regional players, in the case of Burundi 
conflict, to have the right perspective in solving the conflict. By giving Burundi conflict the 
regional focus, it made it easy to see how dangerous the Burundi conflict was to the regional peace 
and security. Hence Burundi conflict formed part of the regional leaders’ efforts to solve other 
conflicts within the region as a way of stabilising the region. The signing of the Dar es Salaam 
Declaration on Peace, Security and Development in the Great Lakes Region is the manifestation of 
this conceptualisation.     
Regional concerns
Relating to the above lesson is the importance of setting up of regional settings/bodies which will 
be used to collectively address certain issues which affect the region. The Great Lakes Region 
which led to the creation of the Regional Initiative on Burundi was a result of regional concerns 
particularly the conflicts which the region was facing. The internal conflicts in some states within 
the region in which other states directly or indirectly were involving themselves in caused fear of 
regional wars. In the absence of such arrangements like the ECOWAS of West Africa, it took too 
long to deal with those conflicts including that of Burundi.    
Sanctions
The use of sanctions as a motivational instrument in a conflict situation like that of Burundi calls 
for a clear and extensive study on its effectiveness to deliver the intended results on the one hand 
and its implications on the part of the state actors on the other hand. While the Regional Initiative 
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had well conceived that the sanctions against Burundi military regime would act as a motivational 
instrument to encourage the latter to return to civil rule, it seemed that it had considered neither 
their practicality nor its implications to the diplomatic relations within the region. While there were 
signs of the impact of the sanctions which had somehow influenced regime change of attitude, the 
flaws in its implementation rendered the whole idea effectless. The research is of the opinion that 
had the Regional Initiative considered diplomatic consequences and the sanctions it would have to 
the immediate neighbors particularly Tanzania, it could well have avoided the diplomatic raw 
between Burundi’s military government and Tanzania. This would also have a more positive and 
rapid impact on solving the conflict. 
Mandela and South African mediation 
The change of mediator from Mwalimu- following his death, to former President Nelson Mandela 
brought some controversy particularly when the later decided to step down after the signing of the 
Arusha Peace Agreement. It is still not clear why Mandela passed the task to his Deputy and when 
the latter was relieved of his duties, the work was entrusted to a minister. The question still is who 
succeeded Nyerere? Was it Mandela or the government of South Africa? It seemed that there were 
no clear guidelines on the part of the Regional Initiative on this, something which needs clear 
consideration for the benefit of similar future events.
Dependence on Resources from outside 
Whilst political will is crucial in dealing with African problems, lack of resources is important 
particularly in ensuring ownership of the process. Relying on foreign resources is a major setback as 
it proved during the Burundi peace process. When conflicts of interests become obvious with the 
financiers it is always the other end which suffers as the latter withholds its resources. This leads to 
delay and non-performance of the programs that ultimately derails the process.    
Conclusion
The main conclusion could be the general one: so far so good and all is well that ends well. The 
Agreement has been held, implemented and the first elected government has survived a longer test 
of time than the first experience in 1993. Taking on board, first, CNDD FDD and, later, 
PALIPEHUTU FNL is further evidence that the process of peace building is on track and firmly on 
course. It has been a very long and arduous track since the peace process started with the 
identification of the relevant Burundian actors and players who would commit themselves to the 
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political solution of the conflict until the inauguration of a new elected President in August last 
year. 
There is no doubt that it is the Burundian actors and players who have made it possible for the 
track to have reached the desired objective-peace, stability and reconciliation. The Burundi Peace 
Process is an experience and an illustrious example of what a committed and determined people are 
capable of doing and able of achieving if they are properly motivated and effectively facilitated. 
This is notwithstanding the obstacles typical of such a deeply divided society, in particular, in the 
case of Burundi, the concerns over the safety, security and survival of the Tutsi as an ethnic 
minority and their accompanying fears of extermination by the Hutu ethnic majority.      
There is, nevertheless, need to acknowledge and give full recognition to the potential role of 
outside actors and players who assisted the protagonists to see the rationale and benefits likely to be 
derived from the peace dividend that was delivered through the political and constitutional 
dispensation. The Burundi Peace Process is an experience with rich examples on the contribution 
made by Tanzania, the Regional Initiative, the AU and International Community in the respective 
roles played at the various capacities from the early phase of peace making to the recent phase of 




THE ROLE OF TANZANIA IN THE BURUNDI PEACE PROCESS
3.0 Introduction
In chapter two, the study concentrated on the peace process, particularly the Arusha peace 
negotiations highlighting the main issues, processes and the signing of the peace agreement. Focus 
was also on the implementation of the agreement which included discussion on the transitional 
period which included setting up the transitional institutions and the ceasefire negotiations. The 
process, as it was revealed, involved different players with Tanzania as one of them.
This chapter focuses on the role of Tanzania in the Burundi’s Peace Process. The study starts by 
tracing and examining Tanzania-Burundi relations overtime. It then looks at factors that have 
influenced Tanzania’s involvement in the peace process. The chapter further looks at the reasons 
why Tanzania was chosen to host the Burundi Peace Negotiations and how South African 
involvement affected that of the former. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of Tanzania’s 
role and highlights the major lessons learnt from its participation.           
3.1 Tanzania-Burundi Relations
During the early years of colonisation Burundi, Rwanda and the then Tanganyika were jointly 
subjugated under the German imperial power through its colonial agent-German East Africa –from 
1888 to 1916. After the First World War, Burundi and Rwanda were given to Belgium, while 
Tanganyika became a British protectorate. The discussion in this section on Tanzania-Burundi 
relations only starts with the decolonisation process in the late 1950s to the present.
In the pre-independence period, the relations between the two countries were conducted through 
their national political movements; in this instance Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) for 
Tanganyika and UPRONA for Burundi. While these were unofficial relations, they, nonetheless, 
formed the foundation during the post independence ties.
The leader of TANU Julius Kambarage Nyerere spearheaded the relations with the other 
nationalist movements in the region. He was instrumental in the formation of the Pan African 
Freedom Movement for East, Central, and Southern Africa-PAFMECSA206, which was founded in 
September 1958 in Mwanza, Tanzania, being the successor of the Pan African Freedom Movement 
  
206 PAFMECA changed to PAFMESCA after widening its membership from only East and Central to include those of 
Southern Africa region.
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for East and Central Africa-PAFMECA.207 The primary functions of these regional bodies were to 
coordinate and support national programs and efforts to accelerate the attainment of independence
in the region and Africa in general. 
Nyerere, who later became the chairman of PAFMESCA, met various nationalist leaders in 
Africa. It was during this time that he met Prince Louis Rwegasore the leader of UPRONA, in 
Burundi and started developing a close relationship. It is believed that Nyerere, through TANU 
tactically and financially supported Rwegasore and his party in their struggle against Belgian 
colonialists. It is, indeed, alleged that Nyerere and Rwegasore had secretly agreed to form a 
federation when their countries attained independence.208 In 1957, on his way to Accra, Ghana, 
Mwalimu made a stopover in Bujumbura where he met Rwegasore. In their discussion it was 
claimed that Mwalimu had told his counterpart that “you [Rwegasore] are lucky, you have a nation 
[Burundi]...but I am trying to build one [Tanzania]”209. Mwalimu’s belief was that Burundi was a 
unified state with only two or three ethnic groups sharing the same culture and language unlike 
Tanzania which had more than one hundred and twenty ethnic groups speaking different languages. 
However both their desire to form a federation and Mwalimu’s belief of a united Burundi were 
thwarted following the assassination of Rwegasore, a Prime Minister-elect, on 13th October 1961 a 
few months before independence.  
After independence, both countries shared common values in their foreign policies. They both 
supported liberation movements as well as belonged to the Non-Aligned Movement to avoid the 
East-West political and military alliances. The two countries recognised, from the very beginning, 
the danger of tying themselves to either of the blocs.
At the bilateral level, the two countries concluded various agreements and protocols of 
cooperation in various fields from the early years of independence until the early 1990s when 
Burundi started to experience extreme internal political turmoil. In May 1971 the then President of 
Tanzania the late Mwalimu Julius Nyerere made a state visit to Burundi. The communiqué issued at 
the end of his visit reaffirmed the critical role the transport sector had been playing as far as 
relations between the two countries were concerned.
The communiqué quoted the Tanzanian President acknowledging that the Dar es Salaam port as 
well as Tanzania central railway line represented a vital link for Burundi as regards her economic 
and commercial relations with the outside world. Furthermore he assured his counterpart, President 
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Jean Baptist Bagaza that his government attached high priority to the transport problem of Burundi 
and more efforts were being made to modernise the central railway line.210
However, at the very diplomatic level, the presence of Hutu refugees in Tanzania, since the ‘first 
wave’ of refugees from Burundi following the 1972 massacre, created a kind of uneasiness on the
part of Burundi211. Indeed on certain occasions this created a black spot in the relations of the two 
countries as will be demonstrated in the course of the discussion later.  Since the 1972 massacres 
many Hutus took refuge in Tanzania and the government in Burundi was suspicious that the Hutu 
refugee in Tanzania could regroup and form an opposition movement against the Bujumbura 
government.
During many occasions when the two countries met particularly at the ministerial consultations, 
the issue of refugees was discussed. However it was in a more covert way under the agenda of 
border security, immigration, illegal trade and movement of people along the border of the two 
countries.212
This mistrust was reinforced by the Hutu incursions in Southern Burundi in 1972 which sparked 
mass killings of Hutus by government forces and resulted in the invasion of Tanzania on 29th June 
1973 by the Burundian armed forces which attacked refugee camps along the border within 
Tanzania. The attack left ten civilians dead. 
The government of Tanzania, it is said, reacted swiftly but silently, by imposing sanctions on 
goods to and from Burundi. However, according to the US Department of State’s Archives, it was 
the dockworkers that appeared to have taken the action against Burundi goods. A memorandum 
from Thomas Pickering, Executive secretary to Mr. Henry Kissinger–The then Secretary of State 
confirms this by noting that “as a result of the strikes into Tanzania, however, Tanzania 
dockworkers had been boycotting goods bound to and from Burundi”213 The diplomatic bickering 
between the two neighbours ended after mediation by Zairean government where The Presidents of 
Tanzanian and Burundi met in Dar es Salaam on 21st July 1973 under the chairmanship of President 
Mobutu Seseko.
The outcome of the meeting was a joint communiqué in which Tanzania accepted to resume 
normal relations with Burundi including economic and commercial relations and Burundi and the 
latter, on its part, expressed its regrets over the June 29th incident and accepted to pay compensation 
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to the victims of the said incident.214 The amount of compensation was worked out later by the two 
parties and was agreed during the protocol signed later in November, the same year. The Protocol 
affirmed the June statement by heads of state and stated that Burundi government would pay 
Tanzanian shillings 3,758,672.00 which was to be effected not later than 30th March the following 
year.215  
The normalisation of relations between the two countries after the 1972 and 1973 incidents saw 
them engaged in more constructive undertakings with emphasis on, among others; cooperation on 
enhancing transport facilities for Burundi goods, improving trade, close monitoring of movements 
of people along the borders and improving cultural relations.
The two countries continued to exchange high level delegations including those of their heads of 
state. In 1980 Burundi and Tanzania established a Joint Permanent Commission to consolidate and 
continue their historical relations by exploring new areas of cooperation. One of the key areas of 
cooperation was, of course, transport. Burundi, as a landlocked state, relies heavily on Tanzania in 
the transportation of its goods. It is the easiest and most convenient gateway to the outside world 
and that is why the issue of transport cooperation between the two has always dominated their 
bilateral relations.
The year 1988 saw another wave of refugees from Burundi into Tanzania and the resumption of 
refugee mistrust. The Bujumbura government pressed for an Extradition Agreement between the 
two countries. The agreement was signed during Buyoya’s state visit to Tanzania the same year.216
As far as Burundi was concerned, the agreement was aimed at nabbing the so called ‘criminals’ 
from Burundi escaping to Tanzania. However, in reality and as a matter of fact, it seemed that it 
was part of the strategy of the Burundi’s regime to enable it pursue the Hutu insurgents fleeing from 
that country to seek refuge into Tanzania. 
In conclusion, the relations between the two countries were dominated by two critical factors 
namely Burundi’s landlocked nature which made it rely on Tanzania for transportation and the 
refugee factor which describes the social relations in Burundi and Rwanda as well. In addition, it is 
relevant to note that these relations were affected by lack of continuity due to the frequent change of 
leadership in Burundi. Notwithstanding all these, the two countries have been enjoying cordial 
relations.  
The assassination of President Ndadaye in October 1993, a few months after his swearing-in, 
resulted in a new wave of refugees from Burundi into Tanzania. This was immediately followed by 
the death of the second Burundi President and genocide in Rwanda. Both events led to further 
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influx of refugees into Tanzania. By mid 1994 Tanzania was faced with civil wars in two of its 
small neighbors and had to do something about it.  It is within this background that one should 
examine Tanzania’s role in the Burundi Peace Process.         
3.2 Tanzania’s Involvement in the Burundi Peace Process
“States have different motives to be involved in conflict management process between other 
states. Their motives may include humanitarian (moral) concerns, interests in regional 
stability….states may be also concerned about their own security-economic, political, military, or 
humanitarian-challenged by a conflict in neighboring country” 217  
The above quote opens this section’s discussion on why Tanzania took part in the initiative to 
find the lasting solution to the Burundi conflict. In chapter one, the section on analytical framework 
highlighted the main factors, which the study asserts that are the main motives behind Tanzania’s 
search for peace in Burundi.                                                                                       
The motives had influenced on what Tanzania could do or not–thereof–in the peace process. 
These motives emanated from both its desire to safeguard its national interests as well as 
humanitarian motives precisely performing its moral obligations.
These factors (motives) include inter alia national security concerns, economic and development 
needs, diplomatic imperatives and the refugee question within the region which was negatively 
affecting its society. Both factors have their roots in the country’s domestic development policies 
and plans, and were given prominence in its foreign policy goals and objectives towards its 
neighbors vis a vis regional economic, security and development cooperation.
It might be useful at this juncture to point out that Tanzania’s efforts in resolving Burundi conflict 
are part and parcel of Regional Initiatives. However, Tanzania has always been associated with 
conflicts in the region including that of Burundi because of its geo-strategic position in relation to 
its neighbors. The geo-strategic location gives Tanzania a positive and comparative advantage 
during the time of peace, but becomes highly vulnerable during the time of civil conflicts in its 
neighbours as it had been from mid 1990s when the region experienced persistent civil wars and 
violence in Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
One of the cornerstones of Tanzania’s foreign policy has been its Panafricanism aptly stated in 
the declaration that her own independence was incomplete if other African nations were still under 
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colonial oppression. This strong Pan Africanist belief has seen Tanzania offering tireless support to 
the national independence efforts in the continent and racial discrimination in South Africa. 
Equally, Tanzania has come to link its national peace and stability with that of the whole region. 
A quote form John Salaita confirms this position: “Tanzania believed that national peace and 
security would be achieved only when the region as a whole was enjoying peace. A volatile region 
was clearly a serious threat to national security in many ways.”218
Thus, to Tanzania, conflicts in Burundi and in other neighbouring countries, like Rwanda and 
DRC, are seen as a potential threat to its national security. Tanzania perceives national security in a 
wider perspective which includes not only threat from outside forces as maintained by the classical 
realist school of thought219, but among others political stability and national cohesion, having stable, 
steady and shared economic growth through investments and promotion of good governance.220
Tanzania had, thus, to participate in the search for peace within the region. There were, however, 
many other factors that shaped Tanzania’s involvement in the Burundi Peace Process. These are 
examined below.
3.2.1 The Refugee factor
Tanzania has been hosting refugees since 1959 when ethnic violence took place in Rwanda in 
what is commonly referred to as the Hutu Social Revolution. Many Tutsi fled to Tanzania. This was 
followed by the 1972 massacre in Burundi which forced hundred of thousands of Hutu to seek 
refuge in Tanzania. These refugees were well received and some were even naturalized.
However, the crisis in the 1990s particularly following the 1993 coup d’etat in Burundi, the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda and subsequent fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo produced 
millions of asylum seekers within the region with many gravitating towards Tanzania. At one time 
during the Rwanda crisis Tanzania received more than five hundred thousand refugees in less than 
twenty four hours. This had a big negative impact on Tanzanian society in terms of inter alia 
political, economic, social as well as in its national security.
The refugees who are running away from persecution normally have, first, the tendency of 
regrouping and possibly organising themselves to return back as rebels or in any other forms of 
resistance against the incumbent regime. This becomes very problematic, on the part of the host 
nation, especially one with porous borders with the refugees’ country of origin as is the case of 
Burundi and Tanzania. 
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Second, refugees normally run away with arms and enter with them into the asylum country. In 
the case of Tanzania, a lot of small and light arms were smuggled into the country during the period 
under review.221 According to Landau, in Kigoma district for example, hidden firearms like AK-47s 
were easily uncovered by the villagers and sometimes easily sold at a price of between USD15 and 
USD 20.222 What made more arms get into Tanzania was among others the lack of proper 
verification at entry points for those who use official entries as during crisis these refugees entered 
in thousands. Besides, many enter using unofficial routes. For example in February 1995, the then 
President of Tanzania, Ali Hassan Mwinyi had to appeal to the international community for 
assistance to disarm Rwandan refugees in Tanzania.223
The two created triple security problems. Firstly, it increased border tension with neighbours,
particularly Burundi and mistrust between the two countries. Secondly, crimes associated with the 
use of arms increased tremendously in the countries that hosted refugees in the period under review 
because of the availability of firearms as noted above. Thirdly, the large number of refugees who
sometimes outnumbered the local population in the area created tension between refugees and host 
communities. For example, in 1994 Ngara district received a record of 700,000 refugees, more than 
four times its population of 160,000.224 Such a big number of refugees increased pressure on 
resources that had to be shared with the local population.   
The refugees forced the government to spend more resources on security for both refugees as well 
as its border areas. This meant diverting funds from development programs for the unbudgeted 
events.           
Tanzania’s response on refugees has always been positive as confirmed by a Burundi returnee 
who says: “Tanzania’s support to Burundi [refugees] over the years has been considerable.”225 The 
government’s strategy was to always have the refugees integrated in the society if they choose to do 
so and hence, the naturalisation exercise in the 1980s. However, as the numbers of refugees 
skyrocketed, Tanzania was compelled to reorient its policies and domestic legal framework on 
refugees to suit the new emerging refugee environment and the challenges of facing the whole 
question of hosting refugees from neighbouring countries.
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Therefore it shifted its refugee policy from what was considered as ‘open door policy’ to a more 
restrictive one with a focus on repatriation of refugees. This was criticised not only by human rights 
activists but also looked at suspiciously by some of its development partners.226 Furthermore, 
refugees too were critical on the new policy although they related it to the change of mediation of 
the peace negotiations. The same returnee quoted above compares the situation and notes that: “the 
role of the facilitator has been shifted from Tanzania to South Africa. It appears that the Tanzanians 
now feel sidelined, and in consequence their attitude towards the Burundian refugees seems to have 
become less supportive”227 Therefore the search for peace in Burundi was partly linked to the 
easing of refugee pressure on Tanzania’s resources and security.        
3.2.2 The Political and social tension
 
The large influx of refugees created internal political tension and an environment of discontent 
among the local communities. First the refugees were perceived by the host communities as 
receiving more services from the state. Secondly, refugees came to be associated with all social 
evils in the host areas including armed banditry, prostitution and even increased costs of living 
which were caused by the increased prices of commodities due to the influx of foreign workers228 in 
those areas.      
As the country approached its first multiparty elections in 1995, after more than twenty seven 
years of single party system, the refugee issue became politicised. The incumbent government was 
constantly blamed for giving priorities to refugees while its own citizens were suffering. This was 
supported by the changed perception of the majority of Tanzanians on the refugee problem which 
had been taking place overtime. Traditionally, refugees were coming from countries which were 
under foreign occupation or oppressive regimes such as apartheid South Africa. In this regard, 
refugees were perceived by the locals as “political not humanitarian”229 and therefore, with all 
coming from independent countries, the justification of giving them asylum, “to the majority of 
Tanzanians is entirely absent.”230
Therefore, this had later forced the government to change the laws governing refugees in the 
country. Part of the solutions, however, lay in possible repatriation of refugees to their countries of 
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origin. But repatriation can not be undertaken when the reasons which made one to seek foreign 
asylum are still there. And on humanitarian grounds, Tanzania could not forcefully do so. 
Therefore, the only solution to the refugee issue was to address the core causes of the problem; that 
is the conflict in the country of origin, in this case Burundi.
The refugees, as noted earlier, constituted a source of tension between Tanzania and its 
neighbors. The mere fact that Hutu refugees were running from ‘unjustifiable’ repression by their 
own government made Tanzania sympathetic with their plight. This created constant diplomatic 
tension between the two countries. Burundi consistently accused Tanzania of harboring and 
assisting rebel groups which were fighting the government.
The relations between the two countries had by mid 1997 deteriorated to such an extent that they 
almost went to war with each other.231 Furthermore, Tanzania’s sympathy to the Hutu refugees led 
Burundi to question the impartiality of the government of Tanzania, in general, and Mwalimu Julius 
Nyerere’s mediation role232 in particular. Both were accused of being pro-Hutu; the majority of 
Burundi’s refugees in Tanzania as well as the rebel groups. These allegations, however, were not 
new. When Hutu refugees from Rwanda fled into Tanzania during the 1994 genocide, the RPF led 
Rwandan government leveled the same allegations against Tanzania.
Burundi’s accusations were exacerbated by the occasional rebel incursions into that country from 
Tanzania which the government in Bujumbura directly attributed to what it described as ‘Tanzanian 
authorities’ support to the rebels and allowing the refugee camps in western Tanzania to be used for 
their recruitment and military training. Such a situation compelled Tanzania to strengthen its 
defense forces to secure its borders from movements of rebels as well as against any infiltrations of 
Burundi forces which frequently crossed the borders claiming to pursue the rebels.   
This also had a negative bearing on Tanzania’s image in the international community as part of 
that community showed sympathy to the allegations raised by Burundi. This resulted in a covert 
reduction in the financial support for the peace process efforts that were being hosted by 
Tanzania.233  
Tanzania’s diplomatic undertakings were affected by frequent regime changes in Burundi and 
other neighbouring countries such as Rwanda and the DRC. Due to these changes Tanzania had, 
invariably, from time to time, to find ways to adjust to the constant regime changes. New regimes 
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not only attracted different players with varying interests but also created different alliances within 
the region. As Balch-Lindsay and Enterline noted: “the greatest the frequency of neighboring states 
[including from distant far in the case of Burundi], the greater the number of interested parties 
resulting in an increase in the general complexity of the civil war”234
Conflict and civil wars in the region attracted many players to the scene. Among the players were 
Tanzania’s main development partners. Tanzania and the other players had neither a common vision 
of these conflicts nor shared common interests. This became a major challenge in that the country 
had to play a balancing game of preserving its integrity and remaining in the good books of its 
partners. 
3.2.2 The Socio - economic factors
In the economic sphere, conflict in the neighboring countries, including Burundi, has had 
negative effects on Tanzania’s short and long term economic goals and plans. This is because it 
regards these countries and the region as a whole as potential partners in development, within the 
context of regional economic and political integration.235 The comparative advantage, Tanzania has 
over its landlocked neighbours like Zambia, Burundi and  Rwanda and close trade relations with the 
eastern DRC has been given prominence in Tanzania’s  strategy of attracting foreign direct 
investment-FDI. 
Two things need to be noted here. First is the fact that Tanzania’s main neighbors are landlocked. 
Tanzania, therefore, provides vital links to the outside world to Burundi, Malawi, Rwanda and 
Zambia and the eastern of DRC. Violent conflict affected commerce and trade between those 
countries. This consequently reduced revenues from trade and also decreased productivity of the 
Dar es Salaam port -which most of those countries use as their gateway for import and export trade. 
The port is one of the prime sources of government revenues that nevertheless if it is so 
underutilised, due to any reason, affects government revenue as a result of which national 
development plans are interrupted.
Besides, the conflict had adversely negative effects in the transport sector particularly the central 
railway and the road network of the southern corridor which connects Rwanda, Burundi and DRC. 
In this case, even the sanctions imposed by the Regional Heads did also critically affect Tanzania 
business in particular and the nation in general.
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Statistics reports show that Burundi, DRC, Malawi, Uganda and Rwanda are the major users of 
Dar es Salaam port. The same report shows that during conflict; particularly when the regional 
leaders imposed economic sanctions against Burundi in July 1996 traffic of goods dwindled. For 
example, Burundi’s imports through the port dropped from 133,970 tons in 1995 before the 
sanctions to 32,312 tons and 31,013 tons in 1997 and 1998 respectively during the sanctions. 236
However, immediately after the sanctions were lifted, they rose again from 78,197 tons in 2000 to 
100,998 tons in 2001.237
Secondly, in attracting FDIs, Tanzania presents itself as the gateway to the regional market (East 
and Central Africa) of over two hundred million people. However, regional peace and security 
remains a pre-condition for external investments. The Great Lakes Region has been engulfed by 
conflicts throughout the 1990s. The Burundi latest crisis started in 1993 and DRC was invaded by 
Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Angola in 1996.
With the overthrow of Mobutu, a new war erupted in the DRC in 1998 pitting more than six 
countries’ armies238 against each other. The generated insecurity put a hamper to the foreign direct 
investment. Tanzania had to play a role in resolving the regional conflict for self economic interests. 
In the case of conflict in Burundi, Tanzania came to play host to the peace negotiations. This is 
what is focused upon below.   
3.3 Why Tanzania was chosen to host the Peace Process?
Choosing venue for mediating a conflict is one of the key preliminary issues involving the 
mediators of any conflict. It is assumed, as in the case of mediators themselves, the venue must be 
accepted by all parties in the conflict. However, in the case of hosting the Burundi peace talks, it 
was the preference of the Facilitator Mwalimu Nyerere. That led to the talks taking place in 
Mwanza. His choice of Mwanza was to avoid big cities’ hassles. But the reason could also be 
because Mwanza was close to his retirement home, Butiama, where he used to stay. 
When the first two rounds of talks (Mwanza I and II) failed, as stated in chapter two, the venue 
was permanently moved to Arusha. The decision to move the talks from Mwanza to Arusha was 
reached by the Regional Summit and the facilitator mainly perhaps for convenience purposes as 
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Mwanza did not have enough facilities to satisfy the needs of many dignitaries. The critical 
question, here, however, is why Tanzania was chosen to host the Burundi negotiations. This would 
help to understand the regional setting for the negotiations as well as shed light on some 
misconceptions about the honour accorded to Tanzania to host the negotiations.
Various factors favored Tanzania to host the peace negotiations than any other country in the 
region. Historically, Tanzania has been engaged in conflict resolution in the region from the period 
of the liberation against colonialism and racial discrimination in Southern Africa to post 
independence period. It hosted the then OAU Liberation Committee until it was disbanded after 
South Africa’s democratic elections in 1994. Besides many liberation movements had made 
Tanzania their home.
Furthermore, Tanzania had played a pivotal role in the Front Line States grouping. This historical 
reputation contributed to its selection to host the peace process. Tanzania had also initiated and 
hosted mediation talks during the Rwandan conflict between the then President Habyarimana’s 
regime and the Rwandan rebels-RPF from 1991 and 1994. This was later followed by the 
International Tribunal for Rwanda.
Another factor in selecting Tanzania was the country’s political stability. In 1993 when the 
Burundi crisis started most of Burundi’s neighbours, in one way or another, had their own internal 
conflicts which precluded them from hosting peace negotiations. The three East African countries, 
namely Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania were the most possible candidates but it was only the latter 
which seemed to qualify because of being the more peaceful and stable not only among the three 
but also among most of the GLR countries. 
In the case of Uganda, the country was fighting an internal insurgency Lord Resistance Army led 
by Joseph Koni and at the same time was allegedly supporting the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army 
led by the late John Garang.239 On its part Kenya’s internal political situation was not conducive 
because the then President Daniel Arap Moi’s regime was under severe pressure from both internal 
political opponents and external critics. The use of force to suppress opposition movements led to 
condemnations from western powers.240
Apart from political stability, Tanzania had an added advantage of having general amicable 
relations with the two East African neighbors. Uganda and Kenya had their own mistrusts and 
several times had engaged themselves in a war of words. For example, President Moi blamed his 
Ugandan counterpart of supporting MWAKENYA, a group of his opponents, by providing it with 
arms while Kampala blamed Nairobi for obstructing transport of Ugandan commercial goods on the 
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Mombasa transport corridor.241 Of more significance, however, was the fact that the two countries 
supported opposing political factions in Burundi and Rwanda.242 Another reason worth of 
mentioning is Tanzania’s proximity to the conflict and that of having for decades hosted refugees 
from Burundi.
3.4 Tanzania’s Role in the Burundi Peace Process
Defining roles played by different actors in conflict resolution has recently not only become a 
tradition but also an unavoidable exercise. This is so not even because of theoretical needs and 
imperatives of the discipline of conflict resolution but for both practical as well as functional 
reasons. Conflict resolution mechanisms do not only involve major protagonists but also attract 
various external players for different reasons, and with varied interests.
The external players, sometimes referred to as external interveners, are those who are either 
affected by and/or related to the conflict. These are mainly neighbouring states, or former colonial 
powers. Regional bodies have also become more active as conflict resolution becomes increasingly 
‘locally focused’. The above parties may engage themselves either in their individual capacities or 
in the form of regional initiatives such as ECOWAS, Southern Africa Development Community 
(SADC) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) or continental bodies like AU 
and European Union or/and through other multilateral organisations like United Nations. 
In addition, as it will be elaborated in chapter four, big powers have often been associated with 
the various efforts of conflict resolution either as guarantors of the settlement or supporters of post 
conflict peace building. Thus big powers have proved not only influential in resolving conflicts but 
also to be critical in implementation of agreed settlements. The various actors noted above perform 
different roles either by being chosen to mediate or just being observers who avail themselves to 
offer their services, be it material or expertise to the process. In some cases, they offer incentives to 
parties in an attempt to lure them to reach the settlement by way of promises of aid and support. But 
it is also true that sometimes they use ‘threats’ to parties who seem adamant to accept a 
compromise.243  
The Burundi peace process too, as argued recently like other peace processes, has involved 
various players. There were Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), multilateral organisations, 
countries which acted on their own individual capacities, others in a collective capacity like 
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regional initiative, and others represented by the respective organisations. Despite being driven by 
different motives and having various interests to pursue, their ultimate aim was to have the conflict 
resolved and their interests realised whenever possible. This chapter focuses only on Tanzania’s 
role and the roles of other actors will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
Tanzania’s interactions with other players and actors within the Burundi Peace Process were at 
two levels namely; the summitry and the host of the negotiations. The Summitry normally 
comprised Heads of State and Government of the Regional Initiative that was originally constituted 
by heads of Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and the DRC. Zambia and South Africa joined the 
Regional Initiative later. As host of the negotiations Tanzania had to interact with other players such 
as representatives and/or special envoys of the multilateral organisations namely the UN, the 
OAU/AU, the EU and special envoys of individual countries such as the United States and France.
This latter category of players participated in the negotiations. Their presence, as intimated 
earlier, had enormous influence and impact on the peace process and the peace negotiations in 
particular. 
States when interacting are in constant pursuit of their national interests. In the case of Burundi 
Peace Negotiations, both states and non state actors had their own individual interests to pursue. 
They did so directly or indirectly. In doing so they were bound to clash as each pursued its interests 
using its preferred and chosen strategies. Tanzania as a host had to play a balancing act. This did not 
become any easier with the frequent involvement of new players. 
Tanzania as host had to ensure the protection of all participants and provide proper facilities. It 
however did not have adequate resources, to host the peace process; hence it had to solicit support 
from the rich West and multilateral institutions. 
In the process of hosting the peace process, the neutrality of the country was questioned as it was 
accused of being pro-Hutu. The country was further accused of dominating the peace process. It is 
important therefore to properly establish Tanzania’s role in the Burundi peace process. 
There are two approaches in understanding Tanzania’s role. The first is that of concentrating on 
purely conflict resolution methods by examining different functions performed by different players 
in the process as provided in the study’s conceptual framework. The other method is by using 
Tanzania’s foreign policy as an instrument which sets goals and objectives on one hand, and which 
identify and rationalise its relations with other countries on the other hand. The two, however, 
complement each other. Below are detailed explanations of the two approaches.      
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3.4.1 Conflict Resolution Approach: A Tool to Study Tanzania’s Role in the Burundi 
Peace Process
When reviewing literature on conceptual framework, in chapter one, it was argued that different 
terms are used in conflict resolution to describe or define the role played by a third parties.
However, according to the reviewed literature, it was observed that those differences were of more 
academic and merely for satisfying the theoretical needs of the discipline because practically there 
exists no fundamental differences between them. What is empirical that might be considered as a 
‘difference’ is the stage at which a third party is involved and the degree of function (s) to which a 
third party performs. 
This study has adopted the mediation framework and distinguishes three stages namely: the pre-
negotiation, mediation and post mediation. In between these stages, terms like good offices, 
intermediaries, facilitation and mediation are familiar. All third parties involved in those stages 
work as go-betweens with the only objective of reducing hostilities and assisting the parties to reach 
a solution to the conflict. The study, therefore, will identify Tanzania’s role in both phases. It is 
within this framework that Tanzania’s role should be identified.
Facilitation denotes a perpetual role in organising and sustaining dialogue whereas mediation 
signifies the management of the dialogue.244 These roles (functions) can be performed by one or 
two officially appointed mediators or by different people or institutions. In other mediation 
processes these roles are performed by different players, however the fact remains that they both 
complement each other.
In the Burundi case, the mediation process was carried out at two levels: the official appointed 
mediator, who was assisted by a team of professionals and other supporting staff, and the summitry 
that provided ‘political leadership’. Both levels worked together and complemented each other.
The political level performed mediation and facilitation functions by providing leadership to the 
mediation process and, more importantly by acting as troubleshooters and by intervening when the 
negotiating parties reached a stalemate. They played the role of go-between and engaged parties in  
more harmonious relations, maintaining and enhancing confidence amongst parties to the conflict 
and between parties and their mediator.
Tanzania was part of the decision-making process as well as the implementation of the decisions 
made by the Regional Initiative. On the other hand, it had to make frequent interactions on behalf of 
the Regional Initiative with the rebel groups because of the positive contact and influence it had had 
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on them. Tanzania’s positive influence on the rebels emanates from the fact that most of the rebel 
leaders lived in Tanzania where they were given asylum and also felt that Tanzania was genuinely 
sympathetic to their plight. Having lived for long in the country they had built confidence with the 
Tanzanian leadership.
Besides, Tanzania played host to the peace process. Playing host is attached to many roles and 
responsibilities. These included providing venue and conference facilities, resources and above all 
ensure security of all parties to the negotiations. Although various countries and institutions 
contributed to the process, Tanzania’s contribution was enormous.
Providing ideal venue and enabling environment is one of the keys to the success of any 
negotiations. It motivates the negotiators, boosts their morale and consolidates their confidence. 
Indeed, the government supported and provided all necessary resources to the first mediator Julius 
Nyerere and the institution he was working with- the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation.
The President of Tanzania Benjamin Mkapa had to play host to the head of states and government 
during negotiation summits and as the Vice chairperson of the Regional Initiative on Burundi, he 
was thoroughly engaged in mediation process by providing guidance and assisting Burundians to 
reach a peaceful settlement.
Tanzania’s roles were critical due to the central position it occupied in the conflict and its 
resolution. Hosting the peace process was one, but most importantly was the question of refugees. 
In the peace negotiations the refugee question was not only one of the very important but also 
controversial issues. As noted elsewhere in the previous sections, thousands of these refugees have 
been living in Tanzania for decades. There was, first the question of their repatriation. Second, there 
was the allegation that these refugees were recruited by rebel groups and trained within refugee 
camps in Tanzania. 
Related to the allegations above was that those rebels were launching their attacks against 
Burundi from Tanzania. These allegations made Tanzania to maintain the permanent suspicion of 
the administration and security forces’ complicity with Hutu rebels.245 This led to the perpetual 
accusations against Dar es Salaam from Bujumbura which strained relations between the two 
neighbours. The allegations will be elaborated later in this chapter. Notwithstanding these 
allegations, Tanzania’s role was considered crucial as identification and association of the rebels 
who were ready to support the peace process could only be conducted in Tanzania as the quoted 
report (in footnote 244) asserts.        
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3.4.2 Foreign Policy: A Tool Defining Tanzania’s Role in Burundi Peace
Process
This perspective sees Tanzania’s role in peace making as a moral obligation, emanating from 
being part of a larger global human community. Furthermore, being a signatory and active member 
of the United Nations and the African Union, its participation in peace process was mandatory. 
Tanzania, in addition, is a founder member of SADC, the brainchild of Frontlines States 
Organisation which was a regional body set to counter against destabilisation of southern African 
states by the apartheid regime. 
SADC has its own unit of mechanism on conflict resolution, which members including Tanzania, 
agreed upon its implementation. Worth mentioning here is Tanzania’s subscription and commitment 
to the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) initiative which 
acknowledges the potential of Africa’s own collective efforts in resolving its conflicts and fostering 
development for its people. In unison, these set up the stage in defining Tanzania’s role not only in 
resolving the Burundi conflict, in particular, but also its role in conflict resolution in Africa in 
general. 
Tanzania’s foreign policy guides the country’s participation, on the one hand, by affirming its full 
support of the efforts at preventing, managing and resolving inter and intra-state conflicts. On the 
other hand, offering to coordinate collective regional action in preventive diplomacy and, where 
necessary, in peacemaking, peace building and or peace keeping.246  
Against this background, the critical roles played by Tanzania during the peace process have 
been, first, giving the issue of Burundi conflict its deserved attention to strategic stakeholders, 
namely, the UN, the continental and the regional bodies. Secondly, using its experience it solicited 
diplomatic support for the process of peace in Burundi, the refugees and the internally displaced 
Burundians. Thirdly, Tanzania has been coordinating efforts in securing peace in Burundi. For 
instance, during its tenure as Chair of UN Security Council in February 2006,247 it prioritised issues 
of peace and security, and underscored the need for increased collective efforts from both regional 
actors and United Nations in addressing conflicts in the continent.  
In fact, Tanzania’s foreign policy strategy to engage external actors in the Burundi peace can also 
be interpreted as a strategy to foster its national interests through the resolution of the Burundi 
conflict. Why does the study suggest so? The study has agued before that Tanzania’s response to 
Burundi’s conflict was due to, among others things threat to its national interests. If one takes 
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Touval’s assertion that mediation can be used as a foreign policy instrument248, one can therefore 
assume that, on one hand, Tanzania used mediation of Burundi conflict as an instrument to further 
its domestic goals. These are among others; achieving domestic stability, stable peace as well as 
improved and sustainable economic growth through investment. 
On the other hand, the strategy was aimed at securing regional stability which provides her an 
alternative venue to pursue both domestic and foreign policy goals and objectives. It can be further 
suggested that it was Tanzania’s strategy to seriously engage in mediation process in order to 
maintain its diplomatic image as well as preserve its well established political and diplomatic 
influence in the region vis a vis South Africa’s emerging regional hegemony. 
3.5 The Role of Tanzania in the Post Arusha Accord
As illustrated in chapter two, the signing of the Burundi Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in 
Arusha on 28th August 2000 marked the beginning of the implementation phase of the peace 
process. Two main issues were very important to Tanzania-the refugees and the rebels. The 
repatriation of refugees which was part of the Implementation led to the signing of the tripartite 
agreement between the governments of Tanzania and Burundi and the United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). This resulted in the repatriation of most of the refugees from 
Burundi.
The agreement also provided for the ceasefire negotiations between the government of Burundi 
and the rebel groups. Tanzania has provided and helped to support the mediation team to persuade 
the rebels to negotiate. The outcome was the ceasefire agreements and integration of the rebels into 
the Burundi political system. During the discussion on ceasefire negotiations in chapter two, it was 
elaborated how different actors including Tanzania contributed to the conclusion of ceasefire 
agreements between the Transitional Government and the rebel movements. The following quote 
sums up what Tanzania has been doing during post Arusha accord:
Tanzanian government is undoubtedly the regional trustee for the application of the Arusha 
accords; it has done everything in its power since 1 November 2001 to force rebels to accept the 
Arusha Accord249
Generally, there are a number of issues that need to be addressed in understanding Tanzania’ role 
in the Burundi peace process. These are the entry of Nelson Mandela as facilitator and the shift of 
venue from Arusha to Pretoria; Tanzania’s neutrality and its non support of Buyoya’s military 
regime.  
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3.6 From Nyerere to Mandela: Pretoria vs. Arusha Does Venue matter?
When Julius Nyerere, the pioneer of the Burundi peace process died, Nelson Mandela succeeded 
him. His nomination, at the eighth Great Lakes Region Summit on Burundi in December 1999, was 
a relief not only to some personalities within Burundi, but also other stakeholders beyond the 
conflict’s main protagonists.
The Tutsi extremists, including the then incumbent Burundi President Major Buyoya, believed 
Nyerere and Tanzania were favoring the Hutu. Thus, immediately after Nyerere’s death in October 
1999 in London’s St Thomas Hospital, the Burundi leader launched a diplomatic offensive against 
any appointment of a Tanzanian to succeed him. It is indeed, a fact that Buyoya had even preferred 
a change of venue for the negotiations from Arusha. 
The Bujumbura regime preferred South Africa’s involvement in the negotiations to balance the 
Regional Initiative which was seen as being more sympathetic with Hutu’s demands which was 
detrimental to the Tutsi interests.250 Furthermore, South Africa would not only balance the power 
equation but also would secure a guarantee against the alleged ‘intended’ use of force by the region 
and specifically Tanzania, which threatened to do so.    
For the western powers, Nyerere’s death was a blessing, because he never entertained any undue 
interference in his mediation work, something unfamiliar and unused to those countries. His 
uncompromising stand created enemies within the circles of the peace process mostly among 
influential western powers and led to ‘apathy’ in supporting the process.251 It was noted earlier that 
Nyerere had decided, from the very beginning, that his facilitation should not be under one state or 
state organisations so that he could be freer in his decision. This however, never spared him from 
such undue interferences. To other regional states, they thought, his death was an event which 
provided an opportunity to change what was perceived as ‘Tanzania’s domination’ of the process.      
Therefore the arrival of Mandela (and South Africa for that matter) was seen as a break through 
from both Nyerere’s ‘arrogance’ and Tanzania’s monopoly of the peace process. This gave impetus 
to the Burundi peace process as support became easily available. It also made Mandela to be seen 
like messiah who had brought the ‘healing’ word from God to save the peace process.252
The entry onf Mandela in the Burundi negotiations, gave South Africa an opportunity to expand 
and enhance its influence in the region in the name of furthering NEPAD’s goals and objectives-its 
brainchild. However, with the appreciation of decades of strong relations and support availed by 
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Tanzanians and their government during the struggle against apartheid, Mandela bravely tried not to 
create a situation which would seem to deviate from his predecessor and of course harm the said 
relations. In his February speech he remarked that when some participants recommended that the 
process should be moved to South Africa: “I said no. As a matter of respect to Mwalimu, let us 
continue the process in Arusha and let keep the entire facilitation team”.253 Arusha thus remained 
the main venue for the negotiations until an agreement was reached in August 2000.
However, South Africa, being more capable in terms of resources than any other country in the 
region, its superfluous generosity to the peace process, including hurriedly pioneering sending 
troops to Burundi on behalf of the AU, could be interpreted as a tacit maneuver to outshine 
Tanzania and strengthen its influence in the region.   
After the signing of the Peace Accord on 28 August 2000, Mandela passed on the mediation 
baton to the South African Deputy President Jacob Zuma. The latter unsuccessfully tried to move 
the remaining negotiations process to Pretoria-his likely motive being that of reducing Tanzania’s 
influence on the rebels which was perceived by some, including himself to be ‘negative’.254 While 
this did not succeed, it should not be surprising that a number of subsequent meetings, as noted 
above, took place in South Africa. The proposed shift of venue from Tanzania to South Africa was 
seen by the Regional states as an attempt to rob them of their initiative. The rebels objected to 
shifting of the venue because they were suspicious that South Africa was pro-Tutsi. 
South Africa’s involvement in the Burundi peace process was not well received in the sub region. 
There was fear that South Africa would use the opportunity to penetrate into the sub-region 
politically and economically. Naturally, for a country like Tanzania, which had for a long time 
exercised strong political and diplomatic influence in the sub-region, the coming of South Africa 
meant that such influence was open to challenge. Tanzania’s influence was bound to suffer given
South Africa’s economic and military strength and its aggressive search for regional hegemony.  
This became apparent, as intimated earlier, when South Africa sent troops to Burundi on behalf of 
the AU to allow the start of a transitional period. 
As it was recently stated, Tanzania’s involvement in the facilitation and mediation of the Burundi 
Conflict was marred by two controversial issues. These were ‘biasness’ or lack of neutrality and the 
threat to use the military to solve the conflict. The two issues have attracted opposing views from 
both the main protagonists in the conflict and conflict resolution experts. This was because the 
former attracted both theoretical as well as practical examinations whereas the later was more of an 
opinion. The two are discussed below.       
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3.7 Tanzania’s Role and the Issue of Neutrality
Neutrality or impartiality in conflict resolution is considered by many authors as central. That is, 
a third party must be neutral so as to be able to mediate without bias. However, some authors have a 
different view claiming that neutrality or impartiality is not a necessary condition for one to be an 
effective mediator. One pertinent issue surrounding these two views is that of the ‘interests’ of the 
third party to a conflict. It is argued that when a third party has interest or is to benefit from the 
outcome of mediation, it can lead to bias. However, as discussed in the first chapter, perceived 
‘biased’ mediators too can lead to a successful mediation.
Tanzania was perceived to be ‘biased’ during the Burundi peace process. The allegations of 
‘biasness’ came from two sources. The first was from the Tutsi-dominated government under 
President Buyoya. The Tutsi regime accused Tanzania and Mwalimu Julius Nyerere in particular of 
being pro-Hutu. This was, however, Buyoya’s political gimmick and one of the strategies by the 
Tutsi government to derail or even reject peaceful negotiation of its conflict with the Hutus. 
As the International Crisis Group (ICG) commented, the more the Burundi government felt itself 
to be in a hostile environment the more it maneuvered to win time and block any possibility of a 
real political compromise.255 Its rejection of Nyerere’s mediation allegedly of being pro Hutu and 
Tanzania’s alleged support of rebels as host of peace talks was a technique of buying time to 
prolong the conflict anticipating that by doing so the regional leaders would relax the sanctions. 
This implied also that Buyoya was not sure of his future as Burundi President that is why he was 
dragging his feet with the regional leaders.   
This is true because initially Buyoya made several visits to Tanzania nudging Mwalimu to assist 
him and his fellow countrymen to solve their problems.256 He even visited Butiama to meet 
Mwalimu and Buyoya also supported his appointment during a speech in New York.  
Buyoya’s anticipation was that, first, Mwalimu would treat his regime more kindly and listen to 
what the regime thought was right. Secondly that Mwalimu would come up with ‘a makeshift 
solution’ which would assure him of his position as used to happen to incumbents in other conflicts 
in the continent. This would allow Buyoya to consolidate his power through the army and weaken 
his opponents through manipulation. But when it was clear that Mwalimu would not accord him any 
special treatment he started accusing him of biasness and impartiality.    
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Secondly, there were those who claimed that Tanzania was an interested party to the Burundi 
conflict, because it hosted refugees, majority of whom were Hutus. In view of this position, it was 
most likely Tanzania would be sympathetic to the Hutus plight.257 This sympathetic stance was 
from the way Tanzania opposed military action against the rebels. The fact of the matter, however, 
was that she was against any rush or quick solutions to the Burundi conflict. It preferred a more 
comprehensive solution which would lead to a durable peace and stability in Burundi. For example, 
in 2001, when the mediating team and some members of the Regional Initiative were contemplating 
forceful action against the rebels, Tanzania “remained the only main opposition of this option”258
Tanzania’s approach to the conflict in Burundi was geared to bringing a more positive solution 
which was possible only if the fundamental problem was addressed. That is, equal access to 
political, economic, military and social structures to all Burundians. This was only possible and 
viable under power-sharing arrangements of the central government. This was the only way that 
would make the Burundian refugees return home. This would relieve Tanzania of the problems 
associated with refugees; the economic burden of hosting them, the political and social tensions 
created by their presence and the threat to national security and stability. This would also allow it to 
mend its relations with its neighbors, particularly Burundi and, give it more freedom in managing 
and conducting its foreign relations in the region.
Tanzania was indeed affected by the conflict in Burundi. But what Tanzania really wanted was to 
bring about peace in Burundi and this made her as an honest broker. Robert Rauchhaus posits that: 
“understanding mediator’s motive is a key to determining whether incentives exist for a third party 
to tell the truth and serve as an honest broker”.259 Besides as noted by Kristine Barseghyan and 
Zainiddin Karaev’s, a third party with a genuine interest in peace and stability in the conflict, 
country or region may be effective in resolving the conflict.260 Tanzania’s perceived ‘biasness’ 
never turned into direct support of rebels’ military activities.
As several reports note: “there has never been any proven training or arming of fighters by 
Tanzanian government”261 and “no credible confirmation of Tanzania’s logistic support or direct 
involvement in the [rebels’] operations”.262 One thing to note is that Tanzania throughout the crisis 
continued to respect and work with Burundi regime despite the feelings that the regime was 
oppressive to the Hutus. As argued by James Smith “mediator in this case, then, while being partial 
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towards one party in terms of feelings or emotional attachment, is nevertheless trusted to be 
impartial towards the issue of a settlement”263.     
One has also to ask the following question on ‘biasness’ as did Chip Hauss. Can we truly be 
neutral if one of the parties to a divorce physically abuses the other? Although Hauss uses divorce 
mediation, the same can as well be used in the case of the Burundi conflict. Who would not be 
sympathetic with the Hutus in this world if one really understands their plight at the hands of the 
Tutsi regimes in Burundi? Hauss gave an example of South African mediation soon after Mandela’s 
release. He said although it was clear that their professional job was to reduce tensions but: “could 
only be done as part of their equal commitment to ending apartheid”.264 This was also the case with 
Tanzania in the Burundi conflict.
Hauss’ conclusion on biasness is that: “there is no way [mediators] can be neutral except under 
very unusual circumstances”265 and adds that: “there are times mediators are morally obliged to take 
a stand”266 That is why even Mandela who was mainly regarded as impartial by some quarters was 
sympathetic to the Hutu plight and denounced Tutsi monopoly of power and suppression of the 
former. As Bentley and Southall summarise the view of the two facilitators: “both Nyerere and 
Mandela viewed the Burundian conflict in quasi-South Africa terms, with Tutsi being cast in the 
role of the white oppressors and Hutus in that of oppressed blacks”267  
Perhaps this difference in approach is attributed to the background of parties and their perception 
of the conflict. To Tanzania, the Hutu were victims of systematic oppression from the Burundi 
government which is dominated by the Tutsi. Consequently, therefore, the rebels had a right and 
genuine course. From this perception, the issue of the rebels in Burundi was not different from other 
peoples’ struggles which Tanzania had supported and even fought for. It should also be noted that 
Tanzania had a better knowledge and experience of the Burundi conflict. Firstly, it has been dealing 
with that conflict for more than four decades and secondly the conflict was one of the two critical 
issues that dominated relations between the two countries as early as the 1970s.
3.8 Was Tanzania Favouring a Military Option against Military Regime in 
Burundi?
One of the controversial issues in Tanzania’s participation in the Burundi peace process which 
was from time to time raised by some players including Major Buyoya was that of Tanzania’s 
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favouring a military option against the Bujumbura regime. This was also associated with the 
perceived Tanzania’s anti- Buyoya and pro-Hutu positions. It has been important for this study to 
make sense out of these allegations and provide a proper perspective.  
From the coup d’etat of October 1993 to 2000, Burundi was marred by indiscriminate killings and 
abuse of human rights by the government forces with the assistance of its extremist allies.268 The 
tension was so high and the authorities in Bujumbura were under pressure from both human rights 
and humanitarian organisations as well as from regional and international organisations to stop 
killings. 
At the same time, the government was facing intense pressure from rebels who were attacking 
government strongholds and trying to establish themselves inside the country. As Frederick 
Ehrenreich notes: “since early 1995, Hutu insurgency has grown from mere nuisance to a full civil 
war”.269 Within this period rebels who were earlier mostly operating in the North West province had 
not only managed to raid Burundi capital but also launched attacks in the south. It should also be 
noted that, Buyoya was facing more pressure as his support within Tutsi was decreasing because 
among them they thought he was unable to safeguard their interests.   
Under pressure from both rebels and international Organisations, the military government 
launched attacks against NGOs providing humanitarian services to the victims particularly in the 
rural areas. It accused them of assisting the rebels with arms to attack government points. 
According to Human Rights Watch, the government through state radio accused relief organisations
of excessively helping Hutu or even with actually providing arms and funds to the Hutu rebels.270
The report further noted the increased attacks and threats on vehicles, offices and residences of 
international relief organisations.
To make matters worse, the Bujumbura authorities amassed its forces along the borders with 
Tanzania and created an atmosphere of insecurity. This was exacerbated by the reports that there 
was a call within military and civilian extremists in Bujumbura to launch attacks against refugee 
camps in Tanzania. It is, however, believed that the call was abandoned after considering far 
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reaching political, diplomatic and economic effects as well as the ability of the Burundi Armed 
Forces (FAB) to sustain Tanzania Peoples’ Defense Forces (TPDF). 
Burundi was to adopt the strategy once used by Rwandan armed forces when they attacked Goma 
refugee camps.271 Of course, Tanzanian authorities had to respond to these, by reinforcing its 
defence along the border.272 One should not be surprised by Tanzania’s decision since during the 
same period, the region was also facing serious insecurity because of the war in DRC.273 Many 
rebels and firearms were moving from one point to another within the region. Moreover, security 
wise, Tanzania could not brush away Burundi’s threat fearing the repeat of the 1973 incident.  
It should be noted here that during this period, Tanzania had twice blocked arms to Burundi.274
The regime in Burundi was badly in need of arms as the insurgents had intensified their attacks and 
also the government was on the verge of strengthening its army by recruiting new soldiers to repel 
the rebels. This also angered the authorities in Bujumbura.   
The accusations were, therefore, first, a strategic invention of Buyoya’s propaganda machine and 
his allies designed to deflect the attention of local and international community from its internal 
situation by creating an atmosphere of sour-relations with Tanzania. Secondly, it was retaliation 
over Tanzania’s decisions to block its arms. To achieve this, Buyoya applied a strategy of 
undermining Tanzania’s reputation. This was done, as stated above, through border provocations to 
which Tanzania reacted. Then Burundi would use this to justify its allegations that Tanzania wanted 
to invade it. 
The regime further launched a diplomatic offense against Tanzania by claiming that it was 
assisting the rebel forces to attack its forces inside the country. Burundi was, in several occasions, 
quoted blaming Tanzania of fueling the civil war by letting rebel forcers based in Tanzania to attack 
it.275 This fueled a war of words and increased tension between the two countries. Bujumbura’s 
worst diplomatic campaign against Dar es Salaam was that of implicating Tanzania in the killing of 
two UN officials by claiming that they were killed by the rebels who had crossed to Burundi from 
Tanzania. Tanzania had to write to UN Secretary General to deny any responsibility of the attack276  
This infuriated Tanzania, because a sizeable part of the international community seemed to be 
sympathetic to Burundi’s allegations. This was considered as a big humiliation in the eyes of 
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Tanzanian leadership as well as to the majority of Tanzanians. While this was happening, the 
government was already under pressure from the parliament on how it was handling the refugee 
issue to the detriment of the welfare and security of those living in the areas hosting refugees. As 
recently mentioned, there was also a growing public opinion against the continuing hosting of 
refugees. Under such circumstances, the Tanzanian government responded by adapting to ‘hard 
talks’ than the usual ‘soft talks’ and clearly wanted to be exonerated from these allegations.
In May 2001 President Mkapa rebuked the UN Security Council delegation- on fact finding 
mission in the Great Lakes Region, when, during discussion, the latter advanced Bujumbura’s 
sentiments. He stated that if the international community felt that Tanzania did not live to its 
expectations in handling the Burundi refugees, why should they not offer the same solution to the 
Burundi refugees as they did in Bosnia by creating ‘safe havens’ within Burundi.277 This would 
relieve his country of this burden of both hosting refugees and condemnations from unfound 
allegations.
During the same occasion, Mkapa never hesitated to tell the delegation that his country was 
considering repatriating all refugees from Tanzania, citing growing anger, even within religious 
leaders, towards the refugees278 as well as the fading of support by the international community.279
Clearly angered by these allegations, the President reiterated at a Great Lakes symposium that his 
country was no longer prepared to host more refugees from internal conflicts. He claimed that his 
country had hosted refugees for decades and had often paid dearly for what he called a 
‘humanitarian’ gesture in terms of security, economic and social development and in terms of 
strained in relations.280.
Furthermore, it appears that the Burundi authorities had interpreted the sanctions imposed by the 
Regional Initiative to be solely the work of Nyerere and Tanzania. The sanctions had negative 
effects on it in terms of the economy, they affected production, especially for brewery due to lack of 
fuel to generate electricity.281 They also affected coffee export. In the wake of all this, the business 
put pressure on the regime and declared: “they can not survive without opening the Tanzania 
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border”.282 On the rebel side the sanctions provided recognition, in particular for the CNDD, by the 
international community as Burundi’s most powerful opponent and key to peace settlement.283
What should be noted here is that Tanzania became a victim of circumstances as the success of 
the implementation of the sanctions mainly depended on the behavior of its authorities. Burundi 
relied on Tanzania for its transportation of goods. Therefore, strict adherence to sanctions fell on 
Tanzania. In doing so Bujumbura took the decision to a level of individual states. Instead of seeing 
itself opposed to the Regional Initiative, it saw itself as being at war with Tanzania. .
This hate attitude by the Burundi government was also exacerbated by the pressure put by the 
Tanzanian government to accelerate the repatriation process of the Burundi refugees. Since majority 
of refugees were Hutu, this was probably interpreted and taken as yet another tactic by the 
Tanzanian government to oust the Tutsi-led government in Burundi. This was because of the fact 
that if more Hutus were to return to Burundi, it meant more votes to pro-Hutu parties and, hence, 
less chances for Tutsi parties to win the elections. 
When Mandela concurred with the rebels’ view on political prisoners in Burundi and made a 
statement against Buyoya and his government,284 Buyoya regarded the issue as Tanzania’s 
propaganda and Hutu political parties. But the worst came when Buyoya, after February 2000 
summit in Arusha, was quoted castigating Mandela as having “a simple view of Burundi 
problem”.285To Buyoya and his Tutsi government Tanzania became synonymous with Hutu parties 
and, hence, provided a bogeyman to defend his atrocities. 
The military action against Bujumbura regime was also associated with Tanzania’s internal 
political developments at that time as the country was heading for the general elections in 1995. 
This was particularly on the part of the ruling party’s candidature for those elections. It was alleged 
that one of the presidential hopefuls from the ruling party who was holding a key ministerial post 
was behind the idea of military action which was against the view of the incumbent President 




284 Mandela’s accusation against Buyoya see Mandela address to the Burundi Peace Consultation Meeting in Arusha 27 
March 200, see also IRIN  News “Burundi: Mandela raps Buyoya over political prisoners ” 1 April 2000 quoted when 
talking to a group of Parliamentarians in United Kingdom. See IRIN Update 867 for the Great Lakes Region. Nairobi 7 
April 2000 A web source http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.int/AllDoocsByUNID/C97d70599bc02fbc8525688e00559de5  
Accessed on 15 January 2007 
285 “Buyoya unhappy with Mandela’s grasp of issues” IRINNEWS, 23 February, 2000.See  IRIN Update 899 for the Great 
Lakes Region A web source 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw.nsf/o/adf00364a8b12108852568ba00740baz?OpenDocument&click= .Accessed on 15 January 
2007.
as cited by ICG Report “Mandela Effect: Prospect for Peace in Burundi” No.13, April 2000 p. 27
92
the ruling party official meetings or within government machinery. This is notwithstanding its 
appearance in reports of some international organisations.286  
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that Tanzania had the intention to invade Burundi 
and unilaterally to topple the Tutsi led government nor was it in favor of any military action against 
the rebels. This is not only because that was against its belief in a peaceful resolution of conflicts 
but also because it acknowledged the consequences such an action might have to its society as it has 
been the case in recent conflicts in the region. However, it is a fact that the environment was created 
to allow such speculations.  
3.9 Lessons from Tanzania’s Involvement in Burundi Peace Process
Many lessons can be drawn from Tanzania’s experience during its participation in the Burundi 
Peace Process. These lessons are both of theoretical and practical nature. On theoretical part, the 
threat to the national interests is vital for the external players to intervene in other states’ internal 
crisis. Refugees posed a security threat to Tanzania. As former US President Ronald Regan 
concluded somewhere “as number of refugees generated by intrastate conflicts increases, the third 
parties are more likely to intervene”.287 The same was the case with Tanzania and other regional 
states. The Cable News Network (CNN) effect has also proved irresistible to the government when 
the effects of the crisis hit the local media. 
Another lesson is that national interests shape the way external players perceive conflict in other 
states.  Relating to this is the question of how these interests influence the way those players 
perceive the solution to the said conflict.  Indeed, Tanzania’s hosting of the peace negotiation and 
also providing the facilitator created a theoretical challenge on how Nyerere could be separated 
from the government which he had served as president. The same could be posed to Mandela’s 
mediation, was it Mandela’s or the South African government? 
The other lesson that can be learnt is that the perceived ‘biasness’ in facilitation or mediation 
cannot be an obstacle to resolving conflict as discussed in the theoretical part of the study. However 
one thing needs to be reexamined. That is what constitutes (defines) interests of third party to a 
conflict and how can this prevent the third party to mediate or facilitate in conflict. Some 
stakeholders opposed Tanzania’s facilitation in Burundi Peace Negotiations by alleging that by 
hosting refugees it is an interested party. But the main interest of Tanzania was to achieve 
comprehensive peace in Burundi because the conflict was affecting its society.
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On the practical side, Tanzania’s involvement created a lot of practical lessons in conflict 
resolution in the region and the continent in general: firstly, the challenge to balance the country’s 
interests with that of the region. Secondly, the proximity factor and historical relations which were 
cut off by the colonial boundaries still hold grips in conflict situation. The case of Hutu refugees 
who seek asylum in Tanzania whenever there is crisis in their country is part of the historical legacy 
between the people of these two countries. This creates uneasy relations between Burundi and 
Tanzania. The question of hosting refugees and allegations of supporting them to overthrow their 
government is applicable to many conflicts in the continent.  Thirdly, the question of capacity to 
provide and to deliver in the conflict resolution proved vital.  The case of South Africa outshining 
Tanzania in the peace process as seen before was mainly because of the ability of the former to 
materially and logistically support the process unlike Tanzania which had limited resources.
3.10 Conclusion
We have shown in our study that Burundi and Tanzania have had historical relations which can 
be traced back to the long distant trade in the seventeenth century. These relations have been 
brotherly and cordial. However due to persistent civil conflicts in Burundi manifested in the form of 
ethnic violence, the relations between the two countries at a certain stage were lukewarm. This was 
because of the presence of Hutu and moderate Tutsi refugees in Tanzania who formed the bulk of 
rebels who fought against their government. This analysis answers the study’s first question which 
was ‘what have been the relations between Burundi and Tanzania overtime? (from independence to 
date).   
We have also in this chapter revealed the thrust of Tanzania’s involvement in Burundi peace 
process by demonstrating that the conflict had inflicted negative political, economic and social 
effects. That is, the conflict was threatening its domestic political stability, disrupting economic 
development and creating social problems on the one hand and causing diplomatic mistrusts 
between Burundi and Tanzania on the other hand. The latter was damaging Tanzania’s reputation in 
the international sphere. These findings answer the second question of our research which set to 
establish why and how Tanzania has been at the centre of the peace process.
It has been also shown that Tanzania played many roles during the peace process. These include; 
mediation and facilitation roles, playing host to negotiations as well as hosting Burundi refugees. 
The study has found that the significant role played by Tanzania was determined by the country’s 
desire to safeguard its national interests which were threatened by the conflict in the region, 
Burundi being its epicenter. This finding proves the study’s main hypothesis that Tanzania’s 
involvement was prompted by the threat posed by the Burundi crisis to its national interests.
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In addition, the intensity of its involvement and the critical roles it has played were influenced by 
both the magnitude of the effects the crisis had inflicted on the Tanzania society and the proximity 
factor to the conflict. On the negative side, the conflict inflicted negative political, economic and 
diplomatic effects. The conflict also caused insecurity and social disruption in the areas which were 
hosting refugees. 
Likewise the proximity factor put Tanzania at the centre of conflict and prone to their effects 
which motivated it to act and treat the issue as a matter of great concern. While protecting its 
national interests was primary to its involvement, the factors which determined its roles were 
established during the study. These were relative peace in comparison to other Burundi neighbours, 
proximity to the conflict area and its historical contribution to the liberation movement and conflict 
resolution in the continent. These findings here provide the answer to the third research question 
which was ‘what is the role[s] of Tanzania in Burundi peace process and what factors determined 
such role?’.
The study noted that the change of mediator from Julius Nyerere of Tanzania to Nelson Mandela 
of South Africa did have impact on Tanzania’s role in the peace process. The facilitators had 
different status in terms of executive powers. While the former was a retired president, the later was 
a serving president. Such a difference implies that facilitation of President Mandela had directly 
involved the government of South Africa whereas in Nyerere’s facilitation, Tanzanian government 
involvement only came in indirectly. That means it was easy for President Mandela to impose the 
will of his government in the peace process, something which was not easy to Nyerere. This gave 
President Mandela the means and power to manipulate the negotiations by imposing conditions and 
also provide for resources to effect what he wanted the parties to adhere to.  
Indeed, it was assumed that the struggle between the two countries surfaced when Mandela took 
over from Nyerere. This assumption was portrayed by the way some officials within and out of the 
peace negotiations and South African government made efforts to reduce the influence of Tanzania 
in the negotiations. This was however unsuccessful because of both Mandela’s disagreement and 
general prevailing conditions surrounding the peace negotiations.
In this case, the change of mediator did affect Tanzania’s influence at a certain stage of the peace 
process particularly during the first year of Mandela’s facilitation. However, Tanzania’s influence 
during the post Arusha Agreement regains its earlier significance as its role in ceasefire negotiations 
proved not only critical but also indispensable. This answers another research question which was 
whether South Africa’s and Mandela’s involvement affected Tanzania’s role in the peace process.  
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE ROLE OF OTHER ACTORS
4.0 Introduction
Having discussed the role of Tanzania in the previous chapter, this chapter examines and 
discusses the role of other actors in the Burundi Peace Process. The aim is to establish whether they 
contributed or not to the facilitation of the peace process. The actors are divided into four groups, 
namely the NGOs, the United Nations and other European states, the AU – the formerly OAU and 
its Regional Initiative for Burundi. The rationale behind such a grouping lies in the fact that these 
actors grouped together mostly had either shared ideas and strategies or operated within a unified 
framework and in collective efforts.
It is argued that after the collapse of the Berlin wall which marked the end of the cold war, 
internal conflicts had marred most parts of the globe, Africa being one of the most devastated 
regions.288 Parallel to this, is the assumption that conflicts in Africa have been allowed to run their 
violent course due to the major powers’ fading interests on the continent. The reason of this is 
partly, as Newbury puts it, that “most of the areas seen as lacking strategic importance in global 
economy”.289 As a result of this, there has been a growing unwillingness and reluctance among 
those powers to commit resources in resolving conflict in Africa.290
Whether this is a fact or not, what is evident, however, is that the post cold war period has 
necessitated the continental body - the AU as well as its member states to rethink their roles in 
resolving conflicts on the continent and hence the OAU Cairo’s Declaration of June 1993 that led to 
the establishment of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution 
(MCPMR)291
The Burundi conflict was unique in that it attracted attention from almost all corners of the 
world.292 There are a number of explanations for this. One is the fact that the post cold war era 
opened up a free judgment of events without fear of hurting an ally or allies. This resulted in the 
global media condemnation of the events in Burundi. Two was the assassination of the 
democratically elected president through a coup d’etat which was regarded as a ‘thing of the past’ 
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and hence intolerable. Three was the Rwandan genocide which could have been replicated in 
Burundi given the same ethnic composition. Fourth, which is related to the above is what 
Wohlgemuth described as a self criticism among international organisations and major powers after 
the Rwandan genocide of 1994.293 He agues that their failure in Rwanda led to increased number of 
initiatives in order to prevent escalation of the Burundi conflict.     
Fifth, the elections which led to the civil government had brought to an end decades of ruthless 
military rule which had resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands and sent millions into exile. 
The 21st October event of overthrowing the government and killing the President reversed the gains 
of a painful reform process in which the world had participated. The global community thus reacted 
in anger at the events in Burundi and also went on to find a solution. Below various global actions 
in the Burundi conflict are examined in some detail.
4.1.0 Regional Initiative on Burundi
This, as noted above was the initiative of the Burundi’s neighbors and initially included Tanzania, 
Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda and the DRC. This was later expanded to include Zambia and South 
Africa. An analysis of the Regional Initiative is done under three phases. The first phase runs from 
1993 to 1996. The second phase is that of the period of the Burundi Peace Negotiations starting 
with the 31st July 1996 Arusha Summit and ends with the signing of the Agreement on 28th August 
2000. The third phase is the implementation phase that started in 2000 and ended in September 
2006.
4.1.1 The Period between the Coups - 1993-1996
During this phase, the Burundi situation was very complex politically and security wise. First, 
there was the question of succession of the president after the killing of president Ndadaye and 
many members of his cabinet. It took quite some time before a successor could be named and 
installed. The successor, however, died in a plane crash in April 1994. The new president, Sylvestre 
Ntibantunganya’s powers were curtailed by the Tutsi - dominated military council. As discussed in 
chapter two, this made him ineffective and created a power vacuum resulting to the return of 
Buyoya into power. 
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Secondly there was a rejection of any external military presence in Burundi.294 This precluded 
external military involvement. Third was the negative impact of the Rwandan genocide to Burundi 
which generated fear of a possible repeat of the genocide in Burundi. Fourth was the indifference in 
the understanding of the conflict between most of African states and the Western states. This 
worsened the situation in that the regime took advantage of this to thwart any effort directed at 
bringing about genuine peace. The Banyamulenge rebellion in Eastern Zaire and the subsequent 
external invasion of the countries only complicated the situation as the conflict spread in the Great 
Lakes Region. 
It should not be surprising that regional action was more or less sporadic during this period. The 
Tunis and Cairo Summits under the initiative of the Carter Centre helped to give focus to the 
regional efforts and to the appointment of Mwalimu Nyerere as facilitator.295 His initial facilitation 
efforts culminated into the party talks dubbed Mwanza I and Mwanza II discussed in chapter two.     
4.1.2 The Period after 1996 Coup and Mwanza I & II Party Talks
While the coup appeared to have been anticipated, it was a blow to the ongoing efforts296 to 
resolve the conflict. A regional summit was immediately held on the 31st of July 1996 in Arusha, 
Tanzania to discuss the coup. The summit was attended by the Heads of State and Government of 
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, the then Zaire and Ethiopia which was the chair of OAU. The 
Summit first denounced the coup, condemned the assassination of President Ndadaye and ordered 
the restoration of the dethroned legitimate elected government.297 Moreover, it called for the return 
of law and order and supported for multilateral military intervention to avert chaos. To assure the 
putsch leaders in Burundi that the Regional leaders were committed to what they had decided, they 
imposed sanctions on Burundi as a means of enforcing the set benchmarks.     
This was the first time that African leaders openly condemned a coup d’etat and acted in unity 
against coup leaders. This turn around was first of all necessitated by the security situation within 
the region which was, at that time considered very fragile due to the DRC and Rwandan conflicts. 
Secondly, the Burundi problem had become a decades - long liability to the region and 
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consequently, the Regional leaders were tired of the unending coups.298 Thirdly, as mentioned 
previously, with the global adoption of plural political systems, military regimes had ceased to be 
neither acceptable nor tolerable. 
Mwalimu Nyerere summarises Africa’s changing perception of coups when he comments on the 
summit that imposed sanctions on Burundi by saying that “leaders in the region are absolutely 
united on this ...the leaders who met in Arusha were really saying to the military in Burundi ‘we can 
no longer accept military rule in our borders’... this is a major change in the continent”299 It can 
therefore be summed up that it was a combination of a series of events which created an atmosphere 
of solidarity within regional leaders.
Burundi’s reaction to the sanctions was as expected. It condemned the sanctions and the country’s 
Prime Minister described them as “illegal, unjust and biased”300 and on negotiations, Buyoya 
strongly opposed it and told the visiting delegations of foreign ministers from the Regional 
Initiative it could not do so “while there was a noose [sanctions] around his neck”.301
Four regional summits were held between August 1996 and February 1998 to discuss and review 
the situation in Burundi with the aim of establishing a framework for peaceful negotiations. The 
sanctions were gradually relaxed with Summit III starting with fertilizers and vegetable seeds and 
next were the items considered ‘to ease’ suffering of the common people.302 These were lifted 
during Summit IV. This was a result of the military regime’s response by allowing political parties 
to operate and to have the National Assembly restored although both were unable to function. 
Critical also during Summit IV, which was held in Dar es Salaam in September 1997, as 
mentioned in chapter two, was the facilitator Mwalimu Nyerere’s offer to resign from his duties and 
the Tanzanian government’s proposal of change of venue for the peace negotiations. The Summit 
rejected both the resignation of Mwalimu and the change of venue.303 Accepting the two would 
have been interpreted as  bowing to the military regime in Burundi, which had been vigorously 
campaigning for the change of facilitator and venue. This led to the resumption of preparations for 
peace negotiations that started in Arusha in June 1998. 
Sanctions were suspended during the Dar es Salaam Summit of 24th January 1999.304 This was a 
result of both external factors as well as relatively ‘good response’ from the military government as 
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indicated above. The external factors were mainly pressure from the Western countries and the 
decreased lack of consensus on the same within members of the Regional Initiative.
As days passed by, the West waged constant pressure against sanctions and openly criticised the 
Regional Initiative over sanctions. France denounced the sanctions way back in March 1997. 
During the Kampala summit of June 1998 where President Buyoya attended, the EU, the US and 
Belgium called for the removal of the sanctions.305 Within the region, Kenya had earlier expressed 
its doubt on the sanctions and unilaterally removed measures against commercial transport of fuel 
and allowed Kenya Airways flights to Bujumbura in June 1997.306 It was the same to the DRC 
which claimed, later the same year that “it could no longer close its borders to commercial 
transactions with Burundi”.307 It was therefore apparent that soon after the Kampala summit, 
sanctions would be raised.
The suspension of the sanctions was variably interpreted. It was interpreted to mean that the 
sanctions had failed in that they had not produced the intended results.  Although the military 
regime had responded by allowing political parties to operate and to have the National Assembly 
restored, both were unable to function. 
On the other hand, it was interpreted that the neighboring countries’ commitment to sanctions had 
always been doubtful. What is important here to note is the fact that the imposition of sanctions 
against the military regime in Burundi was a total rejection of military rule on the continent which 
not only opened a new page but was also a milestone in the management of African international 
relations. 
The period we have here reviewed can be regarded as a foundation phase to real peace 
negotiations which is referred to in conflict resolution as the pre negotiation phase. According to 
Maundi, the phase involves creating conditions for entry into the negotiations by both the mediators 
as well as parties to the conflict.308 The following is the examination of the second phase.
4.1.2.1 Summit Mediation August 1998-August 2000
From the start of the Burundi Peace Negotiations to the signing of the Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreement in August 2000, about eleven Regional summits were convened. The 
summit as noted above provided the political leadership for the peace negotiations. This involved 
resolving the frequent huddles to the peace process and the peace negotiations. These summits can 
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be seen as part and parcel of the mediation process. They consulted parties collectively or assigned 
one or a group of them to consult on behalf of the summit.
The Heads used mediation tools like offering incentives to parties to accept the proposal or even 
used threats to make parties accept the proposals.  As a matter of fact, due to the nature of the 
conflict and characters of the major protagonists, these summits sometimes acted as power-
balancing mechanisms among the parties in the negotiation process. Indeed, they ensured and 
enhanced confidence building among the parties particularly those perceived or considered to be 
‘weak’.
4.1.3 The Implementation Phase: From 28 August 2000 to September 2006
The signing of the Arusha Accord marked the beginning of a long journey of peace building in 
Burundi. The work of the Regional Initiative did not end but continued with the implementation of 
the peace agreement. The summit had to ensure the outstanding issues left out of the agreement 
were settled as envisaged in the agreement. The Regional Initiative had also to facilitate and 
monitor the setting up of the Transitional Government and the negotiations for the ceasefire.
The mediation team under chief mediator, South African Deputy President, Jacob Zuma 
continued with the task of conducting ceasefire talks. When Zuma was fired from office, the 
country’s Minister responsible for Safety and Security Mr. Charles Nqakula took over from him. 
The Regional Initiative continued with its mediation role by engaging the parties to negotiate and 
also dealing with difficult and controversial issues which cropped up during those talks. It 
continued to provide guidance to the mediation team and necessary input when needed. As a result, 
ceasefire negotiations were finalised and agreed upon as discussed in chapter two.
4.1.5 Regional Peace Initiative: An Evaluation
While it was true that the security concerns were the major reasons for the regional leaders to 
establish the Regional Initiative on Burundi crisis, there were differences between them. Apart from 
common security issues, other interests divided the members, a fact which was reflected in how 
decisions were reached and implemented. Within the security paradigm, members differed on what 
constituted security threat.
As discussed in chapter three, for example, Tanzania conceived the conflict as a security threat in 
a broader perspective which encompassed its economic interests, political stability, and spread of 
arms which had tremendously increased incidents of armed banditry, and pressure on local 
resources as a result of increased number of refugees. 
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There were also periodic ‘security alliance’ among members of the Regional Initiative partly 
because of the changing conflict scenarios in the region.309 For example, during the Rwandan crisis, 
President Mobutu of the then Zaire allied with the French-backed Habyarimana’s government to 
repeal RPF incursions into Rwanda. On the other hand, Uganda and Burundi offered logistic 
support to RPF which mounted a conventional war against Habyarimana’s government. Later on 
Uganda and Rwanda, under PRF government invaded Zaire to oust President Laurent Kabila whom 
they had previously supported. The situation was more complicated as conflict continued in the 
DRC, the rift between Kabila on the one hand and Kagame and Museveni on the other hand, led the 
former to retaliate by supporting groups fighting Burundi’s government. Kabila allowed the rebel 
groups to operate within DRC and offered the needed support.
It appeared that such alliances and conflicts of interests at the level of security, as argued before, 
made some countries, particularly the leaders in this case, to indulge in their own approaches to 
conflict resolution mechanisms. The reference here is made to what is referred to as the Museveni 
military dictums “fight and negotiate and negotiate and fight”. This is not a surprise to a military 
leader such as Museveni who himself fought guerilla war for years. The same applies to his “allies” 
who both came to power by force.310.
At the centre of the Regional Initiative, there was also a feeling that some countries wanted to 
influence the outcome of the negotiations. That is, some of Burundi’s neighbours wanted to ensure 
that any new government in Burundi would not support their opponents both politically and 
militarily. This was because of the pertaining conflict environment in the region which, for 
example, Sudan and Uganda governments supported each others opponents whereas the DRC 
supported Rwandan rebels. 
Rwanda’s main concern was on the political formula for power sharing. This was because of the 
similar ethnic setup with Burundi. Rwanda thus preferred a solution that would not disturb its 
political ethnic arrangements. So this made the Rwandan approach to the Burundi negotiations to be 
strategically cautious and, sometime, very inward looking.
Apart from the security perception of the conflict and conceptualisation of its resolution, 
members within the Regional Initiative had different interests which made others less concerned or 
not committed to Regional Heads decisions. For example Kenya and the DRC which unilaterally 
decided not to adhere to the embargo against Burundi. Furthermore, it was alleged that Kenyan 
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President Daniel Arap Moi boycotted September 1997 summit in Dar es Salaam and unleashed 
accusations against members of the regional initiative of “demanding tough measures against 
Burundi which they then failed to enforce”.311 It was obvious that Kenya’s ambitions were more 
inclined to its economic interests.
In spite of this, the Regional Initiative demonstrated African leadership’s readiness to face the 
challenge of conflict resolution in the continent. It showed its concerns on the plight of its people 
which the leadership had lacked for decades. This was attributed to both the realisation that peace 
and stability is important for the continent’s development and the growing indifference on the part 
of major powers in solving African conflicts.
The Regional Initiative’s sanctions, as we have seen before, may be considered to have failed but 
a fair judgment could be “[sanctions] were not able to reverse the coup ...but did increase pressure 
to reach the negotiable settlement”.312 On the political and diplomatic front, it was a litmus test for 
African solidarity. It was an experience which provided African leadership a sense of clear 
judgment of issues and an opportunity to show its commitment to its decisions. Though initially 
curtailed by a lack of outright support from the West, it had decided the continent’s destiny. The 
initiation and sustaining of the regional initiative was instrumental in bringing more actors in the 
process which the latter played critical role during the transitional period and after. The discussion 
now moves on to the role of OAU/AU in the Burundi peace process. 
4.2 OAU [and AU] Involvement in the Burundi Peace Process
The October 1993 coup d’etat and the killing of president, Melchior Ndadaye caught the OAU by 
surprise. As we have see the continental body, like other players, also condemned and disapproved 
the coup. The then OAU Secretary General declared “[the coup] unacceptable…the will of the 
people [can 
not] fall victim to the power of the gun”.313 Burundi became the first challenge for the continental 
body’s MCPMR.314 The besieged civilian government requested for military assistance/protection 
from the OAU.315 The OAU responded by establishing African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) with an 
initial 47 personnel. The OAU also attended the first Summit of the Regional Initiative on Burundi. 
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During the Summit, the Burundi leadership presented again the request for military support to assist
in the deteriorating security situation. The request was accepted but as previously noted there was a 
very strong objection inside Burundi.316
Since the outbreak of the crisis, OAU targeted its efforts in defusing tension, promoting dialogue, 
and supporting determination and efforts of the democratically elected government to promote the 
restoration of democratic institutions in Burundi.317 In doing so it was compelled also to seek 
external diplomatic support and resources. 
In April and June 1994 the OAU Secretary General headed the Council of Ministers delegations 
to Burundi to assess the situation and put pressure on the parties for political solutions to the 
problem. Following these visits, the Council of Ministers at its June 1994 session reiterated its 
strong support of the Convention of Government and called for all political parties and other 
groups, in particular, the military and security forces in the country to work together for its full 
implementation for the restoration of peace and security in Burundi.318 The Council of Ministers 
called upon the member states and the International Community to encourage, promote and support 
elements of moderation in the country and do everything possible to isolate and neutralise elements 
of extremism, to disown and disband the militia in Burundi.319 The mandate of AMIB was 
extended for three more months and its personnel increased from 47 to 67 officers after an earlier 
mandate had expired on the 17th June 1995.320
The 20th Ordinary session of MCPMR held in July 1996 in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, strongly 
supported the Cairo and Tunis summits held under the auspice of the Cater Centre and the decision 
of the Regional Summit held in Arusha on June 25, 1996 and reiterated during the 64th session of 
the Councils of Minister’s meeting held in Yaoundé Cameroon from 1st to 5th July 1995.321  
The 32nd Session of The OAU Summit in Yaoundé held from 8th to 10th July 1996 passed two 
main resolutions. Resolution number 2 noted the fact that the OAU’s concerns and efforts in 
Burundi, as well as those of the countries of the region, can in no way be considered as an 
interference in the internal affairs of Burundi, but flows from a fraternal and genuine concern to 
prevent yet another African tragedy of epic proportions and similar to those witnessed in Rwanda in 
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1994.322 Resolution number 4 supported the request by the government of Burundi for security 
assistance in order to complement and reinforce the Peace Talks. On 26 July 1996 the military 
staged a coup and installed Pierre Buyoya as President.
The continental body through its organ MCPMR reacted swiftly to condemn the coup323 at its 
extraordinary session held at Ambassadorial level in Adis Ababa on the 27th July - just a day after 
the coup. The session threatened “to impose sanctions and isolate” the regime while reiterating the 
organisation’s and the continent’s ‘resolve to oppose strongly illegal change of power’324 in 
Burundi. The sanctions however came four days later from the Regional Initiative Summit that met 
on the 31st July in Arusha.   
From this time onwards the OAU efforts were closely linked with those of Regional Initiative 
where close contacts and collaborations were maintained. In spite of keeping its office in 
Bujumbura, OAU closely followed the matter and engaged itself with other players within and 
outside the continent to find the lasting solution to the conflict. When the Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreement was signed, on 28 August 2000, AU continued to be part and parcel of 
the implementation process of the accord. It continued its collaboration with various players to the 
realisation of the two outstanding issues namely the transitional government and the ceasefire 
between transitional government and the rebel groups.
In July 2002, when the negotiations between the transitional government and the rebel groups 
were not making headway, it conducted massive diplomatic campaigns to persuade the rebels to 
seriously negotiate the ceasefire agreement. When the two rounds of talks between the rebels and 
the government took place in Dar es Salaam on 12-16 August and 18-26 September, AU made a 
constructive contribution which resulted into the signing of MoU between the government and 
CNDD-FDD, the faction of John Bosco Ndayikagerukiye.325
Furthermore, during 18th Summit of the Regional Initiative held in Dar es Salaam between 6th and 
7th October, the AU was represented by Ambassador Said Djinnit Ibrahim – interim Commissioner 
for Peace, Security and Political Affairs. The Summit was very instrumental as it worked out the 
strategy to pressurise the main rebel groups-CNDD-FDD Nkurunzinza and PALIPEHUTU-FNL 
Aghaton Rwasa to negotiate and conclude a ceasefire agreement with the transitional government.
On the ground, the AMIB, among others, continued close contacts with other players within and 
outside Burundi to exchange views on how best to go about the talks and as far as possible soften 
the parties’ positions. AMIB played an active role in ceasefire negotiations and closely involved in 
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UNHCR activities.326 Between July and October, the AU special representative in Burundi had 
audience with the transitional President and his Vice President.
Besides, in support of the transitional government and the implementation of the Agreement, AU 
had expedited Observer Mission to Burundi sanctioned by the 88th Ordinary Session of the Central 
organ held on 14 January 2003 and 91st Ordinary Session of 2nd April 2003. In addition, in 
November the same year, AU took part at the Donner conference on Burundi convened in Geneva, 
Switzerland.327
As the delay of the deployment of the UN Peacekeeping forces was envisaged in the Ceasefire 
Agreement of 7th October and 2nd December 2002, the AMIB mandate had to be extended twice to 
facilitate the implementation of those agreements.
The continent’s efforts in the search for peace in Burundi demonstrated yet a continuous change 
in African leadership style. Resolution of Burundi crisis was a challenge to this change. First, it 
showed a growing sense of responsibility among African leaders in attending to African conflict 
problems. Secondly, the crisis revealed an unraveled resolve and commitment of African leaders of 
riding the continent from unending deadly conflicts. The political will is always there but is 
traumatised by the continent’s lack of resources to perform conflict resolution undertakings hence 
reliance on foreign resources. This unfortunately led the OAU/AU activities in Burundi to depend 
on donations from the developed world. In this regard, even its role in the post-conflict peace 
building in Burundi has been minimised as it was forced to ask the UN to take up its activities. All 
in all, the continental body has made a name of itself that it is ready for a change and takes the 
challenge of political dispensations and of conflicts in Africa.
4.3 UN Involvement in the Burundi Peace Process
The United Nations is the body charged with the maintenance of peace and security globally. 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter mandates the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to take 
appropriate measures when the imminent threat to international peace and security is obvious. 328
The UN immediately condemned the military for overthrowing the legitimate government and 
assassination of President Ndadaye. The Secretary General sent his Undersecretary James Johan to 
Burundi (from 27 to 29 October 1993) to assess the situation. After receiving his report which 
included a request from deposed Burundi’s Prime Minister for peacekeeping force, the UN 
  
326 Ibid  
327 Ibid p.5
328 Also see chapter  I of the UN Charter Purposes and Principles as well as chapter V Security Council Functions and 
Powers 
106
appointed Ahmed Ould Abdallah329 to lead a team tasked to find a political solution to the Burundi 
conflict. On 16 November 1993, the Security Council reiterated its condemnation of the abrupt and 
violent interruption of the democratic process initiated in Burundi and demanded the immediate 
cessation of acts of violence.
The UN efforts between 1993 and 1994 proved not only very crucial but, indeed very fruitful. In 
collaboration with the OAU and the regional efforts, it succeeded in decreasing political tension 
and, to some extent, reducing violence. Among the remarkable success was the creation of a 
conducive environment which led to the successful election of the new President Cyprian 
Ntaryamira later in January 1994 and the inauguration of a civilian  government in February. When 
President Ntaryamira died in a plane crash the UN team was able to successfully spearhead the 
creation of the Convention Government330 which later paved the way for the election of President 
Sylvester Ntibantunganya in September the same year.
The convention Government, however, later became a liability. A critical examination on the 
Convention Government reveals a number of weaknesses. First there was lack of a comprehensive 
political and security evaluation.331 This led to a lack of proper conceptualisation of the conflict 
scenario. Furthermore, the agreement for the convention government completely changed the 1993 
political mandate set by the election.332 This led to conflicts, rifts and squabbles within Hutu parties 
which further weakened the Convention Government.       
When the UN political initiative failed, the political and security situation in Burundi continued to 
deteriorate. The situation was more complicated following the events in Rwanda which spread into 
Burundi itself as well as into the then Zaire. The situation worried the UN, and it started 
contemplating a military option.333 This consideration was mainly necessitated by its inaction in the 
Rwandan crisis. In spite of constant calls, the UN ignored the situation and let killings to unabatedly 
take place. However, as it was in the Rwandan case,334 the key players, the US and France, 
frustrated the UN’s decision to send a peacekeeping mission to Burundi. Though the two had not 
vetoed it, they never gave it the necessary support.  Under such circumstances, the UN 
circumvented its efforts in establishing a small mission in Burundi and liaising with OAU mission 
which comprised a military component.
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Between August 1995 and October 1996, the UNSC passed several resolutions on Burundi which 
underscored the world body’s commitment in achieving peace in Burundi. Among these were, 
Resolution S/RES/1012(1995) which requested the Secretary General to urgently establish an 
International Commission of Inquiry which among others was to establish the facts relating to the 
assassination of the President of Burundi on the 21st October 1993, the massacres and other related 
serious acts of violence which followed. 335
Resolution S/RES/1040 (1996) first acknowledged the continued deteriorating situation in 
Burundi and the threat that the situation posed to the stability of the entire region. In view of this, 
the Security Council resolved to remind the authorities in Burundi of their responsibility as far as 
security of international personnel and of refugees and internally displaced persons was 
concerned.336 The council indeed expressed its readiness to consider imposition of measures under 
the charter of the United Nations, including a ban on the supply of all arms and related materials 
and travel restrictions and other measures against those leaders in Burundi who continue to 
encourage violence.337  
In the addendum of the Report of the Secretary General on the situation in Burundi of October 
1996, issued on 2nd November, the Secretary General highlighted the danger of the new 
developments in eastern Zaire to make the situation in Burundi, where civil war and ethnic conflict 
continue, become a secondary issue.338 This however never received the anticipated result as the 
war in Zaire changed the attention of the major players following the huge humanitarian and 
security impact the latter had on the region. 
After the failure of its political initiative, which was led by the Secretary General’s special 
representative, though not the only one to have failed, the UN efforts like those of others were 
geared to prevent killings and other ethnic related violence and encourage parties to negotiate the 
solution to the conflict. And in this case, when peace negotiations started, the UN actively 
participated and collaborated with the Heads of the Regional Initiative as well as the AU providing 
necessary assistance to the process. These included expertise in various fields on issues which 
arose, assisting and engaging parties during negotiations, coordinating and rallying efforts in the 
sourcing of resources.
After the successful signing of The Burundi Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, the UN 
became part and parcel of the implementation of the Agreement.  The Secretary General sent a 
multidisciplinary assessment mission in Burundi between 16th and 27th February 2004 to conduct 
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appropriate preparatory work and assessment on how the UN might provide the most efficient 
support for the full implementation of the peace Agreement. Following this mission’s report, under 
Chapter VII the UN Charter, the Security Council in its Resolution 1545 of 21 May 2004, 
established the United Nations Office in Burundi (ONUB) in order to support and assist the 
Burundians to comprehensively implement the Peace and Reconciliation.339
The office had close working relations with the Regional Initiative, the AU and the facilitator-
South Africa in securing a smooth transitional period and conclusion of ceasefire agreements 
between the government of Burundi and the various rebel groups which were not part of the Arusha 
Agreement.340 The office indeed coordinated and provided abundant support on the national 
elections marking the end of the transitional government.
In one of its major decisions on Burundi, the United Nations Security Council, later in May, 
accepted the recommendation that it should deploy troops to Burundi and made announcement that 
from 1st June 2004 the AMIB would become UN troops.341 In this regard the number of troops 
would be increased to around 5600.   
When the Mandate of ONUB expired on 31st December 2006, the Security Council through its 
resolution 1719 of 25 October 2006 established the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB)342
which is headed by the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General. The office stated 
operation in January 2007.   
Burundi became the first country to benefit from the UN Peace Building Fund following the 
declaration of its eligibility on 13 October 2006.343 This followed the meeting between the 
Secretary-General’s acting special representative for Burundi Nureldin Satti and the Peace Building 
Commission. The fund will support various programs including good governance, strengthening of 
the rule of law and ensuring community recovery. 
Burundi conflict has yet exposed the world body’s inherent conflict of interests among its 
permanent members of the Security Council. When Burundi really needed the support it deserved 
from the UN, the latter did not come with all its potential at its disposal to support it. All the 
Secretary General’s intended plans at the height of the crisis namely military assistance failed 
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because it lacked diplomatic as well as political support from the United States and western 
countries led by France.344
With the strong international pressure, willingness and commitment to act was necessary, the 
United Nations opted for short term political solutions which ultimately failed as discussed 
previously. However, after this failure, the UN overwhelmingly supported the Regional Initiative 
and other players until the signing of the peace agreement. As guarantor of the agreement, the UN 
plays a central role in implementing the agreement in particular and the post conflict peace building 
activities in general.  
In Burundi itself, the work of the United Nations was affected by lack of security. This made it to 
depend heavily on the government forces for its security.345 As a result heavy presence of the 
former in the work of the UN made the people suspect the UN’s activities. 
4.5 Non-governmental Organizations
Of late, the involvement of NGOs in conflict situations has not only become significant but has 
also taken a new turn. Those which were traditionally dealing with relief services have now moved 
from merely being the instruments of providing relief services to the victims of conflicts to having 
become part of the instruments of conflict resolution. There has arisen a type of NGOs which 
engage themselves in human welfare in the form of promoting democracy and conflict resolution. 
Such NGOs have increasingly become acceptable and have successfully won the confidence of the 
conflicting parties. These NGOs, have sometimes successfully managed to achieve positive results. 
In the context of the Burundi conflict three NGOs were involved though in varied degree, namely; 
The MNF, The Carter Centre-named after the former US president Jimmy Carter and The Saint 
‘Egidio - a catholic mission based in Rome. The three institutions engaged themselves in different 
levels as well as with different conceptualisations of the conflict and thus influenced their 
approaches to its resolution. The contribution of the MNF was dealt with in chapter two. Below the 
study examines the role of other two NGOs.      
4.5.1 Saint ’Egidio   
It is appropriate to start with a brief analysis of how this organisation got involved in Burundi.  
The room for the Saint ‘Egidio entry into mediating the conflict was created by the fact that 
international players like the EU, the US and, even the UN, for various individual reasons, adopted 
different approaches contrary to that of continental and regional initiative. While the latter had 
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adopted sanctions to pressurise the Burundi government, the former invented what they called 
working with ‘moderate’ forces. 
This meant that the West and the UN, the latter with the influence of the former, opted to work 
with President Buyoya whom they regarded as a ‘moderate’. So being a moderate, they gave him 
“the benefit of doubt, on the contrary, the regional leaders took a clear position against the military 
coup.”346 In this respect, they strongly supported Saint ‘Egidio’s initiative and did participate during 
the four rounds of talks held.347 Furthermore, it is alleged that South Africa attended the talks and 
later on Mwalimu’s top aide, one Felix Mosha too participated.348 This weakened the continental 
and regional efforts and paved the way for Buyoya to run away from the Regional Initiative. The 
Saint ‘Egidio engagement lasted almost a year from 1996 to mid 1997. 
It is worth noting, for our later discussion, that while externally the Saint ‘Egidio was trying to 
mediate the conflict, internally new political developments were going on which were part and 
parcel of the ‘brokering’ of peace. This was known as the ‘internal partnership’ which was mainly a 
search for a political compromise between the military government and FRODEBU. Critical 
analysis of this partnership leads to the conclusion that it was a strategic invention by the military 
aimed at accomplishing two main functions. First, it was meant to justify the coup d’etat and 
legitimatise it. With the fulfillment of the first function, that could pave the way for a second one, 
which was, justifying Buyoya’s presidency.        
The Rome initiative ended when the parties reached a stalemate on the very first item of the 
seven-point agenda. This was on the restoration of the constitution and the civil institutional order. 
Both parties had different views. While the government opted for a new constitution, CNDD/FDD 
was in favor of the 1992 constitution.349 After the Saint ‘Egidio’s debacle despite the strong support 
of the Western powers, for obvious reasons, the only alternative was to revert back to the Regional 
Initiative under Mwalimu Nyerere where the former’s  agenda list formed the basis for the all party 
negotiations which took over  the process. 
The Saint Egidio initiative, however, obstructed the Regional Initiative which was already 
underway. A number of things contributed to the failure of the Saint Egidio’s initiative. On the top 
of the list is the involvement of only two parties - The Buyoya military government and the main 
opposition group - the CNDD. Secondly, its initiative was done mainly behind the scene with total 
‘secrecy’ only to be revealed when the parties failed to agree on the key issues. Thirdly, the 
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organisation lacked adequate knowledge of the Burundi conflict which was intractable unlike the 
one it had concluded in Mozambique. 
Fourthly, both protagonists were not genuinely determined to negotiate. The military government, 
as it has been pointed out in the previous section, used the Rome initiative as a way of avoiding 
regional pressure and at the same time buying time hoping to strike a deal on internal partnership 
which was seen by some quarters as not only unique, but rather viable democratic arrangement to 
the Burundi conflict.350 Fifthly, the mediators as well as their supporters underestimated CNDD by 
just assuming that it could be content to join the government on a general political deal, something 
which had proved wrong.351
Assessing Saint ’Egidio’s interests as to its involvement in Burundi’s conflict is not straight 
forward. Unlike in Mozambique where its involvement could be traced on its earlier contact with 
government on the normalisation of relations between the church and the government,352 in Burundi 
it could also be the same. This is because the church has been at feuds with the government since 
the era of Bagaza as the former had been critical on the government’s conduct and on the handling 
of ethnic issues. On many occasions, as seen in chapter two, the church was regarded as pro-Hutu. 
Therefore, whether its entry was by invitation or by its own proposition, the spillover results of its 
engagement would have been that of mending relations between the government and the church.  
Now follows the discussion on the role of Carter Centre. 
4.5.2 The Carter Centre
The Carter Centre’s approach to the Burundi conflict took a wider perspective. That is, it 
regarded the conflict as a regional problem which needed a regional solution. Within Carter’s 
conceptualisation, the conflict included the then Zaire, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. The thrust of 
this conceptualisation reflected US interests in the region at that time; namely interests of US 
multinationals in Zaire and US political and diplomatic interests in Uganda and Sudan.353
The strategy of the Carter’s initiative was to involve regional leaders and seek approval and 
support of the continental body. As discussed in chapter two, under this initiative, two famous 
summits were held - one in Cairo on 29th November 1995 and then followed by another in Tunis, 
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Tunisia from March 11-18 the following year.354 This is where Mwalimu Nyerere got involved in 
the process and it can also be argued that the Region Initiative owes its initiation in these efforts by 
Carter.
The Cairo Summit was attended by Heads of State and Government of Rwanda, Burundi, 
Uganda, and Zaire, and a representative from the government of Tanzania. The summit ended by 
issuing a statement decrying genocidal and exclusionary politics in the region and pledging joint 
efforts to rid the region of conflicts as well as ethnic and politically motivated violence.355 The 
second summit, despite having devoted more time to the Burundi conflict, only came up with the 
expanded Cairo statement which called for leaders in the region to end hostilities and regain their 
confidence on each other. While the summit agreed to convene in the future, this did not happen. 
This meant the end of the Carter initiative. 
While the two Summits did not produce any significant results as anticipated, they did contribute 
to the course of the Burundi Peace Process. They gave the conflict a wider conceptualisation which 
later proved appropriate as it helped to shape the regional leaders’ approach to the conflict. 
Secondly, the initiative helped to put the issue of Burundi in the limelight of international arena. It, 
in short, kick started the new developments in the search for a solution to the Burundi conflict.
4.6 The role of other Actors
This section concentrates mainly with two actors; the US and the EU. The interests they had in 
the region and their influence in the UN Security Council made them important actors. As indicated 
in the previous chapters, the US interests were both economic and diplomatic and were tied to its 
interests in Zaire and Uganda. The European Union’s interests were also economic in line with its 
members. But also within European Union there are members with special interests in Burundi and 
the region due to their colonial relationships. These are France and Belgium.  Below we briefly 
examine the role played by each. 
4.6.1 The Role of United States in the Burundi Peace Process
The role of the United States in solving the Burundi crisis can be looked at two levels. These are 
the levels of its permanent membership in the UNSC and its own  foreign policy practice as a state.  
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Both at the United Nations and as a country, the US was against the military takeover in Burundi 
and condemned the assassination of president Ndadaye. It supported UN resolutions against the 
coup plotters and also called for immediate restoration of peace. As a country, it took various 
measures, though with some reservations, to express its disapproval of the military which had 
ousted and killed an elected president.
Immediately after the 1993 coup in Burundi, President Clinton appointed and sent a special 
envoy, Howard Wolpe to Burundi to try to find a resolution to the crisis. The US declared that it 
would not tolerate governments instituted through intimidation and would never cooperate with 
such governments. It immediately stopped development aid and military training to the country. 
However, the US continued to provide humanitarian aid.
When Buyoya toppled President Ntibantunganya in July 1996, the latter ran for his life by 
seeking refuge at the residence of the US ambassador. This put the US government at the centre of 
the crisis. The US insisted that Ntibantunganya should be involved in any political process leading 
to the solution of the crisis. If not, president Ntibantunganya had to be allowed to seek refuge in a 
foreign country.
When the regional leaders imposed sanctions, the US government initially supported them and 
applauded the decision because of its conviction on democratic governance and its zero tolerance of 
military regimes. However, hardly two months after, the country’s Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher openly opposed them and lobbied the Regional Heads to relax the sanctions claiming 
that the military regime had partially achieved the political conditions set by the leaders.356  
According to Weissman, this was aimed at bolstering Buyoya against Tutsi extremist hardliners.357
This was due to the fact that the US government and some of the western nations categorised
Buyoya as a ‘moderate’ among the extremists, thus deserving leniency. This implied an indirect 
support of the military regime and legitimisation of Buyoya’s claim that “the coup was necessary to 
stem the bloodshed”.358
On the other hand, when the UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali proposed an 
international humanitarian intervention, the US did not fully support it. It neither gave diplomatic 
nor political support it deserved.359 This might have been attributed to two factors namely; its 
failure in Somalia and dissatisfaction with Boutros Ghali.360 Having ignored the UN initiative, the 
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US hurriedly backed the request from the Heads of Regional Initiative for the establishment of a 
regional force to be financed by the West but the program did not take off.
With the moderate view on Buyoya, the US government saw itself concentrate its efforts on 
internal political solutions involving the military regime, the FRODEBU and the CNND, a political 
movement-cum rebel-army led by former FRODEBU Minister Leonard Nyangoma. This 
culminated into the entry to mediation by the Saint Egidio which involved the military government 
and the CNDD. The mediation talks were held in Rome with strong backing by the US and its 
European allies at the detriment of the Regional efforts.  
When the parties reached a stalemate and the talks collapsed, and paved the way for regional 
efforts, the US continued with its diplomatic efforts. However, it concentrated much on 
humanitarian relief services under United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
by collaborating with different NGOs and United Nations Agencies. It seemed that the US 
government’s concentration on humanitarian activities was shaped by the increasing pressure from 
civil organisations in the US361 which were pushing for more US involvement in solving the 
Burundi conflict. Indeed, the US lawyers’ verdict that what was happening in Burundi was genocide 
made the government increase its presence but not to concede to the lawyers’ interpretation of the 
events.
When peace talks under the Regional Initiative started again in June 1998, the US lent its support 
though with some reservations as was the case with other western nations who doubted the 
facilitation of the Arusha peace talks. However, it continued to pressurise Buyoya to continue with 
negotiations in Arusha and talks with the rebels. While attending Mwalimu’s funeral on October 
1999 in Dar es Salaam, the US Foreign Secretary Madeleine Albright insisted to Buyoya that the 
talks had to continue amid escalations of rebel attacks around Burundi capital.362
It was therefore after Mandela’s takeover of the mediation role that the US’ presence was mostly 
felt in the peace process. Firstly, the US lobbied for Mandela’s appointment363 and secondly, in a 
bid to invigorate and attract international attention, the US president was one of Mandela’s invitees 
to the February 2000 session of the Arusha peace talks.  
  
361 Many human rights organizations in the US were of the opinion that the US government is not doing much on Burundi 
crisis particularly on human rights despite the fact that the government had listed Burundi government and rebels among 
those nations in severe violation of human rights. See also Burundi: Foreign policy a web source 
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/World-Leaders-2003/Burundi-FOREIGN accessed on 26 February 2007
362 BBCNEWS “US urges Burundi peace talks” Friday, October 22,1999 A web source 
http://news.bbc.uk?2/hi/africa/482169.stm accessed on  13 August 2006 
363 See ICG Report No. 13,August 2000.Op. Cit  p. 11
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The participation of President Clinton, although through digital communication, made a 
significant mark in US involvement in Burundi peace. This was followed by an increased support364
to the Arusha peace negotiations as promised by President Clinton in his speech. 
In Burundi, the US government continually committed itself to providing humanitarian support to 
the civilians. Overtime, particularly after the signing of the Peace Agreement, the programs were 
expanded to include among others, promotion of good governance, the rule of law and human
rights, democratic values and poverty reduction.365 Other programs included strengthening and 
building local capacity through leadership training. These programs were undertaken with the 
collaboration of more than eighteen NGOs and UN agencies. On the implementation of the 
agreement, it supported the transitional programs such as disarmament and demobilisation of rebel 
groups. In 2003, it provided USD 6.2 million to support AMIB operations in Burundi.366
This signifies the country’s policy objective which is to assist Burundi people to achieve just and 
durable peace, strategically to encourage budgetary transparency and accountability, private sector 
development, fight against HIV/AIDS and promoting community based livelihood security.367  
During this period of peace building in Burundi, the US in collaboration with other actors 
continues to support the process as part of its efforts to promote peace and stability in the Great 
Lakes Region as a whole. The US believes that durable peace in Burundi will strengthen regional 
stability and democratic system in the region.368
The US involvement in the Burundi peace process expresses two realities of current American 
approach to conflict resolution in Africa. Firstly, since the Somali debacle, the US is unwilling to 
send troops in conflict area in Africa. Secondly, strategic and economic interests determine the 
degree of US involvement. Burundi had minimal of the two, hence lack of enthusiasm to act.
For example, during the 1972 Burundi massacres, the US involvement was second to none. There 
were extensive diplomatic activities between the Washington and US missions in Burundi, Kampala 
and Adis Ababa. The US exerted pressure on both the Burundi government and the then OAU 
Secretary General Nzo Ekangaki. It categorically told Burundi government that what it was doing in 
  
364 According to Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, The US donated USD 1m by November 2000 against only USD 
400,000.00 in previous years. This made the US third in the list of highest donors in that year after the Netherlands (USD 
1.25m) and the United Nations (USD 1.097m) 
365 For detail on this programs see USAID Burundi Budget, A web source: 
http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/afr/bi.html accessed on 4th April 2007. See also Department of States, 
“Africa: Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The Record 2004-2005”. A web source 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/shrd/2004/43104.htm accessed on  15 February 2007
366 See statement of the US Ambassador to the United Nations at the Security Council meeting on December 4, 2003. A 
web source http://missions.un.int/03print_249.htm accessed on 26 February 2007
367 USAID Burundi Annual Report FY 2005, 16 June 2005, p. 4. A web source http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf/PDACD858pdf 
accessed on 12  Dec 2006 
368 Ibid.
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Burundi was similar to what white southern African regimes were doing to blacks.369 It also 
cautioned OAU Secretary General of the danger of regarding Burundi issue as internal while it had 
spillover effects to its neighbours.370 It called for international intervention and even offered some 
solutions.
The US interests during this period, apart from cold war competition of spheres of influence, was 
economic speculations on the mineral discoveries in Burundi. The note to the then Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger, from the National Security Council, although it acknowledged progress 
made by Burundi authorities, the need for resumption of its bilateral relations was important to 
further the US interests. It noted: “there is evidence of major new mineral discoveries in Burundi, 
and the US government would want to be in a position to support the efforts of American co-
operations seeking concessions to exploit these discoveries”371  
It seems the humanitarian emphasis of the US involvement in Burundi was response to the 
increased pressure from American civil societies including human rights lawyers who demanded 
more actions because according to them killings which were taking place in Burundi that time 
constituted genocide.
Non support of regional sanctions and the UN contingent plans on one the hand and generally 
lack of strong actions against the military rule in Burundi made Weissman to conclude that the US 
lacked a fully coherent policy that could provide effective leadership to help resolve the conflict.372  
4.6.2 The Role of the European Union in the Burundi Peace Process
The European Union (EU) formed and still forms part of the many political and diplomatic efforts 
toward bringing peace and stability in Burundi. The EU involvement was significant in two ways. 
First, because its membership comprises three countries with historical ties with Burundi and 
secondly, the human rights advocacy which forms part of the guiding principles in this European 
body made its presence unavoidable in the Burundi crisis.
  
369 ‘Subject: Burundi Ambassador Conversation with Assistant  Secretary Newson’ A US Department of State’s Dispatch 
[Adis Ababa, Kinshasa, Kigali, Dar es salaam, USUN YY, Rome, Brussels]  June 22nd 1973 web source: 
http://www.state.gov./r/ho/frus/noxon/06/html visited on 22nd November 2006
370 ‘Burundi Problem and the OAU’ a Department of State note to US ambassador to Ethiopia, June73/Rush [a declassified 
material] accessed from web http://www.state.gov./documents/organization/66748.pdf visited on 22 November 2006. See 
also   “ Comments on Recent Disturbances in Burundi”  a note from Ambassador T.D Melady, US Ambassador to Uganda, 
May 15,1973,  US Department of State Archives Vol. E.6 Foreign Relations 1969-1976,Documents on Africa [declassified 
material]web source http://www.state.gov/r/ho/frus/nixon/06/67268.html visited  22nd November 2006  
371 “Subject: US Policy toward Burundi” a memorandum from H. Horan of National Security Council to Henry Kissinger 
Jan 1, 1974, Memorandum 143(cf 1330x) [a declassified material] web source: 
http://www.state.gov./r/ho/frus/noxon/06/html visited on 22nd November 2006
372 Weissman (1997) Op.Cit 
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Burundi was first under German sphere of influence until the end of World War I when the 
country became a trusteeship under Belgium until its independence in 1962. France as patron of 
French- speaking countries, has a long and close bilateral ties with the post independence Burundi 
regimes despite all the political and ethnic motivated violence. While German ties with Burundi are 
more or less casual, Belgium and especially France relations with central African countries is much 
closer.
Therefore, the EU activities in Burundi greatly reflected both historical ties of some of its prime 
members and also human rights issues which the body upholds. When the 1993 coup d’etat took 
place the EU condemned it and put some efforts to find a political solution to the problem. Its 
efforts also reflected or were influenced by the opinion of its members who are also permanent 
members of the UN Security Council like France, Germany and United Kingdom.
The EU exerted pressure to the military and the government to uphold and observe human rights 
and return the country into normalcy. It supported internal partnership under The Convention of 
Government signed by main political parties in 1994. Early 1996 it appointed Aldo Ajello as 
Special Representative who served until March 2007.373 No sooner had this appointment was made 
than it offered to organise national debate, assisted UN Human Rights Centre in Burundi with about 
USD 3million and provided funds for OAU mission.374 However, in April the same year, the EU 
Commissioner for Human Rights Affairs warned that the EU and the US would have to suspend 
their assistance to Burundi if no progress was made to peace and stability.375 This followed the 
Commissioner’s visit to Burundi where concerns were raised over gross human rights violations 
and growing insecurity.  
Throughout this period until the coup in July 1996, the EU efforts were geared towards an end of 
the political and ethnic violence and violations of human rights. The diplomatic efforts were 
revolving around the UN corridors and European cities where members seemed to have no strong 
opposing views on how to go about the crisis.
The 26 July 1993 coup made the EU suspend all development aid, save humanitarian one.376 In 
September the European Parliament passed a resolution asking member states not to recognise the 
military government in Burundi. The parliament indeed supported the sanctions imposed to Burundi 
by the regional Heads who met on 31st July 1996. Generally, on the outset, the sanctions were well 
received with EU members and praised African leaders for becoming more responsible to African 
problems as noted in the statement: “the wider international community, including the US and key 
  
373 The EU press information http://ue.eu.int/ucDocs/cms_Data/doc/PreesData/en/Sg/85499.pdf accessed on 31st March 
2007




European states greeted the efforts of regional leaders to impose solutions on Burundi through a 
combination of economic pressure and negotiations”377
However, it did not take long before some of its key members started to question the wisdom of 
imposing sanctions and argued for their removal. This included France which in March 1997 
publicly denounced them. Taking the lead, France also did not veto The UN Secretary General’s 
contingency plan in Burundi but shied away from fully supporting it. As Weissman commented, 
France’s position reflected a subtle balance of interests. On the one hand, it was its identification 
with the political interests with those of Tutsi elites and on the other hand, the embarrassment it 
faced in Rwanda by supporting Hutu elites.378 So France was hesitant to act otherwise so were other
members of the EU. 
In spite of this, emphasis continued on providing Burundi with the humanitarian aid aimed at 
easing human sufferings and promotion of human rights and preventing its violations. As to the 
support of regional initiative, the EU like the US strongly backed the Saint Egidio mediation in 
Rome379 and caused a break to the regional initiative. Nonetheless when the initiative failed it 
directed its efforts into the Regional Initiative.
It must be noted here that despite this turn around, the EU participation was not as strong as it 
became more and more critical of Nyerere’s mediation and Tanzania’s facilitation. Few of its 
members contributed substantially to peace talks380 until the demise of Nyerere in October 1999 and 
the mediation role was taken over by Mandela.   
During the February 2000 consultative meeting Arusha, France led the talks by urging other 
countries to resume economic assistance to Burundi instead of tying it with “the conclusion of 
political settlement”.381 It also pledged continued support of the regime in different sectors. 
However, Belgium, contrary to the French plea, tacitly said that it would only put Burundian case 
to the European Union if the Burundi government effectively concluded the dismantling of 
regroupment camps.382 The United Kingdom expressed doubt over the viability of development 
assistance without peace and stability. It added: “we are ready to support ...Burundi when 
conditions are right. You can ensure the stability and security necessary for development assistance 
  
377 ICG Report No. 1 28 April 1998. Op.Cit p. 1
378 Weissman,  (1998) Op.Cit p.12 
379 In 20 May 1997 through the Declaration, the EU welcomed President Buyoya’s announcement of Roma talks with 
CNDD and also argued the later to disband the regroupment camps. For details see Human Rights Watch Report 1997 Op. 
Cit. 
380
381 Message from the President of French Republic Jacques Chirac at the Arusha during Burundi Peace Consultative 
Meeting  12 February 2000 read by the Minister for International Co-operation HE Charles Josselin 
382 Statement delivered by Mr Louis Michel, Belgium Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Arusha 
Consultative meeting on Burundi Peace. 21 February 2000.
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to be effective. We will then support a resumption of assistance to Burundi”383 It must be noted 
however that the EU has always been the largest multilateral donor in Burundi.
The coming of Mandela invigorated the EU and its members. The period saw increasing 
participation of EU members in the facilitation of the process. The charismatic behaviour of the new 
facilitator and having borrowed a leaf from his predecessor’s experience, he was quick to 
accommodate some interests of external players and managed to bring them closer to the peace 
process.
This made availability of resources from the EU to the peace process more accessible hence 
facilitating the peace process. The support continued during the transitional period and post conflict 
rebuilding of Burundi. According to available records, the EU is the most significant multilateral 
donor which in 2005 provided about USD 146 million for budgetary support and other transitional 
activities.384
The EU’s efforts to provide a significant contribution to attaining a political solution to the 
Burundi conflict at the early stage of the conflict had not been marred by conflict of interests within 
some of its members. Being the provider of most of the multilateral and bilateral aid to Burundi, it 
could use this to press Burundi regime to effect changes. But lack of consensus and firm French 
support of Tusti interests made the organisation to play rather a more diplomatic profile during the 
crisis. Hence, the potential the EU had to influence change was not adequately used and instead at 
certain times used to obstruct the Regional Initiative.      
Conclusion
This chapter sums up that generally, at the beginning, the actors outside the continent played 
down the efforts of the Regional Heads and precisely obstructed the latter’s efforts. Inability of the 
UN to act because of the indifference of some of its key members made other players’ efforts 
ineffective. The decision by the US and its allies not to support the sanctions and the position they 
took over Buyoya as being ‘moderate’ complicated the process and frustrated regional efforts. First, 
both positions made the military regime very arrogant and ignored regional leaders. Precisely, the 
West preference of Saint Egidio initiative to Regional Initiative had almost put a halt on the latter. 
As the West has always been applying sanctions in different cases by rejecting those imposed by 
the regional leaders, the Burundi government interpreted Regional leaders’ decision as unjust and 
irrational. This created hatred between Burundi and its neighbors which were members of the 
Regional Initiative. Had the sanctions been totally supported, Burundi peace could have been 
achieved much earlier and perhaps reduced the damage caused by the military regime. 
  
383 Speech by Hon. Peter Hain (MP), Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office at the Opening of the Burundi 
Peace consultative meeting, Arusha 21 February 2000.
384 For details see USAID BURUNDI, BUDGET Op.Cit p 2.
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However, after the failure of Saint Egidio and the UN interventions, the US and its allies who are 
members of the EU joined hands with those of the region to finding the lasting solution of the 
Burundi conflict. Being Burundi’s major donor, the EU is now playing a pivotal role in supporting 
peace building in the country. But the fact is that the multiplicity of players had a negative impact 
on the peace process. Lemarchand notes that the involvement of a large number of external actors 
slowed the process because of different interpretations of the nature of the conflict, stemming 
different agenda and strategies thus presenting the parties with ample opportunities for 
manipulations.385
  





This chapter summarises the main points of the study, enlists some challenges facing Burundi 
peace building today and makes some recommendations. It also highlights lessons of experience for 
conflict resolution in Africa. Burundi has come a long way since the assassination of President 
Melchior Ndadaye in October 1993. A new democratically elected President was installed in 
August 2006 bringing to an end the transitional arrangements set out by the Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreement signed in August 2000. Various players, as noted, contributed variously 
in resolving the Burundi conflict. 
5.1 Summary and Conclusions
This study dealt mostly with the peace process, the actual negotiations and the agreement worked 
out under the Regional Initiative and mediation of Mwalimu Nyerere of Tanzania and Nelson 
Mandela of South Africa (chapter two) and the special role played by Tanzania, both as host to the 
peace negotiations and of most Burundi refugees including the rebel leaders (chapter three), and 
lastly the role of other actors namely the regional initiative (collective actions),the AU, UN, EU, US 
and various NGOs.    
With regard to the peace negotiations the following factors were highlighted. First, the first 
attempts to resolve the conflict failed because of the high stakes set by the two main protagonists 
UPRONA and FRODEBU. Second, the Tutsi extremists in collaboration with the army were a 
stumbling block to the smooth running of the negotiations. Third, the parallel process, that is, 
internal partnership and Arusha negotiations created loopholes which the military regime used to 
defy the Regional Initiative. Fourth, non participation of the main rebel groups was one of the major 
hindrances to the process. Fifth, the Tutsi parties’ lack of confidence on Mwalimu’ facilitation 
slowed down the solution of the conflict. Sixth, the agreement left very contentious issues namely 
transitional government and ceasefire negotiations which the former caused a delay of the 
installation of the first interim president of first transitional period. The ceasefire agreements were 
concluded after nearly six years since the signing of the Arusha Agreement. Despite these 
weaknesses, the transitional programs were implemented which gave the way for national elections 
which saw the new president elected in August 2006.    
On Tanzania’s role, the study found out that different factors determined its roles which are inter 
alia safeguarding its national interests which were threatened by the conflict and also humanitarian 
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or moral obligations as part of the international community. This confirmed the study’s hypothesis. 
The country played both mediation and facilitation roles as well as played host to the peace 
negotiations and Burundi refugees. Tanzania’s role continued after the signing of the agreement 
where it worked on the ceasefire negotiations and implementation of the Arusha agreement. The 
study further found out that what was considered as Tanzania’s ‘biasness’ over the Hutus by 
Burundi military regime was baseless as there was neither evidence of Tanzania’s support to the 
rebels nor that it favoured  the military option of Burundi crisis. To add to this, it was found that the 
military regime was unhappy with Tanzania’s firm support of economic sanctions and its decision 
to block arms export into Burundi. On the involvement of Mandela and South Africa, the study 
revealed that both Tanzania and the regional states were suspicious of the role of South Africa. 
They feared it would use the opportunity to penetrate into the sub-region both diplomatically and 
economically. It was indeed revealed that Jacob Zuma who took over from Mandela wanted to 
move the mediation process to South Africa though failed but the study showed that many 
negotiations later took place in South Africa. 
On the role of other actors, the following conclusions were reached. While the peace process 
involved many actors, the roles of those actors were indispensable although different factors 
influenced their interactions and therefore at certain stage hindered the process. While the Regional 
Initiative owned the Burundi Peace Process, lack of consensus among members on some issues due 
to varying interests slowed down the process. Among them were sanctions and the approach and 
type of solution of the Burundi conflict which had direct influence on the Rwandan and the DRC 
conflicts. On the UN role, despite constructive contribution to the process its role was affected by 
the interests of its veto members particularly the United States and France. The same was to the EU 
where interests of some of its members especially, France affected would - be constructive 
engagement of the institution. The OAU/AU contribution was crucial though handicapped by the 
lack of capacity and financial resources. The Carter engagement though brief, was instrumental. It 
shaped and kick - started the regional initiative. Saint Egidio’s role was seen as more or less of an 
obstructive engagement as it was an attempt of the military regime to dodge the regional pressure. 
But all in all, the involvement of these players showed that the Burundi conflict touched every 
peace-loving state and institution which contributed towards resolving it. Peace in Burundi owes 
much to the tireless efforts of these actors.                       
5.2 Challenges
While the conflict in Burundi can be said to have been resolved with the installation of the new 
President, the country remains with many challenges which could be described as challenges of 
peace building. Principal among them are the following. 
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5.2.1. Political tolerance 
After years of ethnic violence coupled by government impunity, parties in Burundi need to 
exercise high degree of political tolerance. This is one of the key factors if the country wants to 
achieve durable peace. The government must be exemplary on this by tolerating its critics.  The 
recently reported crackdown against media and some civil organisations386 and the seemingly 
political witch hunt following the revelations of the alleged coup and resignation of senior 
government officials send wrong signals. These acts are against the will of the people of Burundi 
who have been craving for peace and stability and labored for the peace agreement they have 
signed. 
5.2.2. Human right abuses
Violations of human rights have been part and parcel of Burundians lives. Some of the 
perpetrators of these abuses still continue for various reasons. Among them are members of security 
forces particularly the National Intelligence Services known in French as Service National de 
Renseignment (SNR). There are still reported arbitrary arrests and tortures made by SNR387 and 
indiscriminate abuses particularly in the rural areas. While the Arusha agreement provides for 
measures to be taken to address this problem, the speed with which those measures are taken does 
not match with the urgency of the problem. This, among others, calls for urgent instilling of the 
sense of professionalism in security forces and also sensitisation of the population to understand 
their civil and human rights
5.2.3. Reconciliation
This is another key area of which if appropriately handled would make Burundians realise what 
actually they were missing. Whilst, the Agreement had set out in protocol I how to achieve 
reconciliation, still measures envisaged in the protocol have not been taken. Despite many efforts by 
the UN the establishment of the institutions of transitional justice has not been affected. This is not 
only against the spirit of the Arusha agreement but the will of the majority in Burundi to heal the 
past wounds and build a new society.  
  
386 International Crisis Group, “Democracy and Peace at Risk” ICG Africa Report No.120, 30 November 2006 pp. 4-5. In 
this report, it alleged that the government responded after being accused of nepotism, corrupt and other malpractices.   
387 IRINNEWS 27 November 2006, UN official in Burundi quoted in the article “Burundi: Government under Pressure to 
Curb Continued Rights Violations”.27 November 2006. A web source 
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?Reportid=61660 accessed on 27 February 2007.  See also ICG Report No.120 30 
Nov.2006 Op Cit 
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5.2.4. Settlement of Returnees 
This involves their security, placement and recovery of their properties of which for the majority 
is land. The land issue poses a big challenge to the government. Hence extra care must be exercised.  
It is known that land left behind by the majority Hutus was taken by the Tutsis either with the 
assistance of the government or just by themselves. The current land law is controversial and denies 
ownership rights to those who left the country more than thirty years ago, precisely those who left 
during the 1972 violence.388 With more than 200,000 people leaving the country only in 1972, if not 
well handled they could be source of a new wave of ethnic tension. Another issue related to 
returnees is adaptation of children returning from exile into education system. Most of them have 
language problems, as some reports noted389 that during exile they were using different languages 
other than Kirundi and French. It becomes more complicated when some of these children cannot 
master even Kirundi
5.2.5. Human security
While it is true that the country is now moving from direct violence to peace, generally Burundi is 
facing its worst human insecurity ever in its post independence history. Coming from decades of 
political instability, the country’s economy has nosedived, placing majority of the population into 
extreme poverty, malnutrition is rife, infant mortality rate is high and the same to HIV/AIDS 
prevalence rate. Other human security challenges are child soldiers, spread of arms, and landmines 
mainly along its border with Tanzania. Urgent measures are needed to address these problems. 
Given Burundi’s situation, more and more support must be mobilised to assist the government.   
5.2.5. Openness and Transparency 
The government is facing another challenge of exercising its duties with openness and 
transparency. Transparency is important in confidence building with both the electorate and its 
development partners. Already complaints have been made by Burundi citizenry and the donor 
community. Lack of transparency in running government business, particularly on the part of 
procurement has attracted the concerns of the international community.390 In this wake of 
  
388 According to the current law, legal title reverts to whoever occupies the land for at least 30 years if no claims are made 
within three years of this period. For more information see “Burundi: Huge Challenges in Solving Land Crisis” 
IRINNEWS 23 November 2006 .A web source http://www.irinnews.org/Reports.aspx?ReportsId-61635 accessed on 20 
February 2007  
389 See IRINNEWS Report on Burundi: “Returnees Children face language Obstacles” of 2 December 2005. A web source 
http://www.irinnews.org/Reports.aspx?ReportId-57434 accessed on 20 February 2007
390 It has been reported that following Burundi’s indifference, key financial donors have frozen aid money. For example by 
September 2006, only 10 percent of fund earmarked for that year was paid. For details see ICG Reports No.120 op. cit p 11 
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allegations of nepotism and corruption and government’s indifferent response to enquiries even by 
the international community which is wholly supporting peace building in Burundi has led to 
strained relations between them. This is not a healthy situation because it undermines the good will 
of the international community towards supporting the course of Burundi’s people.  
5.3.0 Recommendations 
The holding of general elections and the inauguration of President Pierre Nkurunzinza in August 
last year marked the end of the critical phase in Burundi peace process. This was a result, as 
mentioned in this study, of heavy investment in terms of energy, resources - both human and 
material by both internal and external players. With the democratically elected President –a product 
of the new constitution, the country is now on the right track towards durable peace and stability. 
The holding of peaceful and successful elections is a sign of mutual trust and self confidence among 
Burundians and their determination to live in peace through accepting current political dispensation. 
However, this does not mean the country is now invulnerable to its decades-long ethnic violence. 
Putting into account the challenges, some already identified by this study, currently facing 
Burundian society, the study recommends the following:
5.3.1 Ensure equal share of peace dividends
With the new constitution which provides for equal opportunities for all, the current government 
must be proactive in its plans and actions to translate that ethnic equality enshrined in the 
constitution. While the previous Tutsi regime was denounced for excluding the Hutus, on the 
ground it also excluded other Tutsis from other clans. The government must avoid this by making 
sure that peace dividends do not reach only the political elites among ethnic divide but rather the 
majority commons.
5.3.2 Political engagements and consultations
Frequent political forums or consultations involving all stakeholders must be part of government 
strategies to forge political unity and national reconciliation. Despite the fact that the government in 
power was elected by the majority, involvement of defeated political parties must be part and parcel 
of the national strategy toward preventing resurgence of political and ethnic tensions.       
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5.3.3 Transitional Justice Measures must be Put in Place
As listed among the challenges, the establishment of transitional justice institutions as provided 
by the agreement must be done without delay. These measures are important to make sure that those 
in the government and among rebels pay or are held responsible for the atrocities committed before 
the peace agreement. One of the areas where these measures should be taken is on the attacks and 
atrocities against relief and international organisations. This includes killings of the staff of those 
institutions. There must be no amnesty for those committing these atrocities. This will act as a 
warning to prevent future occurrences.
5.3.4 Civil Society Involvement
The involvement in civil society must be given due priority. While little efforts were taken to 
involve civil society during the peace negotiations, its involvement at this stage does not need 
overemphasis. The government must take initiative to encourage, motivate, inspire and strengthen 
civil societies’ involvement in a more constructive manner through more freedoms of actions and 
means to implement constructive ideas in building new Burundian society. Civil societies such as 
those with peace building-oriented activities and community-based must be encouraged and 
strengthened through empowerment and provisions of means to coordinate their activities.
5.4.0 Lessons of Experience for Conflict Resolution in Africa
5.4.1 Handling of Internal Conflict
There is a need for African states and their institutions charged with conflict resolution to adopt a 
proactive approach. The lessons or experiences with Burundi conflict is that Africa is still reluctant 
to take appropriate actions at appropriate time when dealing with internal conflicts. The reason for 
being reluctant is similar to that of interference in internal affairs. It was only when the crisis had hit 
the boiling point when the continental body declared to take measures irrespective of Burundi’s 
sovereignty. This remained so despite the fact that Burundi conflict was inflicting serious 
humanitarian and security problems within its borders and beyond.
With the MCPMR in place, the AU must formulate means where internal conflicts and 
involvement of external states into those conflicts are transparently and openly discussed. Still AU 
is reluctant to discuss thorny issues like state intervention on other countries’ conflict like Rwanda 
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and Uganda involvement in DRC. While their involvement was a total violation of that country’s 
sovereignty, no stern measures were taken to reprimand them. This creates precedence to other 
countries to repeat such acts. The AU has to adopt a new strategy which is more open, transparent 
and accountable to the people and not to its top echelon. The current Zimbabwe problem can also 
serve as evidence of how ineffective the continent’s mechanism is for conflict resolution. This 
shows that the continental body is still not ready to act in a manner it is supposed to.   
5.4.2 Africa’s Foreign Dependency on Conflict Resolution
Africa must recognise the importance of investing in conflict prevention, management and 
resolution. While setting up conflict resolution institutions is a welcoming strategy to deal with 
conflicts in the continent making these institutions work is another thing. Experience from West 
Africa and recently in the Great Lakes Region has shown that there is a heavy dependence on 
foreign support. As a result there are frequent delays in implementing conflict resolution programs 
due to both conditionalities attached to such support or sometime withdrawal of support when 
conflict of interests arises. In this regard, the need for prior strengthening of these institutions is 
encouraged so as to avoid a fire-brigade approach which always affects the work of these 
institutions. One of the innovations is for Africa to design and adopt its own conflict resolution and 
management system which is cost-effective according to the continent’s socio-economic conditions. 
Among the reasons which make conflict resolution particularly peacekeeping operations difficult in 
Africa is the fact that the standards and terms used are those designed by the rich West which reflect 
their financial and technical capabilities, which do not match with continental realities.
5.4.3 Making Signatories to Agreements more Responsible and Accountable
The study has realised that there is a common perception built among players that enforcement of 
and guarantee of peace agreements is solely rested on international organisations like in the case of 
Burundi it is the UN and the Regional Initiative. The research recommends change on this. Efforts 
should be made to make the signatories who are parties to the conflict more responsible and 
accountable: that is by making such accords self-enforcing. By doing so, it will first instil a sense of 
ownership and secondly, it will relieve the external players of the burden involved in guaranteeing 
these accords.    
5.4.4 Deciding on Mediators and Peacekeepers
While the research acknowledges the rights and territorial integrity of states, when it comes to 
mediation and peacekeeping operations, the continental and respective regional bodies must have 
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the final say on who is to mediate and who is to take part in peacekeeping processes. It appears that 
parties to the conflict decide to reject decisions by the regional and continental bodies just because 
there is that opportunity but not with genuine reasons. The Burundi conflict mediation is a case in 
point. Whereas the Tutsi regime alleged that Nyerere was pro Hutu and rejected him when he died, 
they campaigned for Mandela and when Mandela became in charge of the process the Tutsi levelled 
the similar allegations against Mandela.     
5.4.5 Establishment of Internal Safe Zones
There is a need to widen the way the world views the refugee problem. Given the effects of 
refugees in host countries which include hostile relations between host countries and refugee 
countries’ of origin, declining support from international communities and instability they create in 
host countries, creating ‘safe zones’ remains the best option. This has various advantages which are 
inter alia preventing negative effects to other countries, avoiding diplomatic wrangles and 
preventing refugees being cut of from their cultural environment. Other advantages are making the 
incumbent regime more responsible to its people. The tendency today is that when people flee to 
asylum countries, the regimes in their countries of origin seem unconcerned with their plight and 
leave everything to the host countries and international relief organisations. Indeed, to make 
regimes in power more accountable, stern measures like holding part of their incomes to support 
those refugees must be instituted.
5.4.6 The Need for Responsible International Support
Based on the challenges facing Burundi, the need for international community to maintain its 
diplomatic and economic support is imperative. While the contribution of international community 
during peace negotiations and transitional period was encouraging, post elections Burundi still 
needs such support to accomplish peace building goals and objectives. 
In line with pledges, it is highly recommended that donors must be more responsible in their 
support. This means such support should go hand in hand with the regime’s implementation of the 
agreement. This is to avoid the previous situation where the oppressive regimes in Burundi were 
heavily supported by the international community391 despite committing huge human rights 
violation and posing threats to peace and stability in the region. The international community 
  
391 For details see Ndikumana, L “Institutional Failure and Ethnic Conflicts in Burundi” in African Studies Review, Vol. 
41, No. 1 April 1998 p.43 
129
should ensure that its support addresses structural causes of the conflict and prevent the 
perpetuation of structural inequalities392 by promoting inclusion, equitable distribution of resources, 
and access to social services and other peace dividends. 
5.4.7 Continued Monitoring of Events in Burundi
The international community and the Regional Initiative must make close monitoring of events in 
Burundi to avoid any other recurrence of ethnic motivated violence. In fact, Burundi must be put 
under surveillance commensurate to that of post-Nazi Germans. The regional Initiative should take 
the lead on this and through other regional arrangements like East African Community, which 
Burundi was recently admitted as a member, for close monitoring and to make sure the government 
and other players restrain from acts which will jeopardise peace and stability.
  
392 For discussion on this see Brachet, J & Wolpe, H “Conflict- sensitive Development Assistance: The case of Burundi”, 
Social Development Paper, Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction, Paper No.27 June 2005.pp.17-18 A web source 
http://www.wilsoncentre.org/topics/docs/WP27_web.pdf accessed on 3 March 2007
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